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ARTICLES
ORIGINALISM IS BUNK
MITCHELL N. BERMAN*
Critical analysis of originalism should start by confronting a modest puzzle: Most
commentators suppose that originalism is deeply controversial, while others complain that it means too many things to mean anything at all. Is one of these views
false? If not, how can we square the term’s ambiguity with the sense that it captures
a subject of genuine debate? Perhaps self-professed originalists champion a version
of originalism that their critics don’t reject, while the critics challenge a version that
proponents don’t maintain.
Contemporary originalists disagree about many things: which feature of the Constitution’s original character demands fidelity (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning); why such fidelity is required; and whether this
interpretive obligation binds judges alone or citizens, legislators, and executive officials too. But on one dimension of potential variability—the dimension of
strength—originalists are mostly united: They believe that those who follow some
aspect of a provision’s original character must give that original aspect priority over
all other considerations (with a possible exception for continued adherence to nonoriginalist judicial precedents). That is, when the original meaning (or intent, etc.)
is adequately discernible, the interpreter must follow it. This is the thesis that selfprofessed originalists maintain and that their critics (the non-originalists) deny.
* Copyright  2009 by Mitchell N. Berman, Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, the
University of Texas at Austin. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to
Larry Alexander, Dan Coenen, Dick Fallon, Rick Garnett, Jonathan Gingerich, Les Green,
Jeff Goldsworthy, Stephen Griffin, Mark Greenberg, Alon Harel, Don Herzog, Scott
Keller, Brian Leiter, David McGowan, Michael Rappaport, Lawrence Rosenthal, Neil
Siegel, Peter Smith, Jane Stapleton, and Ben Zipursky, and to participants at faculty workshops at the law schools of the University of Texas, the University of Pennsylvania, the
University of San Diego, the University of Georgia, and Columbia University. I am especially indebted to Larry Solum for sharing with me his manuscript, “Semantic
Originalism,” which contained detailed and penetrating critiques of this Article, and for
productive exchanges by email. David Bernard and Don Long provided excellent research
assistance.
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Non-originalists have challenged this thesis on varied wholesale grounds, which
include: that the target of the originalist search is undiscoverable or nonexistent;
that originalism is self-refuting because the framers intended that the Constitution
not be interpreted in an originalist vein; and that originalism yields bad outcomes.
This Article proceeds differently. Instead of mounting a global objection—one
purporting to hold true regardless of the particular arguments on which proponents
of originalism rely—I endeavor to catalogue and critically assess the varied arguments proffered in originalism’s defense.
Those arguments are of two broad types—hard and soft. Originalism is “hard”
when grounded on reasons that purport to render it (in some sense) inescapably
true; it is “soft” when predicated on contingent and contestable weighings of its
costs and benefits relative to other interpretive approaches. That is, hard arguments
seek to show that originalism reflects some sort of conceptual truth or follows logically from premises the interlocutor already can be expected to accept; soft arguments aim to persuade others to revise their judgments of value or their empirical or
predictive assessments. The most common hard arguments contend that
originalism is entailed either by intentionalism or by binding constitutionalism.
Soft arguments claim that originalist interpretation best serves diverse values like
democracy and the rule of law. I seek to show that the hard arguments for
originalism are false and that the soft arguments are implausible.
The upshot is not that constitutional interpretation should disregard framers’ intentions, ratifiers’ understandings, or original public meanings. Of course we should
care about these things. But originalism is a demanding thesis. We can take the
original character of the Constitution seriously without treating it as dispositive.
That original intents and meanings matter is not enough to render originalism true.
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1989 essay, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,1 Daniel Farber provided students of constitutional theory a
valuable service. Because the literature about originalism had
become “so voluminous,” Farber observed that “understanding the
current status of the debate ha[d] become a formidable task.”2 His
goal, accordingly, was “to offer a tourist guide” to the debate3—
sketching the principal arguments advanced for originalism along with
the most trenchant objections.
Much has changed over the ensuing twenty years. To start, the
literature has grown many times larger, fueled both by the emergence
of powerful new scholarly defenders of originalism and by the fact
that the current composition of the Supreme Court, most notably Justices Scalia and Thomas, gives originalist arguments a ready and
important audience. Moreover, these arguments have been trans1 Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989).
2 Id. at 1085.
3 Id.
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formed, as many self-described originalists have shifted their allegiance from original intent to original public meaning. For these
reasons (and perhaps for others), originalists can claim with some
plausibility that, despite its apparent refutation in the 1980s,
“[o]riginalism is now the prevailing approach to constitutional
interpretation.”4
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. While proponents
declare originalism to be dominant, indeed inescapable, critics marvel
that anyone takes it seriously.5 Newcomers to the debate, therefore,
are still likely to arrive perplexed. Indeed, given frequent complaints
that the originalist label is ambiguous and malleable,6 the uninitiated
might wonder whether any true controversy exists. It could be that
self-professed originalists champion a version of originalism that their
critics don’t reject, and that the critics challenge a version the proponents don’t maintain.
The time might seem ripe, then, for an updated version of
Farber’s Guide.7 As originalism comes closer to “working itself
pure,”8 however, we can better assess its progress. And that progress,
I believe, must be counted a disappointment. Notwithstanding their
enviable energy and commitment to the cause, advocates of
originalism have not made good on its core claim. Moreover, dispassionate analysis suggests that the prospects for greater success are slim
indeed. Or so I will argue.
This argument unfolds in three parts. Part I specifies
originalism’s core claim and situates it within a network of possibilities. The importance of this ground clearing can hardly be overstated
given that failure to carefully distinguish among the various forms of
4 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613
(1999). For a sampling of commentators who share this assessment, see Lawrence
Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process,
Procedural Innovation, and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (2007).
5 See, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 155–56 (2d ed.
2005) (characterizing “[t]he widespread attraction of ‘originalism’ [a]s one of the main puzzles about theories of constitutional interpretation,” and declaring it “quite a mystery why
originalism still has the scholarly (and judicial) support that it does”).
6 See, e.g., id. at 155 (“‘[O]riginalism’ is not the title of one particular theory of constitutional interpretation but rather the name of a family of diverse ideas, some of which are
actually at odds with each other.”); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 36 (1992) (“[I]t is difficult to state with precision just what originalism asserts, since commentators have characterized the theory in
varying and often inconsistent ways.”).
7 In the latest edition of his co-authored textbook, Farber’s Guide for the Perplexed,
see supra note 1, appears largely unchanged. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ch. 14 (2d ed. 2005).
8 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003).
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originalism “has tended to confuse fruitful discussion of the doctrine
and frequently caused interlocutors to talk past each other.”9 Because
“[t]he originalist debate has progressed without a clear statement of
the doctrine itself or an adequate account of the different versions in
which it can manifest itself,”10 Part I starts by revealing several distinct dimensions on which versions of originalism can and do vary.
Although assigning any particularistic content to originalism simpliciter will be contestable, I argue that the core originalist contention—
the contention that most fairly lays claim to the term “originalism”
when used without modification—is a strong thesis. As a first pass—
one that will require some clarification and qualification—originalism
maintains that courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions
solely in accordance with some feature of those provisions’ original
character.
To better appreciate this claim, observe that originalism is sometimes described as the theory that judges “should be guided by” the
Constitution’s original meaning (or the framers’ intent, or the like).11
A critical claim of Part I is that this captures contemporary originalism
only if taken to mean that judicial interpretation of the Constitution
must follow, or is bound by, the original meaning (or intent, etc.). If
the notion of guidance at work is looser and more advisory—
directing, for example, that judicial constitutional interpretation need
only take the Constitution’s original meaning “seriously”—then this
characterization fails to capture the form of originalism most commonly espoused by self-described originalists and most vigorously
contested by their self-described opponents.
The feature of the original character that is said to demand this
strong judicial solicitude varies across originalist theories. That is,
self-professed originalists may focus on framers’ intent, ratifiers’
intent, the dominant understanding of framers and ratifiers combined,
or the public meaning of the text. However, for purposes of evaluating contemporary originalism, this particular dimension of variability—variability with respect to the object of originalist concern—is
of secondary, even tertiary, importance. More illuminating is the distinction between varieties of originalism based on the character or
status of the arguments advanced in originalism’s support. I will dis9 Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation,
47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 257 (2002); see also David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of
the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479, 479–80 (1988) (expressing similar view).
10 Kavanagh, supra note 9, at 257.
11 E.g., id. at 255; Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L.
REV. 773, 773.
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tinguish between two such varieties, what I will call “hard originalism”
and “soft originalism.”
Briefly, originalism is “hard” when justified by reasons that purport to render it (in some sense) ineluctably true; it is “soft” when
predicated on contingent and contestable weighings of the costs and
benefits of originalism relative to other interpretive approaches. This
is an admittedly loose distinction. But the basic idea is this: Once we
define originalism with sufficient precision to permit confidence that it
is controversial, we can consider what resources originalists might
employ to convert opponents and skeptics. Hard arguments contend
that originalism reflects some sort of conceptual truth or follows logically from premises the interlocutor presumably already accepts; soft
arguments aim to persuade readers to revise their judgments of value
or their empirical or predictive assessments. Theorists who maintain
that interpreters “have no choice but to respect the original meaning
of [the Constitution’s] text”12 are hard originalists.
The arguments for hard originalism most commonly advanced
today depend upon particular views either about what it means to
interpret a text or about what it means to treat a constitution as
authoritative. They are canvassed and rejected in Part II. Virtually all
remaining arguments—those sounding in democracy, the rule of law,
the cabining of judicial discretion, and the like—are better understood, I suggest, as soft. That is not to deny that these arguments are
frequently presented as hard.13 But if we treat such arguments as
hard, their implausibility becomes evident on little reflection. It is
therefore more charitable to their proponents, as well as more fruitful,
to reimagine them as soft. They are critically assessed in Part III.
Together, these parts conclude that the arguments for hard originalism
are based on faulty logic or erroneous premises and that even the best
case for soft originalism is extremely implausible.
That’s the brief summary of what this Article hopes to accomplish
and how it proceeds. Let me emphasize three limitations on its scope
and ambition.
First, it does not provide an encyclopedic review of the
originalism debate. The literature on originalism is vast, and a thorough survey would fill books.14 Because this Article is partially
12

Barnett, supra note 4, at 635.
See infra Part III.A.
14 Among the best are BASSHAM, supra note 6; DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005); and
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
13
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intended, like Farber’s, to serve as an accessible introduction to the
debate—albeit an introduction with an attitude—exhaustiveness
cannot be attempted. Over the years, originalism’s critics have
argued, among other things: that the target of the originalist search—
be it intent, understanding, or public meaning—is undiscoverable or
(in the case of intent) nonexistent; that originalism is self-refuting
because the original intent or understanding was that the Constitution
ought not to be interpreted in an originalist vein; and that originalism
yields substantively bad outcomes. Seeking to rebut these charges,
originalists have contended: that the originalist object is frequently
discoverable; that original intentions regarding how the Constitution
ought to be interpreted either support originalism or are irrelevant;
and that the bad outcomes laid at originalism’s door have no bearing
on the proper interpretive method or follow from misreadings of the
history. Although each of these argumentative lines has been vibrant
at one time,15 I believe that they are now largely spent and, therefore,
are omitted or touched on only in passing. In short, although I hope
to offer a broad survey of the landscape, the analysis to follow is not
fully comprehensive, nor does it plumb to uniform depth. Arguments
by originalists or their opponents that have already been repeatedly
and adequately rebutted are treated more cursorily than those that
still warrant careful attention. In places, exhaustiveness is sacrificed
for digestibility.
Second, just as the descriptive aspect of this Article falls short of
comprehensiveness, its argumentative aspect cannot claim to be conclusive. I have already remarked that the argument of Part III does
not purport to present a logically inescapable case against soft
originalism. Furthermore, I don’t expect that the intentionalists I take
on in Part II will think themselves entirely without argumentative
room to maneuver. The debate over intentionalism—in law, literary
theory, and philosophy of language—has progressed for too long to
instill optimism that one side will soon, perhaps ever, believe itself
fully vanquished. What I offer is an outline of the argument against
originalism, fleshed out in substantial detail in places, more tentative
or promissory in others. Even if I fail to convince you that originalism
is ultimately untenable, I will consider my efforts largely successful to
the extent you accept: first, that the form of originalism that most of
its present-day proponents champion, and that most of its critics resist,
15 For a nice overview in addition to Farber, supra note 1, see generally Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). Much less comprehensive, but more recent, is
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
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is an exceedingly demanding thesis; and second, that the arguments
that the proponents have thus far advanced are inadequate.
Third, I do not propose or defend any particular normative
theory of constitutional interpretation. My more modest aim is to
facilitate more constructive argumentation about constitutional jurisprudence by dislodging a prominent interpretive theory that does not
warrant the fidelity of its many enthusiasts. I hope to show that we
can all care about framers’ intentions, ratifiers’ understandings, and
original public meaning without being originalists.
Moreover—to put all my cards on the table—I think originalism
(of the form that I challenge) is not merely false but pernicious as
well. It is pernicious because of its tendency to be deployed in the
public square—on the campaign trail, on talk radio, in Senate confirmation hearings, even in Supreme Court opinions—to bolster the
popular fable that constitutional adjudication can be practiced in
something close to an objective and mechanical fashion. To be
entirely clear, I suspect that this is a fable to which few academic
originalists subscribe; indeed, many have denounced it. But there is
little doubt that originalism is often used outside the academy to
pander to that American populist taste for simple answers to complex
questions. By thus nourishing skepticism, even demonization, of judicial reasoning that cannot be reduced to sound bite, originalism
threatens to undermine the judiciary’s unique and essential role in our
system of government.
I
WHAT ORIGINALISM IS
Originalism comes in many flavors; varied distinct theses are
fairly described as “originalist” in tighter or looser senses. Yet, as
Francis Bacon urged 400 years ago, “[I]t is almost necessary, in all
controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our
words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no.”16 Accordingly,
the challenge for those who would evaluate the truth of originalism as
a thesis concerning how the U.S. Constitution ought to be interpreted17 is to identify with greater specificity the claim under consideration, and to do so in a manner neither arbitrary nor idiosyncratic.
16 FRANCIS BACON, The Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human,
in 1 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 211 (Philadelphia, A. Hart 1871) (1605), quoted in
BASSHAM, supra note 6, at 17.
17 The “ought” in this sentence suggests that originalism is a normative thesis, and to a
substantial extent it is. Still, when it comes to constitutional theories, a neat divide
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A. Originalist Logical Space
1. Object
The most common way to categorize the varieties of originalism
tracks a familiar narrative.18 The first wave of contemporary originalists, led in the 1970s by then-Professor Robert Bork and Raoul
Berger, reacted against what they viewed as unjustifiable Warren (and
Burger) Court activism by advocating that courts focus on the original
intent of the framers. By the mid-1980s, however, criticism of intentbased interpretive theories, along with recognition that it was by
virtue of ratification that the Constitution became law, pushed many
in the growing originalist camp away from the framers in favor of the
ratifiers—and thus away from “intentions” and toward “understandings.” Yet it was not obvious that this move avoids all, or even any, of
the objections arising from skepticism that collective intentions exist.
Accordingly, the most prominent trend in originalist scholarship—one
perhaps datable to a 1986 speech by then-Judge Scalia19 and embraced
widely by originalists over the past decade—has been to emphasize
the original public meaning of constitutional provisions instead of anything in the minds of specific persons.20 Consistent with this story,
commentators frequently distinguish three types of originalism:
framers’ intent originalism, ratifiers’ understanding originalism, and
original public meaning originalism. This is a possibly useful classifibetween the normative and purely descriptive is usually elusive. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Choose a Constitutional
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 540–41 (1999); see also infra Part I.C.4 (discussing denial by
some originalists that they mean to express normative claims).
18 A good history appears in Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1134–48. See also
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 257 n.4 (2005) (endorsing account of Kesavan and
Paulsen, supra note 8). For similar tellings of the tale, see generally John Harrison, Forms
of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2003), and
Whittington, supra note 15.
19 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic
Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK app. C (1987) [hereinafter DOJ
SOURCEBOOK]. The shift from original intent originalism to original public meaning
originalism is traced to Justice Scalia’s address by Kesavan and Paulsen, supra note 8, at
1139, 1140 & n.90, and by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 & n.10 (2006).
20 In 1990, Bork himself endorsed this shift, explaining that his earlier references to
ratifiers’ understanding were merely “a shorthand formulation” for original public
meaning. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 144 (1990); see also id. at 218 (characterizing originalism as “seek[ing] . . . the
objective meaning that constitutional language had when it was adopted”).
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catory schema. But however familiar, it is neither the only possible
way to distinguish among originalist theses nor the most important.
2. Strength
If these three forms of originalism differ from one another with
respect to the object or focus of their inquiry, originalist theses can be
distinguished as well on what we might call the dimension of strength.
At the weakest end of the spectrum lies the view that the originalist
focus (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, original public
meaning, etc.) ought not to be excluded from the interpretive
endeavor. This view—what we might call “weak originalism”—maintains merely that the proper originalist object (whatever it may be)
should count among the data that interpreters treat as relevant.21 At a
polar extreme from weak originalism rest views that I will collectively
label “strong originalism.”22
Strong originalism, as I will use the term, comprises two distinct
subsets. Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis
holds that, whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public
meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target or touchstone. Call this subtype of strong originalism “exclusive originalism.”
It can be distinguished from a sibling view that is a shade less strong—
viz., that interpreters must accord original meaning (or intent or
understanding) lexical priority when interpreting the Constitution but
may search for other forms of meaning (contemporary meaning, best
meaning, etc.) when the original meaning cannot be ascertained with
sufficient confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant of
strong originalism “lexical originalism.”23
21 I believe that weak originalism properly claims a spot in originalist logical space
because the position it contests—“exclusive non-originalism” or “anti-originalism”—is
imaginable. Because that latter position is not a live competitor in contemporary debates,
however, readers might fairly doubt that weak originalism falls within the range of positions that anyone has in mind when employing the originalist label. As I will explain
shortly, I agree. For that reason, I will reject weak originalism as a candidate for the
meaning of originalism simpliciter. But that is not enough, I think, to eject it from the
space we are exploring. In any event, nothing about my argument depends upon including
weak originalism as a true subset of the class of views properly deemed originalist. If you
wish to exclude it at this early stage, feel free.
22 Stephen Griffin calls this same concept “exclusive originalism” and shares my assessment of its importance to contemporary debates. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting
Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187, 1197. Griffin’s article is especially valuable
for its insightful and persuasive critique of originalists for embracing “history without historicism”—for failing, in short, to adequately accommodate relevant changes in historical
context.
23 To be sure, exclusive originalists recognize that, for some constitutional provisions,
the original meaning (intent or understanding) cannot be identified to the requisite degree
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Together, weak originalism and strong originalism define a broad
terrain. Lying between these poles are theses maintaining, say, that
“ordinarily” or “presumptively” the contemporary interpreter ought
to follow the originalist object, even though that object is not lexically
prior to all other objects of inquiry, let alone that it should be pursued
to the exclusion of other objects. Call the class of theses in this space
“moderate originalism.”24
In the language of reasons, then, distinguishing originalist theses
on the dimension of strength produces a four-part classification.
According to weak originalism, that the originalist focus was X is a
reason to interpret the Constitution to mean X; according to moderate originalism, that the originalist focus was X is a weighty reason
to interpret the Constitution to mean X; according to lexical
originalism, that the originalist focus was X is a conclusive reason to
interpret the Constitution to mean X; and according to exclusive
originalism, that the originalist focus was X is an exclusive reason to
of confidence (whatever that might be) or that, even if the original object can be identified,
it is too vague or ambiguous to resolve a dispute. To put the point another way, for some
constitutional questions, no sufficiently determinate original meaning (intent or understanding) of the Constitution can be identified. Exclusive originalists prescribe two different courses in such cases. Some advise that courts should conclude, in the name of
majoritarianism, that the Constitution permits the governmental action in question. See,
e.g., BORK, supra note 20, at 166; Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner
on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1992); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret
the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006). Others would permit
courts to announce more determinate constitutional meaning with the proviso that, in so
doing, they would create new meaning for purposes of constitutional law but would not be
engaged in interpreting constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 4, at 645–46;
Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 640 (2005). Lexical originalists permit courts to announce constitutional meaning when the originalist
object is not discoverable and do not insist that, in such cases, courts are necessarily
engaged in something other than constitutional interpretation.
24 The term “moderate originalism” appears frequently in the literature. My use is, I
think, consistent with Farber’s, but not with others’. See Farber, supra note 1, at 1086 (“A
moderate originalist might well view . . . factors [other than original intent] as potentially
important, particularly when the evidence of intent is unclear.”). To Paul Brest, for
example, “moderate originalism” is not the view that original meaning has some form of
priority over non-original meaning short of true lexical priority. It is the view that interpreters should inquire into framers’ intent conceived at a relatively high level of generality.
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
222–23 (1980). Yet more confusingly, what Brest calls “moderate originalism,” Cass
Sunstein calls “soft originalism,” a term I will attach to an entirely different concept. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313 (1996)
(“[T]he soft originalist will take the Framers’ understanding at a certain level of abstraction
of generality.”). (And for a third meaning of “soft originalism” that differs from both
Sunstein’s and mine, see GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 9, which uses the term to denote the
ratifiers’ understanding originalism, specifically in contrast to the framers’ intent
originalism.) In short, to avoid confusion, readers well versed in the originalism literature
are especially cautioned to attend to my stipulated definitions.
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interpret the Constitution to mean X. To repeat, I propose to treat
lexical originalism and exclusive originalism as two variants of strong
originalism.25
3. Status
Of course, object and strength represent only two of the potentially vast number of dimensions in originalist logical space.
Originalist theses are also distinguishable, for example, on the basis of
what I call logical status. To see this, we could consider any thesis
describable on dimensions of object and strength. Take, for example,
lexical original intent originalism (the thesis that the Constitution
must be interpreted in accordance with the original intentions of the
framers in any case where that original intention is discoverable, to
some specified subjective confidence level). What, we might ask, is
the basis or grounding of this claim?
The proponent of this view could believe, merely, that such an
interpretive posture or rule is contingently optimal—that it produces a
better overall state of affairs, given current (and, perhaps, foreseeable) conditions, than any alternative. Any originalist thesis grounded
in this way, I call “soft originalism.”26 But the claim could be
grounded much more deeply: It could be maintained, to take an
extreme, that lexical original intent originalism is conceptually necessary, that matters could not be otherwise. Or, if not conceptually necessary, it could be defended as logically necessary given a set of
premises that, while not themselves necessary, are in fact noncontroversial. Each of these latter two views, let us say, is a variant of “hard
originalism.”27 (My observation that “hard” originalism is grounded
more deeply than are soft arguments suggests an alternative nomenclature: The soft/hard distinction could be captured just as well by the
terms “shallow” and “deep.” I will employ the labels “soft” and
“hard” in this Article, but I invite readers who find the alternative
25 David Hoy employs the labels weak, moderate, and strong originalism to distinguish
among theories that treat original intent as, respectively, necessary to support a judgment
of unconstitutionality, sufficient, and both necessary and sufficient. Hoy, supra note 9, at
483–85.
26 It follows that the particular originalist thesis under consideration would be soft lexical original intent originalism.
27 The hard/soft distinction is cousin to Aileen Kavanagh’s proposed distinction
between “direct” and “indirect” arguments for originalism. See Kavanagh, supra note 9, at
259 (defining “direct” arguments for originalism as “establish[ing] a positive link between
Framers’ intent and proper interpretation” and “indirect” arguments as “merely show[ing]
that originalism is one of the possible ways of answering to a difficulty which afflicts all
methods of interpretation”).
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vocabulary more evocative or illuminating to think and speak in terms
of “shallow” and “deep” originalism.)
Like strong originalism, hard originalism is a robust thesis, just as
soft originalism and weak originalism are modest. But because they
are robust in different senses, a few words about the difference seem
warranted. Relative to strong, weak, and moderate originalism, hard
and soft originalism are meta-level theses. Strong originalism is a
thesis about the reasons that should guide interpretations of what the
Constitution means. Hard originalism is a thesis about the reasons
that make true a particular interpretive thesis (i.e., a thesis about the
reasons that should guide interpretations of what the Constitution
means). So hard strong originalism holds not only that an exclusive
(or lexical) focus on original meaning (or intent, etc.) is a good interpretive posture to adopt but that it is, in some sense, the only posture
we can adopt. Such a thesis is doubly robust.
Soft and hard originalism provide different answers to the question of whether, or to what extent, the originalist claim is subject to
empirical investigation and to reasonable disagreement about the
shape and strength of competing values. If the claim is understood as
hostage to empirics and evaluative disagreement (as per soft
originalism), then, given the most plausible accounts of our present
state of knowledge about the relevant facts and of the prospects for
consensus about matters of value, it seems to follow that soft
originalist theses will be far more provisional and tentative than hard
originalist theses.
I hope that the worth of this particular distinction—a distinction
that might be less sharp than I here suggest and almost certainly could
benefit from further refinement—will emerge more fully over the
course of this Article.28 For now, let me note that its significance is as
much ethical as epistemological. The rhetoric surrounding originalism
is often heated. Strong originalists frequently speak as though their
opponents were either fools or knaves, as though all departures from
original intentions or meanings are unprincipled.29 This is not, in general, a nice way to proceed. But it would be easier to understand and
28 But even if my hope proves unrealized in your case—even if you’re left doubting
that there is a coherent or useful distinction to be drawn in this vicinity—my core arguments remain unaffected. The hard/soft distinction is advanced to facilitate our assessment
of the extant arguments for strong originalism. Yet, however we classify those arguments,
the question of fundamental importance is whether they are successful.
29 For a not wholly atypical rant, see Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality
of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 287 (1996): “The hypocrisy of many of
the nonoriginalists’ arguments, the deliberate masking of their real agenda, the lack of
candor, the absence of respect for (or even acknowledgment of) law as a constraint—all of
these features exert a corrupting influence on . . . the very idea of law itself.”
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perhaps to defend if strong originalism were rationally inescapable. If
it is not, then strong originalism could be plausible, even true, but
because we lack privileged access to the facts (including value facts)
by virtue of which it would be true, we might still expect its proponents and opponents to agree to disagree. Put another way, we can
reasonably demand that theorists who contend that we have “no
choice” but to adopt a particular interpretive posture be prepared
with hard arguments. And we can expect that those not armed with
hard arguments will not make hard claims.
4. Subject
Consider one additional dimension of variability. We started by
distinguishing originalist theses depending on their disparate objects—
original intent, understanding, and meaning. We might also attend to
variations in the subjects of the theses. Many originalist theses concern only how judges should act; they are agnostic regarding how
other readers should interpret the Constitution. Other theses are
broader: They concern how all governmental officials should interpret the Constitution or even how all citizens or all persons should
undertake the interpretive task.30 On the dimension of subject, then,
we confront the possibilities of, at the least, “judicial originalism,”
“official originalism,” and “universal originalism.”
5. Summary
On just this rough and partial sketch, and embracing the simplifying assumption that these four classificatory dimensions (object,
strength, status, and subject) are wholly independent of one another,
originalist logical space can be represented by a 3 x 4 x 2 x 3 matrix,
thus consisting of 72 distinct theses.31

30

This distinction, generally overlooked, is noted in BASSHAM, supra note 6, at 19–21.
(framers’ intent vs. ratifiers’ understanding vs. public meaning) x (weak vs. moderate
vs. lexical vs. exclusive) x (hard vs. soft) x (judicial vs. official vs. universal).
31
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Dimension Meaning

Sample Variants

Object

The target of interpretation

Framers’ (semantic) intentions
Ratifiers’ understandings
Original public meaning

Strength

The weight that the originalist
target plays in the interpretive
theory

Strong
- Exclusive
- Lexical
Moderate
Weak

Status

The character of the reasons
invoked to support the claimed
strength of the originalist target

Hard (supposed conceptual truths
or logical entailments of
uncontroversial premises)
Soft (contingent on contested
empirical, predictive, and/or
evaluative premises)

Subject

The contemporary interpreters who
are claimed to be obligated to
follow the originalist interpretive
theory

Judicial (judges alone)
Official (all public officials)
Universal (all citizens or all
persons)

15

In fact, though, we are still just scratching the surface of potential
diversity. To start, when discussing these four dimensions of variability, I have often collapsed into two or three categories differences
that could be articulated with greater granularity.32 Furthermore,
there exist additional dimensions of distinction that I have not yet
introduced at all. (Consider, e.g., the dimension of scope: Perhaps an
interpreter ought to attend differently to the originalist object on
structural questions than on rights questions, or differently to provisions of the 1787 Constitution that were voted up or down as a complete package than to later amendments.33) Once we recognize more
possible positions with respect to the dimensions already discussed,
and then add additional multivariable dimensions, it becomes
32 For example, I have lumped together as “moderate originalism” all theses that would
assign a presumption to the originalist focus of any weight greater than ordinary but short
of conclusive. This is to recognize fewer differences than the law often feels comfortable in
distinguishing. (Equal Protection doctrine, to take one salient example, subdivides weighty
state interests between the “important” and the “compelling.”) We could, therefore,
replace moderate originalism with the subvarieties “medium weight originalism” and
“heavy weight originalism,” where even the latter is weaker than either of the two variants
of strong originalism. And many more subtle distinctions might helpfully emerge once
self-professed originalists abandon strong originalism and focus their formidable energies
and intellects on the presently undertheorized space of moderate originalism. I have also
noted that hard originalism comes in what we might call “ordinary hard” and “super hard”
variants. Similarly, original intent originalism could be broken into two variants: those
that focus on the intent of the text’s actual authors and those that focus on the collective
intent of all persons at the Philadelphia Convention.
33 See infra note 202.
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apparent that literally thousands of discrete theses can plausibly claim
to be originalist.34
To be sure, some of these possibilities will be ruled out because
the combinations are logically impossible or because there will be no
remotely plausible argument for them. Yet I would bet that the
existing literature contains exemplars of a surprisingly large portion of
the possible. As a view about American constitutional interpretation,
originalism is not a single thesis but a large family of theses that
encompasses even greater potential variability than is generally appreciated. A fuller investigation of this potential variability—a more
complete exploration of originalist logical space—might someday be
useful. At present, we can limit attention to the four dimensions
already addressed and to the dimensions of strength and status most
especially.
B. Originalism Unmodified
With this background in mind, return to the fundamental empirical fact that all of us—constitutional scholars, judges, lawyers—speak
comfortably about “originalism” but rarely of “originalisms,” despite
the diversity of theses that might plausibly be denominated as
“originalist.” We say things like “originalism is now the prevailing
approach to constitutional interpretation,”35 or “originalism is a lousy
theory,”36 usually without pausing to specify the thesis or group of
theses in mind. Indeed, commentators’ frequent failure to disambiguate the claims under consideration has caused critics to question the
term’s usefulness. As one student of the literature has complained, “If
ever a term muddied as much as it clarified, ‘originalism’ is it.”37
34 For a particularly revealing display of some of the dimensions on which originalisms
can differ, and to illustrate how these differences can easily escape our attention, compare
the slight differences in definition across two editions of the Farber & Sherry constitutional
history textbook already cited. The initial 1990 edition announces that “[o]riginalists are
committed to the view that original intent is not only relevant but authoritative, that we are
in some sense obligated to follow the intent of the framers.” DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 374 (1st ed. 1990). In
subtle contrast, the 2005 second edition describes originalists as “committed to the view
that the historical perspective is not only relevant but at least sometimes authoritative, that
contemporary judges are in some sense obligated to follow the views of the framers.”
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 526. On the dimension of object, the authors have
shifted from a position that emphasizes original intent toward one that is agnostic among
the competing candidates; on the dimension of subject, they shift from universal
originalism (marked by “we”) to judicial originalism; and on the dimension of strength,
they have effected a modest equivocation by inserting the qualifier “at least sometimes.”
35 Barnett, supra note 4, at 613.
36 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Early Interpretations & Original Sins, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2005, 2013 (1997).
37 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812 (1996).
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One possible lesson to draw is that we should retire the term,
treating unmodified references to originalism as essentially meaningless. But this might be overkill, for it is possible that most people (or
most theorists) who speak of originalism employ the term to denote a
(more or less) identifiable region within originalist logical space. Of
course, if we choose to retain the term in unmodified form, we must
define it clearly. Moreover, to adjudicate contemporary debates over
originalism, the meaning we ascribe to it cannot be arbitrary or merely
stipulative. By supplying both a vocabulary and a (partial) matrix of
possibilities, the attention we have given to the varieties of originalism
will help us specify what we should take originalism, unmodified, to
mean. It will also help us assess the truth of originalism, so defined.
1. Originalism Is Strong
For economy of expression, let us denote originalism
simpliciter—what might be called “originalism unmodified,” or
“originalism in the strict sense,” or “originalism proper”—by capitalization. The principal question can thus be reformulated: Which of
the various possible forms of originalism, or which particular thesis or
group of theses in originalist logical space, does the relevant scholarly
community mean by “Originalism”?
Two possible meanings can be dismissed straight out. The debate
over Originalism does not concern whether all of those theses are
true, for many are mutually contradictory. Nor does it concern
whether any is true, for it is difficult to see any basis for rejecting even
the most modest among them, e.g., soft weak judicial originalism.
Discussions of Originalism therefore have a narrower focus, be it a
single unique position or a more limited area within originalist logical
space.
But where? Again, one possibility can be ruled out. Originalism
is not the name for the family of theses that share a position on the
dimension of interpretive object. Original intent originalists and original public meaning originalists do not take their disagreement to be
one between originalists and non-originalists, but rather as an intramural debate within originalism. As Justice Scalia observed in a
much-quoted passage, “[T]he Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between framers’ intent and objective
meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether derived
from framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”38
38 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). I agree with those who urge that distinguishing original
intent from original meaning is less significant than often claimed. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson,
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Scalia is surely right about what does not define Originalism—
viz., any particular position on the dimension of interpretive object.
But his remark is ambiguous regarding precisely what does define
Originalism. By failing to specify the attitudes that theorists or interpreters on either side of the Great Divide take toward original
meaning and current meaning, respectively, Scalia does not identify
just where that divide is located. Does it lie between those who care
only about original meaning and those who care only about current
meaning (in which case, everybody who cares about both resides precariously on the divide itself)? Or between those who privilege original meaning as the default and those who privilege current meaning?
Or between those who attend exclusively to original meaning and
those who attend to current meaning too? Or between those who
attend at least partially to original meaning and those who attend
exclusively to current meaning? Or someplace else entirely? Scalia’s
highlighting of the distinction “between original meaning . . . and current meaning” is too elliptical to supply the definition we seek.
Because of this ambiguity, however, Scalia’s formulation of the
Great Divide points us in a promising direction. It suggests that if
Originalism has distinctive content, it will lie on what I have called the
dimension of strength.39 In fact, this is a common scholarly view. As
Dennis Goldford contended in his recent book-length examination of
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 549 n.133 (2003).
Indeed, I suspect that originalists who extol original meaning as a solvent are subject to
embarrassment as it becomes increasingly clear that many of the most difficult problems of
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence involve the resolution of neither word-level
ambiguity nor disputes over the semantics of discrete constitutional clauses or sentences.
As others have argued, and as recent cases involving the war on terror reinforce,
whatever value originalism will have for horizontal separation of power controversies is
more likely to come from inquiries into original purposes or intentions than from original
public meaning. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 37, at 1812–13. But see, e.g., Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that original public meaning originalism presents overwhelming
case for unitary executive). The same is true of vertical separation of powers disputes, as
the Court has belatedly appreciated the importance of the Necessary and Proper Clause
for cases it had previously conceived of as involving the Commerce Clause alone. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (discussing third category of
Commerce Clause power without even mentioning Necessary and Proper Clause), and
Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 n.9 (2003) (upholding federal law that regulated intrastate activities for purpose of protecting instrumentalities of interstate commerce, while expressly disavowing reliance on Necessary and Proper Clause), with
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (emphasizing that regulation of intrastate activities must depend upon Necessary and Proper Clause). It is implausible that proper resolution of cases of this sort will turn on the original public meaning of the word “proper.”
39 Larry Solum thinks that I misread Scalia. According to Solum, Scalia is pointing out
merely that Originalists, unlike their opponents, believe that the semantic meaning of the
Constitution does not change; he is saying nothing about the Constitution’s legal meaning.
See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 11 n.31 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
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the originalism debate, what distinguishes originalism from nonoriginalism is the claim “that the original understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any contrary understanding of that text in
succeeding generations.”40 Self-described originalists differ regarding
countless details: whether the proper interpretive focus is framers’
intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or original public meaning; whether
the best reasons for originalism concern what it means to interpret a
text, or what must be presupposed in treating a Constitution as
binding, or how best to constrain judges and provide stability and predictability; whether extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is subject to the same constraints as is judicial constitutional interpretation;
and so on. But the contention urged consistently—from originalist
icons Raoul Berger and Robert Bork41 to younger standard bearers
like Randy Barnett, Steven Calabresi, Gary Lawson, John McGinnis,
Michael Paulsen, Sai Prakash, and Michael Rappaport42—is that (putResearch Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. I
believe that Solum is mistaken. See infra Part I.C.4.
40 GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 139 (emphasis added).
41 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1977) (“[T]he ‘original intention’ of the Framers . . . is
binding on the Court . . . .”); BORK, supra note 20, at 5 (arguing that judges are “bound by
the only thing that can be called law, the principles of the text, whether Constitution or
statute, as generally understood at the enactment”); see also, e.g., DOJ SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 19, at 2 (“[C]ourts must construe the Constitution according to its original
meaning.”).
42 I have included here only a tiny sample of these scholars’ characterizations of
Originalism. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 4 (2004) (“[B]y committing ourselves to a written constitution,
we commit ourselves to adhere to the original meaning of the text and any later amendments.”); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 38, at 551–52 (“[T]he text of the Constitution, as
originally understood by the people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of the land. . . .
The meaning of all . . . legal writings depends on their texts, as they were objectively understood by the people who enacted or ratified them. Originalists do not give priority to the
plain dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s text because they like grammar more than
history. They give priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.” (footnotes
omitted)); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1250 (1994) (“[O]riginalist interpretivism is not simply one method of interpretation
among many—it is the only method that is suited to discovering the actual meaning of the
relevant text.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles
as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007) (“[Originalism] requires
that judges interpret the document based only on its original meaning.”); Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1142 (“[O]riginal meaning textualism is the only method of interpreting the Constitution.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 544 (1998) (“When we accept some text as law, we also commit
to the law’s original meanings. . . . Indeed, to embrace the legitimacy of words as law
without their original, ordinary meanings is to embrace nothing.”); see also, e.g., MICHAEL
J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 32 (1994) (“The constitutional text as originally understood should be deemed authoritative for purposes of constitutional adjudication.”).
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ting aside, for the moment, the special problem of continued adherence to non-originalist judicial precedent43) judges should interpret
the Constitution solely in accordance with some feature of the original
character of the constitutional provision at issue. Thus do originalists
frequently contend that interpreters owe “fidelity” to the original
meaning.44 Such fidelity is not satisfied by a disposition on the part of
interpreters to, shall we say, take original meanings and principles
“seriously,” or pay them substantial regard. “Fidelity” is consistently
defined to entail strict, exact, or unfailing adherence to a standard or
duty.45
Understandably, then, this is how Originalism is generally understood both by its critics46 and by commentators purporting neither to
praise nor to bury.47 Translated into my proposed terminology and
shorthand: Originalism is strong originalism. The Great Divide, to
complete Scalia’s observation, lies between those who attend exclusively to the original object and those who attend to changed meanings too.
This is not, I emphasize, a conceptual or normative claim. It is
descriptive. Moreover, it is a descriptive generalization. Surely, it is
43

See infra Part I.C.5.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
295 (2007) (“Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to the Constitution as
law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the text, understood
in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text.”).
45 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 655–56 (4th ed.
2000) (defining fidelity as “[e]xact correspondence with fact or with a given quality, condition, or event” and explaining that “fidelity implies the unfailing fulfillment of one’s duties
and obligations and strict adherence to vows or promises”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 845 (1993) (“Fidelity implies strict and continuing faithfulness as to an obligation, trust, or duty.”).
46 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 24, at 204 (describing Originalism as theory that “accords
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters”); James
A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (noting diversity of originalist views, but identifying as core premise of
Originalism that “the role of judges in constitutional cases is simply and exclusively to
discover and give effect to the meaning of the Constitution as embodied in the constitutional text and the original intentions of the founders”).
47 In what is possibly the only book-length investigation of the historical development
of originalist jurisprudence, Johnathan O’Neill characterizes Originalism as comprising
“several closely related claims about the authoritative source of American constitutional
law,” among them an “insist[ence] that interpreters be bound by the meaning the document had for those who gave it legal authority.” O’NEILL, supra note 14, at 1–2 (2005); see
also, e.g., JOHN H. GARVEY, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DANIEL A. FARBER, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 91 (5th ed. 2004) (describing Originalism as view
“that the original intent of the framers ought to control constitutional interpretation”);
Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612,
619 (2006) (“Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that assigns dispositive
weight to the original understanding of the Constitution or the constitutional provision at
issue.”).
44
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false that when commentators refer to originalism without modification (i.e., when they refer to Originalism) they invariably mean strong
originalism. I claim only that it is frequently true—frequently enough
to permit us to use the term without modification, and to treat it as
meaningful.48
To be absolutely clear, then, Originalism is not the view that some
feature of the original character of the U.S. Constitution—the intent
of the framers, the understanding of the ratifiers, the text’s original
public meaning, or an amalgam of these things—“matters” or “is relevant” to proper constitutional interpretation. So understood,
Originalism would be a trivial thesis without dissenters. Nor is
Originalism the slightly stronger thesis that courts should “generally”
or “presumptively” interpret the Constitution in accord with its original character. True, this position, unlike the first, is modestly controversial. It is also of considerable interest; indeed, a major reason to
defeat strong originalism is to thereby spur greater scholarly attention
to the challenge of articulating and defending usefully distinct forms
of moderate originalism. But it is not what the majority of self48 Admittedly, I am not sure how to prove this claim to those who remain skeptical
notwithstanding the supportive quotations I have already presented and those I will marshal later in the Article. So any reader who doubts my rendering of Originalism as strong
originalism—because she believes, for example, that most references to Originalism mean
something else (say, moderate originalism) or that usage is so variable as to render any
generalization false—ought to read the term Originalism in this Article to mean strong
originalism by stipulation. For example, the title of this Article would become “Strong
Originalism is Bunk.” Any reader who thinks that so few originalists defend strong
originalism as to make its repudiation uninteresting should probably stop reading now.
Even readers who accept that a sufficiently large percentage of scholarly and judicial
advocates for originalism simpliciter (including a sufficiently large number of the most
prominent among them) mean thereby to endorse strong originalism—enough to justify
their critics in likewise treating originalism simpliciter to mean strong originalism—might
still question whether that is the more desirable course. That is, even if I am justified in
equating Originalism with strong originalism, one might prefer to retire the term
originalism, when used without modification, and speak instead of more narrowly and particularly defined neighborhoods within originalist space.
This proposal has much to recommend it. It likely would facilitate greater clarity of
thought and a greater likelihood of successful communication between writer and reader.
However, I do not embrace that advice here—the title does, after all, promise a critique of
“originalism” and not of “strong originalism”—only because for a critic of strong
originalism to take that first step would amount to something like unilateral disarmament:
Persons who become aware of the Article’s existence but who don’t read it (a class that,
however small, will nonetheless dwarf the class of persons who do read it) are apt to suppose that it targets a (perhaps minor) variant of originalism, leaving the core of originalism
unscathed. If and when self-described originalists make clear to their readers either that
the form of originalism they defend is “strong originalism,” and not something that can
meaningfully be rendered as originalism proper or originalism simpliciter, or (even better!)
that they disavow strong originalism in favor of something more modest, then I will happily
announce that the concept of originalism proper has no usable meaning, least of all that it
should be construed as strong originalism.
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professed originalists endorse. Neither weak originalism nor moderate originalism warrants the title Originalism, unmodified. Put
somewhat differently, contemporary Originalism is not merely a “sensibility” or “orientation.”
Originalism proper is strong originalism—the thesis that original
meaning either is the only proper target of judicial constitutional
interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings the text might bear (again, contrary judicial precedents possibly excepted).49 It entails (but is not equivalent to) the
thesis that nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular constitutional provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has
operative (as opposed to evidential) bearing on what courts ought to
identify as constitutional meaning. As the Supreme Court put it a
century ago in a much-quoted passage, “The Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant
when adopted it means now.”50 To the same effect are Chief Justice
Taney’s words in Dred Scott:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, . . . should induce the
court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the
instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be
altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If
any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed
in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at
the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the
same in meaning . . . ; and as long as it continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of
the United States.51
49 For the remainder of this Article, for expositional ease, I will generally refer only to
original meaning, with the understanding that my comments also apply to original intent
and original understanding (or any other possible originalist object) unless the context
makes clear otherwise. Likewise, I will generally omit the parenthetical qualification about
judicial precedent. In doing so, I will not mean to deny the empirical fact that contemporary Originalists divide over the propriety of judges adhering to judicial precedents that
they now believe to be inconsistent with original meanings. I will, however, raise some
doubts about whether Originalists who recognize this one exception to strong originalism
have good arguments for going this far but no farther. See infra Part I.C.5.
50 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
51 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856). Given the universal
opprobrium that attaches to Dred Scott, it is unsurprising that Originalists would seek to
disavow it. Some argue, accordingly, that Taney got the original meaning of the relevant
constitutional provisions wrong. BORK, supra note 20, at 30; Michael W. McConnell, The
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Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the
Tradition?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1172–74 (1992). This could be correct; I quote from
Dred Scott because it contains a particularly clear and forceful statement of strong
originalism, not to defeat Originalism by showing that it compelled the result in Dred Scott.
In a most shameless display of the adage that the best defense is a good offense, however, Originalists have frequently sought to turn tables on their opponents by laying Dred
Scott at the feet of the non-originalists, as when then-Justice Rehnquist described it as
“[t]he apogee of the living Constitution doctrine during the nineteenth century.” William
H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 700 (1976). (For
an astute assessment and criticism, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again:
Originalism’s Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 37 (1993).) Representative is the contention of the Meese Justice Department that, although Taney “paid lip service” to
originalism, in fact the decision “was plainly the result of [non-originalism].” DOJ
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 19, at 58. This extraordinary contention rests on the claim that
“Taney’s opinion . . . relies, not on the original meaning of the due process clause, but on
the extraconstitutional notion of substantive due process.” Id. at 58–59.
This argument is doubly unpersuasive. First and more significantly, although Taney
did conclude that the Missouri Compromise violated slaveholders’ due process rights, the
passage quoted above serves an entirely different conclusion—namely, that black persons
could not avail themselves of federal diversity jurisdiction because they could not be “citizens” of the United States within the original meaning of Article III, Section 2. That constitutional ruling was independently sufficient to drive the result in Dred Scott and
occupied a far more central role in Taney’s opinion. Moreover, it is one that many historians believe Taney got right—even if he plainly overreached in asserting that free blacks
had not been recognized as citizens in any states at any time. For a careful discussion, see
Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 294–302 (1997). To be sure, others are unpersuaded. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 266 (1985) (“Taney’s arguments against the citizenship of free blacks . . . left a good deal to be desired.”). But for an Originalist to claim, as
Michael McConnell has, that “Dred Scott was wrong, plainly wrong, not just as a moral
matter, but as a legal decision,” McConnell, supra, at 1174, is more than Originalist premises can support.
Second, although Originalists routinely denounce substantive due process as perhaps
the plainest of non-originalist sins, the history is far more complicated than they let on.
Here, again, is the DOJ Sourcebook:
At a minimum, original meaning jurisprudence limits the range of acceptable
choices. The precise original meaning of the due process clause, for example,
might be difficult to determine, but at the very least we should be able to agree
that the clause is limited to process, and does not entitle courts to conduct a
substantive review of the wisdom of legislation.
DOJ SOURCEBOOK, supra note 19, at 7–8. That’s a reasonable conclusion for a textualist to
reach, but not one that an Originalist ought to take too quickly for granted given the plausible contentions that the framing generation treated “due process of law” as a legal term
of art roughly synonymous with the Magna Carta’s prohibition on certain deprivations
except by “the law of the land” and that both phrases had substantive as well as procedural
content. See generally John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text,
83 VA. L. REV. 493, 542–55 (1997) (concluding that whether Due Process Clauses were
generally understood this way in 1791 or 1868 remains open question); Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (concluding that educated persons
in 1791 probably would have understood Due Process Clause to impose both substantive
and procedural limitations on state action).
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2. Non-originalism Is Modest
It follows, of course, that Originalism’s opponents need merely
deny that courts must interpret the Constitution in accordance with its
original meaning, even when that meaning is discoverable. Such a
position is commonly called, seemingly interchangeably, both nonoriginalism and living constitutionalism. For reasons set out in the
margin, however, the terms are best viewed as nonidentical.52 The
former is more apt and is the one I will adopt. Non-originalism,53 in
other words, is the thesis that facts that occur after ratification or
amendment can properly bear—constitutively, not just evidentially—
on how courts should interpret the Constitution (even when the original meaning is sufficiently clear).54 It does not hold that original
meaning, when discoverable, should be irrelevant to judicial interpretation, or even that its relevance should be slight.55 Non-originalism is
simply the denial of strong originalism; it is not the denial of all forms
of originalism.
I belabor this point because we cannot intelligently assess the
“debate over originalism” without grasping just what separates selfproclaimed originalists from their self-proclaimed opponents. Not a
single self-identifying non-originalist of whom I’m aware argues that
original meaning has no bearing on proper judicial constitutional
52 Living constitutionalism is frequently characterized, by proponents and critics, as the
view that, at least with respect to constitutional provisions centrally concerned with moral
values like liberty and equality, courts ought to follow evolving or contemporary norms.
See generally GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 57–61. Thus one respected commentator
presents constitutional interpreters as faced with a simple binary choice: “whether
American constitutionalism . . . obligates interpreters to base decisions on what the framers
had in mind when they wrote the Constitution or whether it obligates interpreters to adapt
general constitutional principles to changing circumstances or more enlightened sensibilities.” Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the
Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 191, 192 (1997). If, as Gillman plausibly claims, the latter option represents
living constitutionalism, then its nonidentity with non-originalism is clear, for nonoriginalists qua non-originalists need not recognize a general obligation to endorse
updated or “enlightened” constitutional interpretations; though they necessarily reject the
obligation that strong originalists embrace, they need not replace it with some form of
competing obligation.
53 Consistency would dictate that the opponents of Originalism be called “nonoriginalists.” In this Article, though, I bow to convention and simplicity by omitting the
capitalization.
54 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 1, at 1086 (defining non-originalists as those who “do not
find original intent dispositive of contemporary constitutional questions”); Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1126 (defining non-originalists as “theorists who believe that constitutional interpretation should not be limited by the intentions of the Framers, the understandings of the Ratifiers, or evidence of the original meaning of the words and phrases of
the text”).
55 This observation is far from novel, see, e.g., Farber, supra note 1, at 1086; Kavanagh,
supra note 9, at 256, but warrants repetition nonetheless.
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interpretation. To the contrary, even those scholars most closely identified with non-originalism—Paul Brest, David Strauss, Laurence
Tribe, for example—explicitly assign original meaning or intentions a
significant role in the interpretive enterprise.56
3. Originalism and the Fallacy of Equivocation
Emphasizing the boldness of Originalism and the concomitant
modesty of non-originalism also facilitates a critical evaluation of
some of originalists’ favorite argumentative maneuvers. To start,
Originalists routinely set forth the Originalist thesis in the strong
form—that is, they advocate Originalism—but provide arguments that
only support some type of moderate originalism. We will see examples of this sleight of hand in Parts II and III.57
Originalists also trade on the ambiguity of the originalist label in
a second way—by castigating opponents for hypocrisy on the grounds
that they (the critics) also pay attention to original meaning.58 Yet
arguments of this sort commit the fallacy of equivocation: The
originalism that the critic rejects is originalism unmodified, i.e., strong
originalism; the originalism she endorses is either weak or moderate
originalism.
Even a thinker as careful and precise as Mark Greenberg falls
into this trap. In an important article that first set forth with care the
now well-appreciated distinction between the original meanings of a
56 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 24, at 237 & n.124 (observing that “[t]he nonoriginalist
treats the text and original history as presumptively binding and limiting, but as neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for constitutional decisionmaking” and adding that
“there are some instances in which the nonoriginalist presumption of fidelity to the text
and original understanding is very unlikely to be rebutted”); David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (observing that
“[v]irtually everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the Framers count for something” and seeming to approve of practice in which they count “for something but not
everything”); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 38, at 93 (agreeing that
many constitutional provisions fairly conceived as architectural “probably must be taken to
have a fixed meaning that it is the task of the faithful interpreter, whether a judge or
anyone else, to identify and preserve”).
Perhaps relying on sentiments such as these, one commentator has recently observed
that “[i]t is common ground amongst originalists and non-originalists alike that the
Constitution means what the Framers intended it to mean.” Kavanagh, supra note 9, at
274; cf. GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 77, 78 (“[N]onoriginalists tacitly accept the originalist
premise that [‘the constitutional text’] and [‘the original understanding of the constitutional text’] are equivalent . . . .”). I find this not only mistaken but truly inexplicable.
57 See infra Parts II.B.1, III.B.2.
58 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 4, at 615–17; Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an
“Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 301 (1996) (“[T]he very constitutional scholars
who decry originalism most loudly rush to use originalist arguments when they serve their
purposes.”).
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text and its originally expected or intended applications,59 Greenberg
and Harry Litman argued:
Despite originalism’s apparent problem in accounting for the evident invalidity of particular traditional practices, the doctrine’s core
notion—that the Constitution must be interpreted in accordance
with its original meaning—is difficult to challenge. Some version of
the position seems to follow from the very idea of a written constitution, which is designed “to be an anchor in the past.” Indeed,
nonoriginalists tend to recognize the substantial force of the basic
argument for originalism, and often emphasize the importance that
they too accord to original meaning.60

To see the equivocation clearly, notice that the referent of the words
“the position” in the second sentence is originalism. If one makes that
mental substitution, then the three sentences can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) originalism is hard to challenge, (2) because some
version of originalism seems to follow from the Constitution’s writtenness, (3) as evidenced by the fact that even non-originalists recognize
the force of the argument for originalism.
The problem is that this single word “originalism” changes
meaning from sentence one to sentence three. The originalism meant
in the first sentence is the thesis that “the Constitution must be interpreted in accordance with its original meaning,” and therefore is
strong originalism.61 But that’s not the sense of originalism meant in
the third sentence. In attributing significance to original meaning,
non-originalists are acknowledging, at most, the force of arguments
for moderate originalism. What about the second sentence? Well, if
non-originalists’ endorsement of moderate originalism is all the evidence that Greenberg and Litman muster to support the claim that
some form of originalism follows from the writtenness of a constitution, then sentence two is speaking of moderate originalism and does
not support the contention of the first sentence that strong originalism
is difficult to challenge. Alternatively, if Greenberg and Litman mean
to claim in sentence two that some version of strong originalism
(strong original intent originalism? strong original meaning
59

See infra Part I.C.2.
Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569, 571 (1998) (citation omitted).
61 To escape the fallacy, one might propose that the originalism Greenberg and Litman
have in mind in the first sentence cannot be strong originalism, for otherwise they would
speak of, for example, the “doctrine’s contention,” rather than its “core notion.” That is,
the qualifier core might suggest that originalism, in the first sentence, is broader than
strong originalism. And if so, then the originalism in the first sentence might be the same
as it is in the third, namely moderate originalism. This route out of the fallacy won’t work,
for it depends on the odd claim that “the core notion of moderate originalism is strong
originalism.”
60
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originalism? soft strong originalism?) seems to follow from the writtenness of a constitution, then the argument for that is absent; it is not
supplied by the fact that even non-originalists acknowledge moderate
originalism.
C. Qualifications and Clarifications
1. Universal Originalism
I understand Originalism to address what courts must do, not
what all interpreters must do. This thesis (but not all positions in
originalist logical space) would allow other actors—legislators, citizens, executive officials—to interpret the Constitution in a way that
departs from original meaning. Put another way, Originalism is
agnostic with respect to the range of possibilities on the dimension of
interpretive subject. To be sure, some forms of Originalism are justified on grounds that rule out even extrajudicial non-originalist interpretation. But I do not treat extrajudicial originalism to be a
necessary component of Originalism.62
Although I do not elaborate on the distinction between judicial
and universal originalism here, I have elsewhere explained why it
might be important.63 Very briefly, few doubt that the Constitution
plays a significant nonlegal role in our culture. It has meaning and
exerts power outside the courts in helping shape political-legal debate
and even national identity. Presumably, elaborations of, and arguments about, constitutional meaning will not proceed on wholly separate tracks inside and outside the courts.64 Accordingly, proponents
of judicial Originalism who rely on arguments that would not themselves support universal Originalism (intentionalists being the most
obvious counterexample) must explain how such cross-fertilization
can proceed when different interpreters are entitled to rely on significantly different interpretive methodologies or, alternatively, why
62

Reaching the same conclusion is BASSHAM, supra note 6, at 21.
See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought
or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007).
64 The literature exploring how social movements affect constitutional change has
exploded in recent years, propelled by the work of scholars such as Jack Balkin, Bill
Eskridge, Willy Forbath, Robert Post, and Reva Siegel. For a recent discussion, see The
Brennan Center Jorde Symposium on Constitutional Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
Copious citation to the burgeoning scholarship can be found in the lead lecture of that
symposium, Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1328 n.13 (2006).
For my money, it is in the descriptive analysis and normative theorizing of the two-way
interaction between judicial and popular constitutional understanding, and not in its focus
on extrajudicial constitutional understandings alone, that the trend toward “popular constitutionalism” is likely to prove most interesting and profitable.
63
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there should be—even how there could be—something closer to
acoustic separation between judicial and extrajudicial constitutional
exegesis.65
2. Application Originalism
Some commentators believe that Originalism directs that interpreters owe fidelity to the framers’ (or ratifiers’) originally expected
applications of the constitutional text, not as evidence (sometimes
powerful) of original intent or meaning, but as controlling in themselves.66 On this view (to take an example frequently pressed by Justice Scalia), the fact that the framers and ratifiers did not expect
capital punishment to violate the Constitution entails that it cannot
now constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Others have persuasively critiqued this position.67 For our purposes, though, it is enough to note that (with the
partial exception of Justice Scalia) the only commentators who take it
seriously are those aiming to attack it.68 Leading originalists have
unambiguously repudiated it for years. As (now-Judge) Michael
McConnell insisted a decade ago:
[N]o reputable originalist, with the possible exception of Raoul
Berger, takes the view that the Framers’ “assumptions and expectations about the correct application” of their principles is [sic] controlling. . . . Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’
analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed and made them wrong.69

Application originalism is a bad view, but one to which not even
originalists subscribe.70
65 On “acoustic separation,” see generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
66 See Balkin, supra note 44, at 292, 338; see also, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE
MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 47–52
(2006); Kavanagh, supra note 9, at 265.
67 See Greenberg & Litman, supra note 60.
68 This argument is elaborated in Berman, supra note 63, at 384–85.
69 Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment
on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269,
1284 (1997).
70 Possibly the one partial exception to the latter assertion is Jed Rubenfeld, who has
long urged that judges are obligated to follow originally intended applications of constitutional provisions, but asymmetrically. If the original purpose or understanding of a provision was to apply to some particular set of facts, he argues, then judges must abide by those
foundational “Application Understandings.” In contrast, if the original understanding was
that a provision would not apply to some particular set of facts, such foundational “NoApplication Understandings” can be freely disregarded. See generally JED RUBENFELD,
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2005). For example, because a foundational Application Understanding behind the First
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3. Levels of Generality and the Concretization of Original Meaning
Some theorists have sought to marry an evolutionary or progressive sensibility to originalist dogma by urging that interpreters should
follow the original meaning, construed at high generality. Ronald
Dworkin reflected this approach when opining that “[t]he important
question for constitutional theory is not whether the intention of those
who made the Constitution should count, but rather what should
count as that intention.”71 It follows that “[w]e are all originalists
now”72—but that some of us read the original intentions broadly, and
others read them narrowly.
This seems mistaken.73 As Originalists have urged for some time,
their interpretive methodology requires meaning to be rendered at the
Amendment was to prohibit prior restraints, that particular expectation demands our continued fidelity. But that a No-Application Understanding might have been that the First
Amendment did not protect nude dancing imposes no demand on contemporary constitutional interpreters. Although I am not ultimately persuaded that strong deference is owed
even to Application Understandings, I emphatically exempt Rubenfeld’s intriguing and
provocative theory from my “bad view” verdict.
71 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 57 (1985).
72 This is Tribe’s paraphrase of Dworkin. See Tribe, supra note 56, at 67. It is a widely
expressed sentiment, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in
the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 496 (1996)
(“[W]e are all originalists.”); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 718 (1991) (“[W]e are all originalists
now—or should be.”), but one that should provoke concern. As Gregory Bassham
observed, “In any important debate, whenever one side declares ‘We are all x now,’ it is a
pretty safe bet that the debate has taken a wrong turn—or that someone is trying to pull a
fast one.” Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia’s Equitable Constitution, 33 J.C. & U.L. 143,
154 (2006).
In my view, the “we are all originalists” claim takes several wrong turns, the most
common being the failure to recognize the signal importance of what I have called the
dimension of strength. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5,
1997, at 26 (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996), and SCALIA, supra note 38) (“We are all
originalists now. That is to say, most judges and legal scholars who want to remain within
the boundaries of respectable constitutional discourse agree that the original meaning of
the Constitution and its amendments has some degree of pertinence to the question of
what the Constitution means today.”). If I’m right that what its advocates mean by
“originalism” is strong originalism, then weak and moderate originalists are not originalists, in the relevant sense.
73 The issue I address here should not be confused with the related but distinct problem
that arises when bona fide intentions turn out to conflict with each other. Consider Bork’s
famously unpersuasive effort to establish that Brown v. Board of Education is consistent
with originalism. That argument claims that the original intent or understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause incorporated the principle of “equality,” or “equality before the
law,” and that the ratifiers intended to preserve racial segregation given their (mistaken)
belief that it furnished such equality. BORK, supra note 20, at 81–83. This situation too
might be said to present judges with a choice about which intent—the specific or the general—to privilege. In fact, I think cases such as this present a conflict between intended
meaning and intended or expected applications and that all or almost all originalists are
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level of generality originally intended or publicly understood.74 Suppose, for example, that the original meaning and intent of “equal protection” had involved some strictly formal sense of legal equality. A
judge who finds this conception of equality morally unattractive might
be tempted to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to advance something closer to a norm of antisubordination. And, if she believes that
levels of interpretive generality or abstraction are up for grabs, she
might reason that such an interpretation reflects the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to constitutionalize the concept of equality. Such an interpretation might or might not be defensible, all things considered. But the judge who would effect it is not,
pace Dworkin, an Originalist.
That said, some constitutional provisions might have been originally understood at a level of generality too high to permit effective
resolution of disputes. If, for example, the original understanding of
“equal protection” had been nothing more determinate than the bare
concept of equality, then it is not obviously antithetical to Originalism
for judges to interpret the clause to refer to some presently favored
conception of equality. As noted earlier, Originalists differ regarding
whether contemporary interpreters are permitted to concretize constitutional meaning in this fashion or, instead, must uphold any challenged governmental action so long as it conforms to any plausible
conception of the concept.75
It is even possible that the original understanding or intent of a
provision was to delegate to future interpreters the power to concretize underdeterminate meaning—either once and for all (in which
case the meaning would become “fixed”)76 or in a continually
changing or evolving fashion. Suppose that the Equal Protection
Clause was originally intended or understood to delegate authority to
future interpreters to select an appropriate conception of equality. It
committed to the former. In any event, this type of situation is distinct from that in which
an interpreter might wish to interpret some constitutional concept or principle at a level of
abstraction different from what was originally meant or intended. I am focusing on the
latter situation.
74 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 20, at 149 (“The role of a judge committed to the philosophy of original understanding is not to ‘choose a level of abstraction.’ . . . [A] judge should
state the principle at the level of generality that the text and historical evidence warrant.”);
WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 187 (“[T]he search for intention must be guided by the
historical evidence itself. The level of generality at which terms were defined is not an a
priori theoretical question but a contextualized historical one.”).
75 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76 See generally Nelson, supra note 38, at 547 (“[M]embers of the founding generation
do not seem to have anticipated constant reinterpretation of the Constitution. . . . [T]hey
expected subsequent practice to liquidate the indeterminacy and to produce a fixed
meaning for the future.”).
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would then be appropriate for courts to adjudge challenged state
action as constitutional or not depending upon its conformity with the
judges’ best understanding of what equality demands—or with their
best understanding of what society believes equality demands. Strong
originalism allows for this.77 The meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause would remain, as it had originally been, that no state shall deny
to any person what contemporary society deems equality to demand.78
It follows that Originalism is not disproved by the fact, if true,
that some constitutional provisions were intended or understood to
have an evolving character. Yet if there are many such provisions (or
even a small number of provisions that are especially fertile as generators of litigation), then some of Originalism’s supposed benefits, such
as its constraining effect on judicial subjectivity and its concomitant
ability to promote rule of law values like predictability and stability,
are likely to prove rather more modest than its proponents often
claim.79
4. Non-normative Originalism
I have described Originalism as a thesis regarding what courts
ought to do: They ought to follow the Constitution’s original
meaning. Most Originalists advance a view of just this sort, expressly
employing deontic language like “should,” “ought,” “obligated,”
“required,” and “bound.” Yet some theorists whose Originalist credentials are otherwise impeccable expressly deny that they mean to
advance any normative claims.80 Does this view cause any significant
difficulty for our working definition of Originalism?
I think it does not. When contending that a judge should or must
(endeavor to) interpret the Constitution in accordance with its orig77 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 611 (“[I]t is entirely possible that the principles that the founders meant to embody in the text were fairly abstract. It is also possible
that the founders merely meant to delegate discretion to future decisionmakers to act on a
given subject matter with very little guidance . . . .”). In correspondence, Dick Fallon
questions whether all Originalists need accept this possibility. That they might not, he
offers, suggests another dimension of variability within originalist logical space. E-mail
from Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard
Law School, to author (Feb. 5, 2008, 15:24 CST) (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
78 Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that original understanding of Due Process
Clause was as directive for courts to evolve common law of requisite procedures for deprivation of liberty and property interests).
79 Still, it is an overstatement to conclude that “[t]his move from specific intentions to
general principles . . . eliminates any meaningful distinction between originalism and
nonoriginalism.” Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 411, 432 (1998).
80 Gary Lawson is perhaps the best example. See generally, e.g., Gary Lawson, On
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997).
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inal meaning, Originalists are essentially telescoping two claims: first,
that judges should say what the (constitutional) law is; and second,
that what the constitutional law is, is what its original meaning was.
When Originalists disclaim a position about what judges should do,
they mean, I think, to recognize that they are not advancing any argument for this first claim. But because it is not in fact controversial in
the contemporary debates over American constitutional interpretation that judges should enforce the law, the non-normative variant of
Originalism is not interestingly distinct, for our purposes, from its
more common, avowedly normative, cousin. Put another way, we can
think of the putatively non-normative variant as at least contingently
normative: Insofar as judges ought to follow the law, they should
follow the Constitution’s original meaning.
There is, however, at least one other way to think about nonnormative Originalists. In a monumental work in progress,81 Larry
Solum carves the Originalist salami one slice thinner than I have just
done, distinguishing not only between what the law is and what judges
should do but also between the Constitution’s semantic meaning or
content and its legal meaning or content. On his view, the original
meaning determines the former but only “contributes” to the latter,
without fully determining it.
I cannot fully address Solum’s complex and challenging arguments in this already long Article. For present purposes, suffice it to
say that whether Solum’s theory is Originalist or moderate originalist
(hence non-originalist) depends on whether it permits non-originalist
contributions (other than judicial precedent) ever to override the
(original) semantic content in the production or determination of constitutional law, i.e., of the Constitution’s legal content. This is a question that the most recent draft I have read of Solum’s Semantic
Originalism does not, to my eyes, unequivocally answer. As an empirical matter, I submit, the debate over originalism is principally about
what judges should do or, at a minimum, about what the constitutional
law is, properly understood. It is not about what the Constitution’s
semantic meaning is if we understand semantic meaning to be only an
ingredient (even a substantial ingredient) in its legal meaning.
Accordingly, if the semantic content of the Constitution does not
firmly constrain legal content—if, in other words, it is permissible, on
Solum’s account, for constitutional law to be incompatible with the
text’s (original) semantic content, even putting aside any possible contribution of non-originalist judicial precedents—then his theory might
be entirely acceptable. It just wouldn’t be Originalism as that theory
81

Solum, supra note 39.
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is broadly understood and deployed today. On the other hand (and as
I think is significantly more likely), if Solum’s “contribution thesis”
allows non-originalist elements merely to supplement
underdeterminate (original) semantic meaning—as by reducing
vagueness or by choosing among ambiguous meanings—thus producing legal content that must always be consistent with the (original)
semantic content, then his theory is Originalist. But this robust form
of the contribution thesis will require more argumentation than Solum
has yet supplied for it.
5. Originalism and Stare Decisis
I have already acknowledged that some contemporary theorists
and jurists who purport to be Originalists—Justice Scalia most
famously or notoriously82—would permit judges to continue to abide
by judicial precedents that depart from original constitutional
meaning. Let us call this form of Originalism, if otherwise strong,
“one-exception strong originalism”: Always follow original meaning
except when (a) the relevant judicial precedents depart from original
meaning, and (b) the reasons to adhere to those particular precedents
outweigh the reasons not to.83 Because I employ the Originalist label
as shorthand for the thesis that is presently contested between selfdescribed proponents of “originalism” and their self-described opponents, Originalism is not fully reducible to strong originalism. Rather,
to make more explicit what was intimated in Part I.B.1, Originalism
comprises both true strong originalism and one-exception strong
originalism. This is, to reiterate, a descriptive claim. The more interesting question, much debated in recent years,84 is whether oneexception strong originalism is a tenable position. The challenge for
its proponents, of course, is to muster principled and persuasive
grounds for modifying strong originalism to permit courts to interpret
82 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989).
83 Condition (b) is required by the fact that everybody recognizes that stare decisis is
not an inexorable command, especially in constitutional cases. For Scalia’s views of constitutional stare decisis, see, for example, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–83 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 672–73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
84 See, e.g., Can Originalism Be Reconciled with Precedent? A Symposium on Stare
Decisis, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005). The argument that many judicial constitutional
precedents are irreversible and that stare decisis thus presents a challenge to originalism
was perhaps first pressed in Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). It was contested in Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994).
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the Constitution in line with judicial precedents that departed from
the original meaning without thereby recognizing grounds for other
exceptions, and thereby devolving into a more catholic form of moderate originalism.
To be clear, one who is skeptical that one-exception strong
originalism describes a stable position need not conclude that to
accept this one exception or adjustment to Originalism necessarily
throws us into all-things-considered balancing in every case. The
doubt, rather, is that the rule commentators often discern in Scalia’s
writings—something like “follow original meaning always, except
when judicial precedent departs from the original meaning, and the
reasons for adhering to that judicial precedent appear, on balance,
good”—is likely to be the optimal interpretive rule among all
possibilities.
Why an exception to strong originalism for (some!) nonoriginalist judicial decisions would be both a consequentially good
adjustment to Originalism and the only consequentially good adjustment is, at first blush, mysterious. After all, nonjudicial precedents
have significantly shaped American politics and culture, including
many never subjected to legal challenge, hence never passed on by a
federal court. For example, in 1803 it was vigorously debated whether
the federal government had constitutional authority to acquire territory without a constitutional amendment.85 If a self-proclaimed
Originalist is willing to accommodate stare decisis for reasons of stability and predictability, it is hard to fathom the grounds she might
have for utterly ignoring the precedential significance of the Louisiana
Purchase, as well as any subsequent territorial expansions, were there
no judicial precedent on point.
Strikingly, support for the skeptical position comes from an
unlikely source—Justice Scalia himself. Most commentators, I’d venture, would identify him as a one-exception strong originalist.86 But
the accuracy of the designation is uncertain. Although he seems to
encourage that view in his widely read 1997 book,87 he acknowledged
85

The classic study is EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
LOUISIANA PURCHASE: 1803–1812 (1920). For a recent argument (challenging
conventional wisdom) that Jefferson’s own doubts on this score were well founded, see
generally Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’ Rights
and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343 (2003).
86 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1628 n.31, 1631 (2006) (intimating that Scalia views
stare decisis as only exception to Originalism).
87 See SCALIA, supra note 38, at 138–40 (acknowledging that some judicial precedents
“are effectively irreversible,” and urging that “stare decisis is not part of [his] originalist
philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it”).
OF THE
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in an earlier article that “stare decisis alone is not enough to prevent
originalism from being what many would consider too bitter a pill.”88
Most self-described originalists, he asserted, would temper originalism
with some deference to social changes other than judicial precedent.
And he strongly intimated that he would too.89 By his own (implicit)
admission, then, Justice Scalia is neither a true strong originalist nor a
one-exception strong originalist; he is (in our terms) a moderate
originalist.90 Put another way, Scalian “faint-hearted” originalism is
not identical to one-exception strong originalism: It is a more moderate view. To be sure, Scalia is almost certainly on the stronger end
of moderate originalism than are most academic commentators and
any of his fellow Justices, Thomas excepted. However, to paraphrase
George Bernard Shaw, now we’re just haggling over the price. Of
course, price matters. But (to pursue the metaphor), arguments that
something ought to be valued more (or less) highly are very different
in texture from arguments that the same thing is inalienable or
nontransferable.
That’s the short take on why Originalism and stare decisis make
for an unhappy marriage. Let me now offer a thumbnail sketch of one
way the marriage might be saved, along with brief thoughts about the
risks that the escape route confronts.
As others have noted, there are (at least) two distinct ways to
conceptualize a tempering of strong originalism with stare decisis.91
First, we might urge that the Constitution should be interpreted “in
light of” non-originalist judicial precedent. This is the possibility we
have just been pursuing. As we have seen, it provokes the question of
why the Constitution should not also be interpreted in light of other
considerations, such as changed social norms or practices of the political branches. An alternative conception maintains (with true strong
originalism) that the Constitution ought to be interpreted solely in
accordance with its original meaning but denies that the constitutional
text is the sole source of constitutional law. On this view, judicial
88

Scalia, supra note 82, at 861.
See id.
90 As Randy Barnett notes, Scalia “proves unfaithful to the original meaning of the
text” in yet a third way: “[H]e is willing to ignore the original meaning of those portions of
the Constitution that do not meet his criteria of the rule of law as the law of rules.” Randy
E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 7, 13 (2006). Barnett is surely right that, when original meaning is not sufficiently
rule-like to suit his tastes, Scalia often abandons the former in favor of more rule-like
doctrine that better constrains judges in future cases. However, I’m disposed to treat this
fact, not as a qualification to, or modification of, his basal commitment to Originalism, but
as evidence that, at root, Scalia is not truly an Originalist but rather a rulist.
91 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1132 (2008).
89
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precedents interpreting (or purporting to interpret) the Constitution
are not, as one-exception strong originalism would have it, interpretive considerations; instead, they are independent sources of law.
Surely there is something to this view: In a common law system,
judicial decisions are unquestionably sources of law just like, for
example, constitutions, statutes, and regulations. But that can’t be the
end of the story. To see why, consider what Mark Greenberg has
helpfully dubbed “[t]he Standard Picture of law.”92 That picture has
many elements, but for our purposes two stand out: First, “it is the
linguistic content of an authoritative pronouncement that becomes a
legal norm”;93 second, “in the explanation of why the law has the total
content it does, we appeal to individual legal norms; but in the explanation of an individual legal norm, we do not appeal to the content of
the law, except to individual legal norms vertically above the norm in
question.”94 Given this standard hierarchical conception of law, the
Originalist who would accommodate non-originalist judicial precedents as sources of law must, I think, meet two challenges: first, to
explain why, as sources, judicial decisions are superior to the written
Constitution or even co-equal; and second, to defend a theory that
explains which other texts or phenomena are sources of law too. (To
return to a previous example, if Marbury is a source of law, we need
to know whether the Louisiana Purchase—understood at the time to
be the more momentous constitutional event of 180395—is too, and if
not, why not.) Proposed answers to these questions will almost certainly rely heavily on Article III’s conferral of “[t]he judicial
[p]ower.”96 I cannot pursue this possibility any further here. I’ll
merely confess my doubt that persuasive answers can be derived from
this spare text that are consistent with Originalist premises, especially
premises that would tether us tightly to original public meanings (even
including established technical meanings, including technical legal
meanings) while denying independent relevance to, e.g., framers’ purposes or expectations.97
92 Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents 5 (UCLA Sch. of Law
Research Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103569.
93 Id. at 8.
94 Id. at 10.
95 This is an observation made frequently by my colleague Sandy Levinson. See, e.g.,
Sanford Levinson, Why Professor Lynch Asks the Right Questions, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 45, 48 (2000).
96 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
97 On Greenberg’s view, incidentally, the standard picture is a naive oversimplification.
Rather, he would view the content of law as a complex function of, or operation upon,
legal sources. Determining what the law is, then, depends upon the successful completion
of at least three fairly discrete tasks: identifying legal sources; interpreting these sources to
ascertain their meanings; and combining or integrating these meanings, or these sources, to
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6. Originalism and Transtemporal Integration
Naturally, the original meaning of a provision, P, that was not
part of the originally ratified Constitution has the meaning it bore at
the time it was adopted, say t2 . It is possible, however, that the full
meaning of P—or the full significance of the ratification of P—might
include a transformation of a provision, R, adopted at the earlier time
t1 . It is an interesting question whether, from the perspective of time
t3 , “the original meaning” of R is its meaning at t1 or t2 . Suppose, for
example, that the original meaning of the term “persons” in the Equal
Protection Clause limited its application to persons born alive, but
that a subsequent amendment were to confer some specified rights on
fetuses—say, it prohibits abortion. The meaning of that amendment
might be thought to reverberate back to expand the meaning of the
word “persons” in the Equal Protection Clause. I do not have an
answer to the puzzle of diachronic synthetic constitutional meanings
or to whether the correct answer will require that my definition of
Originalism be modified.98
II
HARD ORIGINALISM
Defenders of Originalism (i.e., defenders of strong originalism)
have advanced a great many more-or-less distinct arguments in its
defense. Two sets of arguments—those based on the nature of interconstitute the law. On this jurisprudential account, there is no one-to-one relationship
between a legal text and the law, thereby (it seems to me) problematizing the very concept
of constitutional law. That is, constitutional law is distinguished from other forms of law,
not in the simple way that it is the meaning (semantic, linguistic, or legal) of the Constitution, but in a more functional sense as being the supreme law. Though I won’t pursue the
issue further, it seems plain to me that to adopt this view would make the Originalist case
harder not easier. Surely one who extols Originalism as a means to limit judicial subjectivity is not likely to smile on a theory that recognizes multiple sources of constitutional
law.
98 Cf. Barnett, supra note 4, at 650; Farber, supra note 1, at 1097 (“[A]n originalist
might take into account not only judicial precedents but also the changing views of those
adopting later constitutional provisions. For example, those who ratified the fourteenth
amendment’s due process clause may have had a broader concept of the meaning of due
process than their predecessors who adopted the fifth amendment’s due process clause.
Yet it would be incongruous to give the two due process clauses different interpretations
today.”); Tribe, supra note 56, at 86–87.
One recently proposed solution that I do feel confident in rejecting is that the original
meaning of a constitutional amendment is constituted by the hypothetical understandings
of a reasonable person at the time of ratification of the 1787 Constitution. See Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 19, at 75–76 (“Though the matter is hardly free of doubt, we offer the
suggestion that the reasonable person of 1788—the original ‘We the People of the United
States’—is the reference point for all interpretative issues until the document itself otherwise specifies.”).
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pretation and on the nature of constitutional authority—are advanced
to support hard Originalism and will be considered here. The
remaining arguments for Originalism appeal to a diversity of values—
democratic self-governance, the rule of law, stability, predictability,
efficiency, and substantive goodness among them—and might seem,
therefore, to amount to a disconnected hodge podge of considerations. In fact, though, I believe such arguments are best viewed as
grounded in the proposition that Originalism produces better consequences than its competitors.99 Such arguments from good consequences seem to support soft Originalism at most and will be
addressed in Part III.
A. Intentionalism and the Meaning of Interpretation
We have assumed thus far that federal judges—Supreme Court
Justices most especially—are, and should be, engaged in the activity of
interpreting the Constitution, understood as the process of deriving or
divining law (or “legal meaning” or “legal content”) from the constitutional text.100 They are engaged, that is, in a particular type or form
99 This strikes me as a fair characterization of extant arguments for Originalism. I do
not want to insist, though, that there is no possible room for arguments that are not most
fairly classified as consequentialist and yet that are more perspicuously viewed as soft than
as hard. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. And keep in mind that the hard/soft
distinction is advanced only as a potentially useful classificatory tool. The core argument
of this Article—that existing arguments for Originalism are extremely unpersuasive and
that the likelihood of ultimately successful arguments is remote—does not depend upon it.
See supra note 28.
100 Many theorists have conceived of constitutional adjudication as consisting of two
distinct steps, both prior to the application of law to facts to reach a case-specific holding.
Originalists like Keith Whittington and Randy Barnett, for example, argue that when constitutional interpretation produces meaning that is vague or ambiguous, other legal actors,
including judges, can make the law more determinate through a process of “constitutional
construction.” See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
(1999); Barnett, supra note 4. Kim Roosevelt and I have argued that courts often (and
permissibly) craft “decision rules” that facilitate the case-by-case application of courtinterpreted constitutional meaning by minimizing some of the costs produced by the fact
that constitutional law is judicially enforced. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 66, at ch. 2;
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); see also
Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.
220, 221 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/march06/berman.pdf
(“[J]udicial review requires devices that direct courts how to decide whether [judgedetermined constitutional] meaning is met.”). Dick Fallon, Henry Monaghan, and Larry
Sager have advanced broadly similar accounts of how courts refine or supplement constitutional norms or propositions. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 1–12, 76–77 (2001) (distinguishing constitutional norms from implementing
doctrine); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1975) (distinguishing “constitutional common
law” from “Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1213–14 (1978) (distinguishing judge-announced “[institutional] constructs” from “consti-
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of interpretation. So, what is interpretation? Unfortunately, this is a
much vexed question.101 To better understand intentionalism, it will
be useful to first posit a definition of interpretation that least commits
us to a contested position in the debates between intentionalists and
their opponents. Following the standard view, let us say that interpretation is the activity of assigning or attributing meaning to a text.
Intentionalism is the theory that the meaning properly attributed
in a successful interpretation is the meaning(s) intended by the text’s
author(s), and therefore that the activity of interpreting a text is an
effort to identify the authorially intended meaning(s). This thesis can
be supported in either of two ways, which intentionalists do not
always clearly distinguish. One can maintain either that authorially
intended meaning is the only coherent meaning of a given text or that,
although a text may possess diverse types of meaning, authorially
intended meaning is the only appropriate target of the activity of
interpretation.102 By either route, intentionalism is a theory of interpretation generally, not a theory of constitutional interpretation in
particular. Intentionalists contend that the interpretation of any
text—a poem, a novel, a musical score, an architectural blueprint, a
sign, a contract, a will, a statute, or a constitution, among innumerable
other things—is necessarily a search for the intentions of the text’s
author(s). As explained by Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels,
the literary theorists who have championed intentionalism most vigorously over the past quarter century, “the meaning of a text is simply
identical to the author’s intended meaning.”103 Stanley Fish, the literary theorist and Milton scholar turned law professor, likewise contends that “[i]nterpretation is the act of trying to figure out what the
tutional norms”). All such accounts, I believe, recognize two conceptually distinct stages
of constitutional adjudication (even if the courts rarely expressly distinguish the two in the
course of their opinions). When I speak of constitutional “interpretation,” I am referring
to the initial and conceptually distinct step of deriving legal meaning or legal content from
the constitutional text.
101 For a compact and reasonably accessible overview of debates over interpretation in
philosophy and literary theory, see GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY
CRITICISMS OF LAW ch. 2 (2000). See also Symposium, Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985). An excellent electronic source is the Johns Hopkins Online Guide to Literary
Theory and Criticism, http://litguide.press.jhu.edu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
102 See infra note 103.
103 Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723,
724 (1982). As this passage suggests, Knapp and Michaels are best read to take the first
position identified in the text accompanying supra note 102. See also generally Steven
Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 790 (1983)
(further developing this position). In doing so, they part ways with their intentionalist
predecessor E.D. Hirsch who, they say, adopts the second. See generally E.D. HIRSCH, JR.,
VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
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author, not the dictionary, meant by his or her (or their) words.”104
As a consequence, “[a]n interpreter cannot disregard [the author’s]
intention and still be said to be interpreting.”105
There are many paths to Originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation. One can be an Originalist with respect to how the
courts should interpret the Constitution without being an intentionalist with respect to how everybody should interpret everything. But
the converse is less clearly true.106 For if one embraces intentionalism,
then Originalism might come to appear as an incontrovertible, even
fairly uninteresting, application of this more general theory of interpretation. It is no surprise, then, that some of today’s most prominent
constitutional Originalists defend that view on straightforwardly
intentionalist premises. As Lino Graglia has put it in a representative
passage, “[I]nterpreting a document means to attempt to discern the
intent of the author; there is no other ‘interpretive methodology’
properly so called.”107 It follows that the application of intentionalism
to constitutional theory ordinarily results in a particular form of
Originalism: one whose focus or object is intentions rather than
public meaning,108 and whose status is hard.109
104 Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1127 (2008).
105 Id. at 1122. Oddly, Fish’s greatest fame as a literary theorist derives from his role as
a proponent of reader-response criticism, which is usually understood to be firmly antiintentionalist. In a postscript to a recent French edition of his famous collection of essays,
Is There a Text in This Class?, however, Fish explains that his earlier work erroneously
conflated descriptive and normative accounts of interpretation. See STANLEY EUGENE
FISH, Postscript to QUAND LIRE C’EST FAIRE: L’AUTORITÉ DES COMMUNAUTÉS
INTERPRÉTATIVES [IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES] (Étienne Dobenesque trans., 2007). His present view is that interpretive
communities do drive what is taken as a successful interpretation in any given time and
place but that the true or correct interpretation is always and necessarily the meaning that
the author intended. See id.
106 I don’t describe the converse as necessarily false only because intentionalism does
not itself have anything to say about whether and when somebody should endeavor to
interpret a text. A constitutional theorist who embraces intentionalism but who rejects the
view (common though it is) that the appropriate relationship between court-announced
constitutional law and the constitutional text is properly described as involving interpretation need not be an Originalist. See infra note 109.
107 Graglia, supra note 23, at 1024; see also, e.g., id. at 1029; Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 388, 397 (1993) (“[T]he meaning of a text is
always what its authors intended it to mean . . . .”).
108 Although intentionalists necessarily focus on the intentions of the text’s authors and
therefore favor intent over public meaning, it does not necessarily follow that they urge
inquiry into the intent of the framers as opposed to that of the ratifiers. It all depends on
whom we identify as the Constitution’s authors. If we conceive of the author as the
ratifiers, then intentionalism can support original ratifiers’ intent originalism. See, e.g.,
Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of
Intentions [hereinafter Alexander, All or Nothing at All?], in LAW AND INTERPRETATION:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 363 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW AND
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This Section aims to assess intentionalism. First, though, let us
clear away one possible misconception. A favorite tactic of intentionalists, especially intentionalist-Originalists, is to appeal to their
readers’ pre-theoretical intuitions that, in a range of everyday contexts, interpreters ought to search for authorially intended meaning.
Thus does Paul Campos suggest that intentionalism’s truth is bolstered by recognizing that you interpret the grocery list given you by
your spouse by trying to ascertain the meaning she intended to
convey.110 That’s a sound intuition, and acting on it will likely make
INTERPRETATION] (arguing that meaning intended by authorities who author legal text
should control); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 667 (2005) (“[N]othing in the logic of interpretation itself can tell
us which of those stages [of drafting, ratification, and judicial review] should count as the
one that confers on the text the meaning we are trying to interpret . . . .”). But see Larry
Alexander, Originalism, or Who Is Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 325–26 (1996)
(seeming to endorse possibility that persons whose intentions count for purposes of constitutional interpretation could be neither framers nor ratifiers but rather average speakers of
English in 1787). This point will bear greater significance later.
In any event, whether the “authors” whose intentions intentionalist-Originalists seek
to discover are the framers or the ratifiers (or somebody else), intentionalist-Originalists
focus on subjective intentions, not objective public meanings. Yet, surprisingly, one prominent Originalist seems to deny precisely that. Michael Paulsen has recently protested that
it is “a caricature of originalism” to portray it as “a version of crude intentionalism that
focuses on the specific subjective intentions or expectations of individuals as to how a provision might be applied.” Instead, he says, originalists “focus[ ] on the objective linguistic
meaning of the words of a text (taken in historical context).” Paulsen, supra note 23, at
2059.
This is a false dichotomy. As I have already suggested, see supra Part I.C.2, Paulsen is
right to deny that contemporary originalists focus on the subjectively intended or expected
applications of the text. But he is wrong to suggest that it follows that contemporary
originalism is focused exclusively on public meaning and not subjective intentions. It does
not follow because authors can have intentions about applications and intentions about
meaning, and these need not be the same thing. See generally BASSHAM, supra note 6, at
29 (distinguishing among an author’s scope beliefs, counterfactual scope beliefs, and
semantic intentions); McConnell, supra note 69, at 1284–85 (criticizing Dworkin for failing
to distinguish between framers’ “expectations about specific applications” and “moral and
political principles they intended to express”). Not only does the conclusion not logically
follow, it is empirically false. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 19, at 49 n.12 (recognizing that “[t]here are notable dissenters who continue to focus on concrete historical
intentions” rather than public meaning).
109 To be sure, this view does not present originalism as inescapable, full stop. It is not
internal to an intentionalist theory of constitutional interpretation that courts engaging in
constitutional adjudication must engage in constitutional interpretation. The possibility
remains, for example, that constitutional adjudication ought to proceed without regard for
the Constitution’s meaning, that we could have constitutional adjudication without constitutional interpretation. A view of this sort still qualifies as a form of hard originalism,
however, for I have defined that term to encompass, in addition to the (super hard) view
that originalist interpretation follows from either necessary or conceptual truths, the (ordinary hard) possibility that such interpretation is logically necessary given a set of premises
that, while not themselves necessary, are in fact noncontroversial.
110 Paul F. Campos, A Text Is Just a Text, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 327–28
(1996); see also, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 106–07 (2004) (discussing inter-
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you a better husband or wife, but the example does not directly
address the relevant question, for nobody denies that intended
meaning is both a valid form of meaning and the frequently appropriate target of interpretation.111 All nonintentionalism denies is that
interpretation must be a search for intended meaning in all interpretive contexts, and with respect to all types of texts—poems and statutes as much as grocery lists, invitations, and instruction manuals.
Nonintentionalism as a general theory of interpretation is no more
anti-intentionalism than non-originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation is anti-originalism.112 Accordingly, the question is not
what can be said in favor of interpreting a text in accordance with
presumed authorial intentions. The question concerns what can be
said for always interpreting all texts solely in accordance with presumed authorial intent.
This Section examines that question in several steps. Part II.A.1
sets the table by introducing terms and by providing some reasons to
doubt that authorially intended meaning—what I will call “utterer’s
meaning”—is the sole coherent meaning of a text or the sole proper
target of interpretation. Part II.A.2 identifies and rebuts one argument frequently advanced against nonintentionalist interpretation,
namely, that intentionalist interpretation follows from the fact that the
act of interpretation presupposes an author. Part II.A.3 identifies
what I understand to be the strongest argument for intentionalism—
what we can call the argument from rationality—and disambiguates it
into two variants. Part II.A.4 argues that neither variant is persuasive.
Part II.A.5 is more constructive, although also more exploratory and
less essential to the burden of this Article. It sketches the contours of
a more pluralist theory of interpretation and draws forth one implication for debates about constitutional interpretation.
pretation of recipe); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967, 975 (2004) (discussing interpretation of order in restaurant).
111 This point is forcefully emphasized in, for example, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word
Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 468 (2005). Even the New
Critics who launched the assault on intentionalism in the first half of the last century were
arguing about how to interpret literary works. They acknowledged that many texts ought
to be interpreted in accordance with the apparent intent of their authors. See, e.g., BINDER
& WEISBERG, supra note 101, at 117. As the prominent New Critic Monroe Beardsley
emphasized:
No one can deny that there are many practical occasions on which our task is
precisely to try to discover authorial meaning, or intention: . . . . When there is
a difficulty in reading a will or a love letter, or in grasping an oral promise or
instruction, our primary concern is with authorial meaning.
MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, THE POSSIBILITY OF CRITICISM 31 (1970).
112 See supra Part I.B.2.
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1. Preliminaries
A text or an utterance is a particular instance or token of expression. Before we analyze whether, as intentionalists contend, the
author’s intended meaning determines or constitutes the true or correct meaning of her utterance, and thus the proper target of interpretation, we should get clear on what the alternatives might be.
Unfortunately, literary critics, linguists, and philosophers of art and of
language have reached no consensus on the number of distinct and
plausible candidate meanings that an utterance might have: They
employ a large number of different terms even when seeming to refer
to the same concept.113 So any brief statement of the state of contemporary understanding is necessarily both simplified and contestable.
That said, here’s one useful way to describe the range of possible
meanings of an utterance:
Word-sequence meaning: “the meaning (or, usually, meanings)
attachable to a sequence of words taken in the abstract in virtue of
the operative syntactic and semantic (including connotative) rules
of the specific, time-indexed, language in which those words are
taken to occur.”
Utterer’s meaning: “the meaning an intentional agent (speaker,
writer) has in mind or in view to convey by the use of a given verbal
vehicle.”
Utterance meaning: “the meaning that such a vehicle ends up conveying in its context of utterance—which context includes its being
uttered by such-and-such agent.”
Ludic meaning: “any meanings that can be attributed to either a
brute text (a word sequence in a language), or a text-as-utterance, in
virtue of interpretive play constrained by only the loosest requirements of plausibility, intelligibility, or interest.”114

Some theorists, Knapp and Michaels most notably, appear to collapse word-sequence meaning and utterance meaning and to deny that
they are distinct from utterer’s meaning. On this view, language has
no meaning apart from or prior to its use by a speaker or author on a
113 The most familiar distinction, initially proposed by Paul Grice half a century ago, lies
between speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE
WAY OF WORDS chs. 5–6 (1989). Yet theorists continue to debate exactly how Grice
meant to distinguish these two types of meaning and whether the distinction, as Grice is
best understood to have drawn it, can be defended. See generally Stephen Neale, Paul
Grice and the Philosophy of Language, 15 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 509 (1992). I will eschew
the terms “speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning” to try to reduce the risk that I be
understood to incorporate aspects of the Gricean intentionalist apparatus.
114 Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look, in INTENTION AND
INTERPRETATION 221, 222–23 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992).
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given occasion. For well-rehearsed reasons, however, this is an
extremely implausible position.
First, words must have meaning prior to their deployment by a
particular speaker in a particular context, because the speaker must
have a reason to select particular words (or signs or marks), rather
than others, as the vehicle for conveying his intended meaning (aside,
of course, from cases in which the speaker self-consciously coins new
words). For example, if, wanting the whitish mineral that enhances a
food’s flavor, I know to ask you to “please pass the salt” and not to
“please pass the gas” (let alone, to “flymx groppo hurplebinger”),
that’s because “salt” means the thing I have in mind antecedent to my
choice to use it in this context, and “gas” doesn’t.115 Likewise, you
know that my utterance of the word “salt” in this context is evidence
of my wanting salt because of the meaning conventionally assigned to
the word prior to my usage. Indeed, because intentions are states with
semantic content, their content cannot be reduced to intentions on
pain of infinite regress.116
Second, we need some notion of word or sentence meanings that
are nonidentical to the author’s intended meanings just to express the
mundane idea that a speaker has misspoken or in some other way
erred in use of language. We know that “‘meaning’ and ‘authorial
intention’ are not conceptually identical . . . by the mere fact that we
can meaningfully ask whether a given text really conveys the author’s
intention.”117 If I do ask you to “pass the gas” when I really want the
salt, and then I complain about the consequences, we know that I
have erred in my use of language. I erred precisely because “gas”
does not mean “salt”—not because saltness is naturally excluded from
115

As Fred Schauer has put the point:
Yet if language is [intentionalist] in this sense, it is hard to imagine why a
word or a phrase is a piece of evidence of one intention rather than another
intention. . . . Then, for language to be evidence of “something” rather than
“something else,” it must have some independent capacity without circular reference to the subject of which it is evidence. To put it somewhat more simply,
the ability of language to be evidence of something presupposes that language,
according to rules of language or according to conventions of language, can
carry meaning.
If language itself can carry meaning, however, then it turns out that as a
descriptive account of language, [intentionalism] is not plausible.
Frederick Schauer, Defining Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 344 (1996).
116 See, e.g., Colin Lyas, Wittgensteinian Intentions, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION,
supra note 114, at 132, 146–47. For the qualification that this argument works only when
(as is usually the case) the author’s intentions are linguistic in character, see George Dickie
& W. Kent Wilson, The Intentional Fallacy: Defending Beardsley, 53 J. AESTHETICS & ART
CRITICISM 233, 237–38 (1995).
117 Richard Shusterman, Interpreting with Pragmatist Intentions, in INTENTION AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 114, at 167, 168.
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the combination of sounds or markings that constitute “gas,” but
because of common usage and understandings. The simple idea that I
misspoke is close to inexpressible if the only meaning of meaning is
utterer’s meaning. For in that event, “gas” does mean salt. So, again,
there must be conventional word meanings that are external and prior
to the intent of an author. Because both of these arguments apply as
well for conventional rules of grammar, it seems to follow that a given
utterance has a word-sequence meaning that may or may not be the
same as its utterer’s meaning.
We can make this discussion more concrete with an example,
what I’ll call Announcement. Suppose that a radio station is giving
away tickets to a concert on the Rolling Stones’ farewell tour (or,
more realistically, the Stones’ latest “farewell tour”). The station
offers free tickets to the first ten persons who correctly answer a set of
trivia questions, with the caveat, specified in the contest announcement, that “no submissions will be eligible for consideration if
received before 12:00 a.m. Thursday.” Suppose further that the
author or promulgator of the announcement mistakenly believed that
“12:00 a.m.” means noon and therefore intended to provide that applications are ineligible for consideration if received before midday
Thursday. Nonetheless, the dictionary meaning of “12:00 a.m.” is midnight. Therefore, the word-sequence meaning of the announcement
provides that applications are eligible for consideration if received any
time on Thursday (or any day thereafter). In contrast, according to
the utterer’s meaning of the announcement, some of these submissions are premature and thus ineligible for the tickets.
What about utterance meaning? The short answer is that it
depends upon further information about the context of utterance. For
example, if submissions had to be hand delivered during regular business hours, then the audience might infer that the speaker had misspoken and had intended to require that applications be submitted
after Thursday noon. So too, perhaps, if the radio station had commonly followed a practice of commencing contests at noon. In circumstances such as these, the utterance meaning of the announcement
would likely depart from the word-sequence meaning and correspond
to the utterer’s meaning. But the context could be otherwise. Absent
any contextual clues that might serve to undermine the wordsequence meaning—if, among other things, for example, entries could
be submitted by email or fax—then the utterance meaning—what the
announcement is taken to mean by the audience—would likely track
the word-sequence meaning and differ from the utterer’s meaning.
Let us suppose that this is the case in Announcement.
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Suppose, finally, that a dispute arises. The contest organizer
decides to exclude the handful of correct entries submitted between
12:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. Thursday on the grounds that they did not
comply with the announcement, as interpreted in accordance with its
utterer’s meaning. The disappointed contestants, let us imagine, do
not challenge the veracity of the radio station’s assertion that, by
“12:00 a.m.,” the announcement’s author had meant noon. But, they
insist, that’s not what the announcement means. In this context, the
meaning of the utterance is its utterance meaning, not its utterer’s
meaning, and that meaning is midnight not noon. So, they conclude,
the disputed entries are eligible under the contest rules, as set forth in
the announcement. Who’s right?
Nonintentionalists are apt to side with the disappointed contestants. Although it is often most sensible to interpret a text in accordance with its presumed utterer’s meaning, in this case a host of
arguments militate in favor of an interpretation that accords with
utterance meaning. Not only is this the most equitable resolution,
because a contrary interpretation would unfairly disappoint the contestants’ reasonable expectations, but it is most consistent with the
functions that public announcements are designed to serve—to provide clear notice and certainty, without requiring the addressees to
inquire deeply beyond the face of the document. Intentionalists
would seem to differ.118 The meaning of the announcement, they say,
118 I say “seem” because, in correspondence, Jonathan Gingerich has argued that this
example doesn’t rebut intentionalism because the reasons for interpreting a text in any
given context rest on the author’s intention. E-mail from Jonathan Gingerich, J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, to author (Jan. 19, 2008, 20:38:00 EST) (on file with the New
York University Law Review). In particular, we interpret the announcement to mean midnight instead of noon only because its author intended the text to mean whatever a competent speaker of the language would ordinarily understand it to mean. First and foremost,
Gingerich supposes, she intended to put people on notice, and while she may also have
intended that “12:00 a.m.” mean “noon,” the former intention was more important to her
than the latter. If she were to read the text after it had been published, she would probably
agree that it meant midnight. So, the intentionalist could say, when we ascribe the utterance meaning to a text, we’re doing so because we’ve decided that the author of the text
intended it to have whatever meaning it would ordinarily be given by a competent speaker
of the language, and that this intention was more important to the author than other, possibly conflicting, intentions about the meaning of particular words.
I think this effort to avoid a conflict between intentionalists and their opponents does
not succeed because it is an entirely contingent question whether the author of the
announcement did intend the text to mean “whatever a competent speaker of the language
would ordinarily understand it to mean.” That could be, but I don’t think that it must be,
and I believe that our disposition to interpret the text to mean midnight doesn’t depend on
whether the author did in fact have the intention Gingerich posits. If the author (perhaps
unreasonably) continues to insist that the announcement ought to be interpreted and
enforced in accordance with utterer’s meaning, I maintain that most of us would just
respond that, actually, the announcement means midnight, and be done with it—without
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is just the meaning intended by its author, which, by hypothesis, is that
entries are ineligible if received prior to Thursday noon. Of course,
they may hasten to add, that does not mean that we must enforce the
announcement against the entrants. Whatever reasons nonintentionalists put forth for assigning to the announcement its utterance
meaning intentionalists could (but need not) recognize as reasons for
reforming the rules or choosing not to enforce them according to their
meaning. Still, they say, the station manager is right, and the disappointed contestants wrong, about what the announcement means. It
means its utterer’s meaning, not its word-sequence meaning or its
utterance meaning.
I submit that the nonintentionalist position is far more plausible.
It seems to me, first, that the contestants should prevail and, second,
that they should do so, not because we choose for reasons of fairness
or otherwise not to enforce the meaning of the announcement, but
because the contestants are right about what the announcement
means. Of course, this is more assertion than argument. But at this
early stage of the dialectic, my modest goal is simply to establish the
strong prima facie grounds for believing that the author’s intended
meaning is not the only possible meaning, hence not the only possible
target of interpretation, and therefore (to speak loosely) that the argumentative burden appropriately falls upon the intentionalists.
2. One Bad Argument for Intentionalism
An early gambit in the intentionalist offensive is to attack the
idea that meaning could simply “inhere” in a text.119 If the drippings
from a stalactite make impressions on the ground that resemble the
English word “dogs,” it does not follow that the impressions constitute
a text with the same meaning as the English word. The markings have
no meaning precisely because they were not intended by an author to
mean something. Similarly, if my toddler’s scribblings resemble the
English word “dogs,” it does not follow that the “text” has the same
meaning as do the same markings in the sentence “my daughter is
very fond of our neighbor’s dogs.” Now, that sentence does mean
something because I intend it to do so. But what it means (say the
intentionalists) depends on my intention—whether I intended to
convey my daughter’s liking for our neighbor’s two Irish Setters or for
our neighbor’s delicate and well-pedicured feet. Again, if I report that
bothering to reconcile this fact with any other intentions the author might (or might not)
have had.
119 For a representative argument that proceeds along the following lines, see Alexander
& Prakash, supra note 110, at 974–82.
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“my daughter is very fond of our neighbor’s canards,” the meaning of
the utterance depends on whether I intend, with that last word, to be
speaking English or French. As Fish summarizes:
[L]exical items and grammatical structures by themselves will yield
no meaning—will not even be seen as lexical items and grammatical
structures—until they are seen as having been produced by some
intentional agent. A text whose meaning seems perspicuous and
obvious right off the bat is a text for which an intentional context
has already been assumed . . . . It is the specification or assumption
of intention that comes first; the fact of a text with meaning comes
second. The text, in short, has no independence; it is an entirely
derivative entity—something else (an animating intention) must be
in place before it can emerge, as text—and as a derivative entity it
cannot be said to be the source or location of meaning.120

Alexander and Prakash are more succinct: “[I]ntention free interpretation is an impossibility.”121
To this general line of argument, however, nonintentionalists
have a ready rejoinder, for they need not contend that meaning simply
inheres in shapes or sounds or even in lexical items fashioned around
grammatical structures. Some nonintentionalists deny that we need to
assume authorial intentions at all. For them, nonhuman artifacts can
have semantic meaning.122 But we need not go quite that far to rebut
intentionalism, either generally or as applied to the Constitution.
Even granting arguendo that fully intention-free interpretation is
impossible, that doesn’t get the intentionalists where they want to go.
We could agree that the intention of an agent to convey meaning is
necessary for the text thereby produced to bear meaning—we can
even agree that the text’s meaning depends upon the language that
the author intended to employ and that it must even be sensitive to
the category of utterance she intended to make (a poem, a law, an
advertisement, etc.)—without agreeing that the meaning that the text
thereby bears must be the meaning that its author intended.123 As
already noted, utterance meaning does depend upon context and convention; it just does not depend upon the particular meaning the
speaker intended to convey. We might say, in other words, that some
120

Fish, supra note 23, at 635.
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 110, at 967.
122 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Interpreting Interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 108, at 1, 8; Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 111, at 474–77.
123 See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate Versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and
Michaels Revisited, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669, 670 (2005) (arguing that authorial intention
to convey meaning is necessary for text to have meaning but not sufficient to establish what
that meaning is); Levinson, supra note 114, at 232 (distinguishing semantic from categorial
intentions).
121
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authorial intentions (to communicate and to use a particular language,
for example, and perhaps also to create a text of a particular type or
category) could be preconditions to interpretation (if they are even
that), without any such intentions necessarily serving as the targets of
interpretation. The fact (if true) that an interpreter must necessarily
have “assumed an intention”124 does not entail that interpretation
must be a search for utterer’s meaning—it does not, that is, entail
intentionalism. The question, therefore, remains: Is it a conceptual
truth that interpretation is just a search for the author’s intended
meanings, or could it be, at least in some contexts, an effort to discern
or discover other meanings?
3. Intentionalism and the Argument(s) from Rationality
To support their negative answer, the intentionalists require an
additional argument. Here, again, is Fish:
When there is no credible information about the intent of the
author, you abandon interpretation, which is the effort to determine
that intent and try something else. Trying something else, like putting a fictive intention in the place of the one you were unable to
specify, might be just what the situation requires—you have to do
something—but just don’t call it interpretation.125

If Fish’s insistence that you not call the something in which you’re
engaged “interpretation” looks stipulative to you, you’re not alone.
As Fish acknowledges:
At this point someone always objects, why not? And who are you
to say what is and is not interpretive? Aren’t you just foisting (or
attempting to foist) a stipulative definition on us? It is certainly
true that if you want to call something (including flipping a coin for
that matter) interpretation, I can’t stop you. And, as a matter of
fact, I don’t have a strong stake in the word interpretation; it’s the
rationality of the activity, by whatever name, that I am interested in,
so let me rephrase: if what you’re trying to do is figure out what
somebody meant by something, asking what somebody else might
have meant by it is not going to get you there . . . .126

Much in this passage is distracting. Surely Fish is right to disavow any
claims of linguistic necessity—views about what the word “interpretation” must mean—but none of his opponents thinks otherwise. He’s
124 See Fish, supra note 23, at 632–33 (“Words alone, without an animating intention, do
not have power, do not have semantic shape, and are not yet language; and when someone
tells you (as a textualist always will) that he or she is able to construe words apart from
intention and then proceeds (triumphantly) to do it, what he or she will really have done is
assumed an intention without being aware of having done so.” (italics in original omitted)).
125 Fish, supra note 104, at 1129.
126 Id. at 1133.
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also right that if we’re trying to figure out what somebody meant by
something, then what we should ask about is, well, what that somebody meant. Again, this is not controversial. The contested question
is whether we should be trying to figure out what somebody meant by
something. And Fish’s answer to that question is yes: We take interpretation to be a rational activity, and it can be rational only if it is a
search for utterer’s meaning. As he elaborates:
For interpretation to be a rational activity and not a form of what
H.L.A. Hart calls “scorer’s discretion,” there must be an object
prior to and independent of the interpreter’s activities, an object in
relation to which you can marshal and assess evidence and measure
progress. The text cannot be that object because until an intention
has been posited for it, it is radically unstable, it doesn’t stand still.
The desire of the interpreter cannot be that object because it is a
moving and ever changing target; it doesn’t stand still. The only
object of interpretation that makes it a rational activity rather than
a free-for-all is the intention of the author.127

Similarly, the literary theorists Knapp and Michaels explain that
“the main point of intentionalism” is that “we can only make sense of
what people are doing when they disagree with each other about the
meaning of a text if we suppose that they regard the text as meaning
what its author actually (and not just apparently) intended.”128
This intentionalist argument should look very familiar, for
Originalists of all stripes—those who do, and those who don’t,
embrace intentionalism—frequently contend that constitutional interpreters face just two choices: either to search for the original object or
127 Id. at 1138 n.98 (citation omitted). Although the passage above recognizes only
three possible interpretive objects—authorial intention, inherent textual meaning, and the
interpreter’s desires—elsewhere Fish has contemplated a somewhat richer menu of alternatives: “Nor,” he added (in that earlier formulation),
does a text mean what is specified by the conventions of the day because conventions do not have intentions and they do not author texts. Nor does it
mean what the ordinary or ideal or reasonable interpreter would mean by the
words because none of those authored the text either, and declaring any one of
them the author by fiat would amount to rewriting, not interpreting.
Fish, supra note 23, at 644–45.
But these arguments for rejecting, as the target of interpretation, the meanings that
conventions and hypothetical reasonable interpreters (or speakers) seem to direct are circular: That conventions do not have intentions and do not author texts is a reason why a
text does not mean what the conventions prescribe only on the assumption that authorial
intentions are the key to meaning. That one who would identify a text’s meaning as what
would be meant by an ordinary or ideal or reasonable interpreter effectively declares one
of them the author by fiat and assumes that the meaning must come from the author and
nowhere else. But both assumptions capture precisely what is in dispute.
128 Knapp & Michaels, supra note 108, at 664. This is the overarching theme of HIRSCH,
supra note 103.
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simply to give effect to their own personal preferences.129 Here, the
intentionalists seem to be making the similar but broader claim that if
we aren’t searching for the authorially intended meaning, we’re just
making it all up, and whatever interpretation is, one thing it’s clearly
not is that. I believe that we have reached the fulcrum of the intentionalist argument and therefore that it warrants being parsed more
carefully.
As I read them, passages of this sort can be parsed into two distinct but related arguments, relying on two distinct major premises
about the nature of interpretation. The weaker version maintains (as
I will put it) that some claimed interpretations of a text must, in principle, be excludable. Call this the exclusion premise. Stated differently, interpretation must proceed on principles that preserve a
limited range of possible mappings of meanings onto texts and that
ensure that a change in text at least has the potential to dictate a
change in the set of permissible interpretations. Otherwise, putative
interpretation is an unconstrained exercise in wish fulfillment. The
stronger version maintains not merely that some meanings must be
invalid as interpretations of a text but that a single meaning is
uniquely correct, or that candidate interpretations must be capable of
being true. Call this the truth premise. (Of course, the truth premise
entails the exclusion premise, but not vice versa.) In both versions,
this general premise about the nature of interpretation is married to a
claim that the relevant conceptual constraint on the nature of interpretation can be satisfied if but only if the correct interpretation, and
thus the target of the activity of interpretation, is the authorially
intended meaning. The arguments can be formalized as follows:
Argument for intentionalism—weak version
W1: It is a conceptual truth about an act of interpretation that some
putative interpretations are excluded. (The exclusion premise)
W2: The only way that some putative interpretations can be
excluded is if interpretation is a search for the meaning intended by
the text’s author.
W3: Therefore, interpretation is a search for the meaning intended
by the text’s author.

Argument for intentionalism—strong version
129 See, e.g., DOJ SOURCEBOOK, supra note 19, at 4 (“[I]f the courts go beyond the
original meaning of the Constitution . . . . [t]hey transform our constitutional democracy
into a judicial aristocracy, and abandon the rule of law based on a judge’s subjective
notions of what is best for society.”); Barnett, supra note 4, at 651 (presenting strong
originalism as only alternative to allowing government officials to give meaning to
Constitution “in their unfettered discretion”).
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S1: It is a conceptual truth about any act of interpretation that only
one among the non-excluded interpretations is true or correct. (The
truth premise)
S2: The only way that some putative interpretations can be rendered true or correct is if interpretation is a search for the meaning
intended by the text’s author.
S3: Therefore, interpretation is a search for the meaning intended
by the text’s author.

Two things make these formalizations attractive as alternative
renditions of the intentionalist position. First, each presents intentionalism as, in essence, a conceptual claim, not a normative one, which is
how intentionalists argue. Second, each presents the conceptual claim
as the result of an argument, not merely as an assertion. I’ll explain.
One difficulty with assessing intentionalism is that, for those sympathetic to it, it’s close to bedrock. Much like retributivists regarding
criminal punishment find it hard to persuade skeptics because their
arguments often so closely approximate the bare assertion that wrongdoers simply deserve to suffer, intentionalists’ premises often look
much like the conclusion that interpretation just is the search for
intended meaning. Insofar as intentionalists’ arguments proceed
along the preceding lines, they can satisfy the requirement that their
conclusion is nonidentical to their premises.
4. Nonintentionalism, Rationality, and Truth
Because the two arguments for intentionalism just sketched are
valid, nonintentionalists can rebut the conclusion only by challenging
the premises—either the conceptual desiderata reflected in premises
W1 or S1 or the contention (captured in premises W2 and S2) that
intentionalism provides the only way to satisfy them.
The weak version need not detain us long, for it is pretty clear
that W2 is false. Consider again Announcement. I can interpret that
utterance to mean that entries are acceptable if received anytime
Thursday or thereafter even if I don’t intend to apply, indeed have no
stake in the answer. And I can continue to believe that is the better
interpretation even after I learn that the author meant to require that
applications be submitted no earlier than twelve hours later. That’s
what she meant, I’ll say, but that’s not what the announcement means.
I understand that intentionalists disagree. But disagreement is not
argument. And insofar as their argument depends upon the view that
my contrary position would render interpretation irrational because
my efforts would lack “point and sense,”130 or because, once we
130

Fish, supra note 23, at 644.
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untether meaning from authorial intention, a text can mean just anything at all, their position is plainly mistaken. In short, the choice set
that the intentionalist offers—interpretation is either a search for the
authorially intended meaning or is utterly unconstrained—represents
a false dichotomy. Utterance meaning is not ludic meaning. It is substantially constrained by conventions.
The strong version of the intentionalist argument is not quite as
quickly dismissed. Even if interpretation of a text in accordance with
its utterance meaning can satisfy the exclusion premise, intentionalists
might argue, that does not satisfy the truth premise, because to recognize appropriate interpretive targets or touchstones in addition to
utterer’s meaning leaves us without a basis for selecting the correct
meaning. Because nonintentionalists don’t deny that utterer’s
meaning is frequently the correct meaning of a text—as in most conversational and reportorial contexts—then utterance meaning cannot
generally supply the correct or true interpretation of a text. Only by
privileging utterer’s meaning as the correct meaning of a text can we
ensure that interpretations can be validated across interpretive contexts. And if this is so, then to assign utterance meaning as the
meaning of a text when it departs from utterer’s meaning is to misinterpret it.
For two independent reasons, though, this strong argument is not
persuasive. First, it is not obvious that there must be a true or correct
interpretation in all cases. Many commentators seem to accept S1 as
almost axiomatic. But as Joseph Margolis has observed, “[N]o one
has shown why nonconverging interpretations cannot be legitimately
defended.”131 And it might be, he has further suggested, that—at
least in the case of certain types of texts, like artworks—interpretations are more reasonably assessed, not as true or false, but as more or
less plausible, where “criteria of critical plausibility . . . entail (1) compatibility with the describable features of given [texts] and (2) conformability with relativized canons of interpretation that themselves
fall within the tolerance of an historically continuous tradition of
interpretation.”132 If something like this is right—and I am tentatively
sympathetic—then S1 is false and S3 unsupported.
Second and alternatively, S2 is itself highly doubtful because it
rests on the puzzling assumption that the truth conditions that validate
one interpretation must be the same as those that validate all interpretations. Yet there’s another possibility: The truth conditions for an
131 Joseph Margolis, Robust Relativism, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note
114, at 41.
132 Id. at 48.
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interpretation could vary across categories of utterance; what makes
the interpretation of a personal letter or a grocery list true might not
be the same as what makes the interpretation of a poem true, or an
announcement, or a statute, or a constitution.133 There are many
deeper accounts of interpretation that would yield a heterogeneity of
interpretive truth conditions. I couldn’t possibly identify, let alone
assay, them all. Nor can I elaborate and defend any particular theory
in an already lengthy article whose main aim is critical, not constructive. Still, for purposes of illustration if nothing else, here’s the skeleton of one account of interpretation that fits the bill: Interpretation
might be understood as an effort to attribute to a text the meaning
that would best serve a hypothetical reasonable interpreter’s reasons
for engaging in the activity of interpretation or would best serve her
(possibly inchoate or not wholly conscious) criteria for success. And if
the reasons that our hypothetical reasonable interpreter has for interpreting a particular text are varied, then so will be her criteria of success. The best or correct interpretation will thus be a complex
function involving disparate desiderata all satisfied to varying
degrees.134
To put the claim more simply, our reasons for interpreting the
text at all might themselves provide reasons for or against the different interpretive targets. Attending to the reasons for engaging in
the activity of interpretation in a given context can help us resolve
when to interpret in accordance with utterance meaning, utterer’s
meaning, or something else. This “pluralist” claim is not, as one
Originalist has suggested dismissively,135 that using utterer’s meaning
is good enough for insignificant texts but that we should pursue a dif133 Some texts might occupy more than one category of utterance—either by virtue of
an author’s multiple categorial intentions or perhaps given needs of different audiences.
An expatriate poet working as a spy might pen verse that is intended to function both as an
elegy and as a report about the enemy’s munitions capacity. As a clandestine report, the
text’s meaning is utterer’s meaning; as a poem, its meaning might be something else.
134 This view bears some similarity to Andrei Marmor’s, the principal difference being
that he would describe interpretations that do not seek to attribute to a text the meaning
actually intended by its author as attributions of counterfactual intentions to fictitious or
stipulated authors. See MARMOR, supra note 5, at 21–25. A kindred view has been
advanced under the caption “hypothetical intentionalism” in Levinson, supra note 114.
See also Daniel O. Nathan, Irony, Metaphor, and the Problem of Intention, in INTENTION
AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 114, at 183, 202 n.29 (citing works); William E. Tolhurst,
On What a Text Is and How It Means, 19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 3, 11–12 (1979). As I
understand it, Marmor’s approach and others like it preserve the structure or “grammar”
of intentionalism but abandon its substance. I am weakly disposed to find the fictitious
author device unnecessary and potentially misleading. But hypothetical intentionalism is
enough to defeat Originalism.
135 Cf. Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Law
Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2224 (2006) (“If we have
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ferent meaning when it comes to texts that are, in some sense, important. Rather, the claim is that our object or target of interpretation
should be sensitive to our reasons for engaging in the activity of interpretation. When interpreting the grocery list, aim for the author’s
intended meaning because he or she had knowledge, which you lack,
that is relevant to your reasons for interpreting the document. Interpret the announcement in pursuit of utterance meaning because doing
so best advances the values that surround and inform the use of
announcements—to promote shared understandings, notice, fairness.
And so on.136
On either of these alternative views—(a) that it need not be the
case for all interpretations that there exists a truth of the matter, and
(b) that proposed interpretations of a text are always truth-apt but
that the truth conditions vary across utterance types—the proper
target of interpretation can be sensitive to the type of text at issue and
to the types of reasons for interpreting it (either the reasons that motivate an actual interpreter or those that would motivate the hypothetical reasonable interpreter). This would explain why we can make
sense of disagreement about meaning (in the way, I am willing to suppose, that we cannot make sense of disagreements over which is
tastier—chocolate or vanilla) without the subject of that disagreement
necessarily having anything to do with authorial intentions: We can
sensibly argue both about what our goals should be and about how
they will be best served. When the reader’s purpose in interpreting a
text is to coordinate with the author or to glean information from him,
she will rarely have any reason to engage in nonintentionalist interpretation. Or if she does have any such reason, her reasons to seek
the authorially intended meaning will clearly dominate. But not all
communication is designed to effect coordination or convey information. Constitutions, to take one salient example, might be designed—
and, in any event, might be understood and valued—in part to secure
good outcomes within broad constraints. Thus, the standards that
determine whether a given interpretation is true (or, on Margolis’s
approach, more or less plausible) would not be determined by conceptual truths standing wholly apart from our reasons for engaging in
interpretive activity. Rather, our reasons for engaging in interpretation (understood as activity) would partly determine the standards by
which interpretations (understood now as the output of the activity)
are measured.
identified some method of finding meaning in inconsequential documents, we can apply
the same method to finding meaning in consequential documents.”).
136 I note in passing that utterance meaning and ludic meaning together describe a
broad terrain that might, with profit, be more finely subdivided.
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5. Interpretation and Living Constitutionalism
The immediately preceding analysis successfully counters the
argument that intentionalism is demanded on the grounds that it
alone can satisfy the critical conceptual premises regarding what interpretation is. Because we already saw that the other principal intentionalist arguments are insufficient (those relying on our untutored
intuitions about the frequent propriety of intentionalist interpretation
and on the proposition that meaning depends upon some sort of
authorial intentions), that is enough to throw intentionalism into
grave doubt. This final subsection briefly highlights one consequence
of the rather general view of interpretation roughly sketched in Part
II.A.4 as it bears on the subject of legal interpretation.
If you interpret a poem, or even a novel, your interpretation is
essentially private. It is not an essential part of the nature of your
activity that you can gain adherents to your view. This is not to say
that you feel free to embrace, even just for yourself, any interpretation
at all. Because we are already enmeshed in a set of cultural understandings that treat interpreting a text and authoring it as nonidentical
(even if the precise nature or contours of the difference are not clear),
you are likely not free, psychologically or phenomenologically, to
offer interpretations that would serve to efface, for you, the interpretation/authorship distinction. (This is why the account of interpretation that I’m floating would not count as a genuine interpretation a
reading motivated just to advance the putative interpreter’s narrow
self-interest. The reader can claim to be interpreting the text, but
saying does not make it so.) My point, rather, is that it is no obvious
threat to your project that you and your friends and neighbors might
each come to interpret the poem differently.
Things are different when it comes to legal texts, whose interpretation has a public or shared aspect. And things are vastly different
when it comes to the interpretation of legal texts by judges in legal
cultures broadly like ours. It is surely part of their criteria for success
for engaging in the activity of legal interpretation not only that the
interpretation reached fits the judge’s own (probably inchoate) sense
of what distinguishes interpretation from authorship but also that it
has the capacity to win public acceptance as an interpretation. Success
on this count requires a grasp of the contemporary society’s argumentative culture—i.e., it requires awareness of the sorts of arguments
that might persuade in the relevant context. And while there exists no
comprehensive or authoritative guidebook to, or restatement of, the
society’s argumentative norms, nobody doubts that such norms exist
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and constitute only a fraction of the arguments that are possible.137
This fact imposes additional constraints on the judicial interpretive
enterprise and helps explain why, as Jefferson Powell observed two
decades ago, “American constitutional discourse is not and has never
been a free wheeling debate over personal political views, notwithstanding the almost hysterical claim of some contemporary originalists
that this is what it has become.”138
The fact that acceptance-as-interpretation is likely to be a significant judicial criterion of success also helps make sense of several
aspects of contemporary judicial, academic, and political practice.
First, it helps explain why some Originalists, even those with little skill
or training in the essentially philosophical questions concerning the
nature of interpretation generally, would press their case so fiercely in
the public square. The reason is not that intentionalism is true but
that a sufficient change in popular understandings could, at least in
principle, render nonintentionalist judicial interpretations substantially less eligible.
Second, it partially explains why judges are so often influenced by
evolving popular understandings. Suppose, for example, that the
meaning of the phrase “freedom of the press” originally intended by
the authors and ratifiers of the First Amendment was “freedom from
prior restraints,” or that the original meaning of “freedom of speech”
was something like “freedom of political discussion,” or that “free
exercise [of religion]” was originally understood to refer only to
choices regarding which religious practices to exercise and excluded
any supposed freedom to refrain from religious practice entirely.
Today, however, all these phrases mean something much broader—
inside the courts and on the streets. Precisely what they are generally
taken to mean today is not essential to the present argument. The
137 Compare Gerald Postema’s explanation of how “the collaborative nature of” the
common law disciplines analogical reasoning:
While it is always individuals who participate in analogical reasoning in law,
they proceed with a keen sense that they deliberate, as Hart put it, not each for
his own part only, but as members of a larger whole. . . . This capacity for
reflective judgment is a social capacity, the ability to reason from a body of
supposed shared experiences to solutions to new practical problems, to judge
what one has good reason to believe others in the community would also
regard as reasonable and fitting. These judgments can be made with confidence, not because one is a good predictor of other’s behaviour, but because
one understands at a concrete level the common life in which they all
participate.
Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 607 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (citation omitted). I am making a broadly similar claim about the interpretation of
legal texts.
138 H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 697 (1987).
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important point is twofold. First, we should expect judges to treat
conformity with present extrajudicial constitutional understandings as
relevant to their interpretive project. Second, to the extent that is so,
the intentionalists’ fear that nonintentionalist interpretation must
devolve into simple wish fulfillment is again undermined. It is possible for an interpreter to give effect to the contemporary meaning (or
one among competing contemporary meanings) without it being that
interpreter’s personal preference. Therefore, to the extent that judges
are influenced by popular (though contested) understandings of the
Constitution, Fish’s assertion that the intention of the author is “[t]he
only object of interpretation that makes it a rational activity rather
than a free-for-all”139 is rendered false. And without that premise, his
insistence that “[a]n interpreter cannot disregard [the author’s] intention and still be said to be interpreting” is just ipse dixit.140
One could try to rehabilitate intentionalism in the face of this
particular challenge (but not against the arguments advanced in the
previous subsection) by contending that the interpretive community
(although not individual interpreters) is, in some sense, the author of
the interpreted text. Because some constitutional provisions are
widely understood to mean something different from what their original authors intended (whether the authors are understood as framers
or as ratifiers), we might explain that change on the grounds that,
once a nonintentionalist meaning becomes sufficiently widely and
strongly held, it amounts to the substitute of a new text for the old
one. This is a counterintuitive idea, for in the most obvious sense, the
text has not changed. But, Knapp and Michaels might say, it all
depends on what you mean by “text.” A “text” can “mean a string of
139

Fish, supra note 104, at 1138 n.98 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1122. To this, the intentionalist might reply that even if some interpreters (like
judges) might possibly be searching for the understandings of a text held by some other
community of interpreters, members of that community must themselves be searching for
some meanings, and those meanings cannot be contemporary meanings without circularity.
And if the members of the community whose understandings judges seek are themselves
aiming for the originally intended meanings, then, even if judicial interpreters can possibly
be searching for popular understanding, they are properly described as searching for
beliefs about intentionalist meanings. On this account, intentionalist meanings remain
essential, though they are filtered, or provide meaning at one remove. See, e.g., Campos,
supra note 107, at 391–92.
This argument fails, for nonjudicial interpreters might not be searching for original
meanings, let alone original intentions about meaning. They might, e.g., be self-consciously
constructing meaning. Or they might naively believe that language “just has” meaning. Or
they might be searching for what a contemporary community with which they affiliate or
identify takes the Constitution to mean. In short, the community need not have a theory at
all. They might have only customs and patterns of practice. “I know it when I see it”
might make for bad constitutional doctrine but need not be a false description of how
ordinary people evaluate a proffered interpretation of a text’s meaning.
140
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signifiers (just the marks without their meanings) [or] a string of signs
(the marks and their meanings combined).”141 It is in the first sense
that the text has not changed. In the second sense, it may well have.
And if so, the community that has changed the meanings that attach
to the constitutional signifiers has created a new text (in the second
sense). Of course, because the change in signs occurred while the signifiers remained constant, and because even the change in signs is
likely to occur slowly over time by imperceptible increments (much as
a person grows old or goes bald), we will probably be unable to identify the moment at which the new text is authored. But it is unclear
why that fact should be dispositive. Indeed, I think it possible that
Knapp and Michaels might try to save intentionalism against this
worry by relocating the author from the text’s initial writers and
ratifiers to later interpretive communities.142
I am skeptical that this is a felicitous conceptualization. I am disposed to think that nonintentionalists have the more perspicuous
account of how constitutional meaning changes and how searches for
such changed meaning qualify as the “rational activity” of interpretation. But I needn’t engage that battle here. My beef is with
Originalism, not with intentionalism. Even assuming arguendo that
intentionalism could be preserved by recasting contemporary publics
as the authors of new texts, the cost would be to sacrifice Originalism.
B. The Entailments of Authority
Given the failure of intentionalism, the question becomes why
judicial constitutional interpreters should not engage in the “rational
activity” of seeking a meaning affected by post-ratification developments. Enter now the arguments grounded in the nature of constitutionalism. Like the intentionalists’ arguments about the concepts of
meaning or of interpretation, these are arguments for hard
Originalism. Unlike the former, though, they do not depend upon the
meaning of “meaning” or the meaning of “interpretation” generally,
but upon the interpretation of specifically legal texts, and (in some
tellings) of constitutions in particular. On this view, to treat a consti141

Knapp & Michaels, supra note 108, at 666 n.37.
See id. at 667 (“Legal texts are often the products of multiple stages of drafting and
ratification, not to mention the revision that some say occurs in judicial review. But
nothing in the logic of interpretation itself can tell us which of those stages should count as
the one that confers on the text the meaning we are trying to interpret when we try to obey
the law or to adjudicate it.”). I don’t see any obvious basis for allowing judicial decisions
purporting to interpret the Constitution to count as a re-authoring of the text while categorically excluding purported constitutional interpretations that occur outside the courts—
whether in the halls of Congress, the op-ed pages of the nation’s newspapers, or the coffee
shops and Internet chatrooms frequented by the American public. See supra Part I.C.5.
142
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tution as binding or authoritative entails that what we treat as binding
is the original meaning. It is the original meaning of the Constitution
that confers upon the Constitution its authoritative character, the fact
that we take ourselves to be bound by it. This is among the most
elusive of the arguments for Originalism and needs the most fleshing
out.143
1. Whittington and Writtenness
The most sophisticated and influential argument along these lines
has been presented by Keith Whittington. In its basic and familiar
form, Whittington explains, the claim from authority “is that the practice of judicial review derives from the Court’s claim to be enforcing
the supreme law of the sovereign people, which in turn requires an
originalist approach.”144 Unfortunately, he (rightly) observes, most
originalists who have advanced this view have done so as mere assertion, not as argument.
In order to establish the persuasiveness of this justificatory argument, however, its advocates must be able to demonstrate that the
enforcement of the Constitution as supreme law of the sovereign
people requires an originalist interpretive method. In emphasizing
that the enforcement of the Constitution as written requires the
enforcement of the original intentions of those who wrote it, the
originalists have largely begged the question of whether the two are
in fact linked.145

According to Whittington, that link is supplied by textualism or by the
writtenness of the Constitution.
Precisely why the writtenness of the Constitution dictates
Originalist interpretation is not obvious. Originalists had placed
heavy weight on writtenness long before Whittington.146 But, as
others have observed, they overwhelmingly tended to simply assume
or to assert a false equivalence between the bindingness of “the con143 Arguments from authority often appear intermingled with arguments from legitimacy. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 4, pts. 1–3; Kay, supra note 15, at 228, 232–34. Little
needs to be said about the legitimacy-based arguments. If sociological legitimacy is at
issue, then whether non-originalist interpretation enjoys legitimacy, and how much, are
empirical questions—in fact, empirical questions the answers to which originalist scholarship does more to (try to?) effect than to resolve. If the theorists mean that non-originalist
interpretation lacks normative legitimacy then it is a conclusion, not an argument. Presumably, the argument that would support such a conclusion sounds in authority, good consequences, or some combination of the two.
144 WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 46.
145 Id.
146 Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1984).
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stitutional text” and the bindingness of “the original understanding of
the constitutional text.”147
In Whittington’s telling, however, the equivalence depends on
“three broad and interrelated arguments.” Somewhat simplified, they
are: (1) that the newly independent Americans were self-consciously
reacting against a British tradition seen to poorly protect liberty precisely because the limits on governmental authority were unwritten
and therefore weak and unstable; (2) that a clear text was thought
necessary to enable the courts to enforce the Constitution as law; and
(3) that writings, especially legal writings, are frequently employed to
convey authorial intent. It follows from these arguments, Whittington
concludes, that “a written constitution requires an originalist interpretation.”148 Put another way, written constitutionalism “entails
originalism.”149 Like the defense of Originalism built on the concept
of interpretation, then, the argument from authority treats
Originalism as inescapable—so long as we treat the Constitution as
authoritative.150 Whittington’s originalism is hard and strong.151
I do not believe that Whittington’s arguments, alone or in combination, support strong originalism. To see why they do not, we need
not go beyond Whittington himself. For if he is the best expositor and
defender of the authority-based argument for Originalism, he is also
the author of an especially clear and persuasive rebuttal.
After presenting his subtle argument that to treat our written
Constitution as binding demands “an originalist judiciary,”
Whittington promptly acknowledges that “[t]he originalist approach is
not the only possible conception of the significance of a written
text.”152 In particular, “the nature of the constitutional text can be
147

GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 77.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 50.
149 Id. at 49.
150 Whittington also provides extensive argument, grounded in the nature of popular
sovereignty, to support the proposition that we should treat the Constitution as binding.
See id. at 128–35. For the most part, we can safely put that aspect of his argument aside,
careful and illuminating as it is, because no parties to the academic or judicial debate seem
to disagree. See, e.g., GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 74–75; Larry Simon, The Authority of
the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 606 (1985). What does warrant mention, however, is the conclusion to
Whittington’s analysis, where he moves from arguing that respect for popular sovereignty
justifies our treating the Constitution as authoritative to contending that it also requires
originalism as the proper method of constitutional interpretation. See WHITTINGTON,
supra note 14, at 152–59. I discuss that argument infra Part III.A.1.
151 See also, e.g., Barnett, supra note 4, at 636 (“We are bound [to respect the original
meaning of the Constitution] because we today . . . profess our commitment to a written
constitution, and original meaning interpretation follows inexorably from that
commitment.”).
152 WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 61.
148
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conceived of as a fixed referent for political debate, a promissory note,
or as essentially indeterminate.”153 Although each of these possibilities is interesting and repays attention, the first alone suffices to show
that Whittington’s argument for Originalism fails.
The vision of a written constitution as a fixed referent for political
debate, and thus not as a document demanding originalist interpretation, starts from premises that are hard to controvert. Far from being
“simply a supreme legal guidebook addressed to judges,” Whittington
observes, the U.S. Constitution is “essentially political.” Specifically,
“[t]he citizenry necessarily formulate their own interpretations of the
document and apply those understandings in their own political activities.” Conceived politically,
the constitutional text does not stress any reference to the original
intent of the framers or recourse to the judges whom the originalists
charge with discovering and applying that intent. As a political
referent, the primary value of the written Constitution is not that its
terms are fixed for judicial inquiry but that they are universally
known, readily available to the average citizen [who can be mobilized to employ those terms in political debate].
....
. . . Having reduced political principles to writing, the founders
provided relatively clear guidelines for normal political practice. . . .
The letters of the document became living through their constant use in normal political discourse . . . . Becoming so ingrained in
the political community, however, the text also loses its particular
meaning. It can be appropriated for divergent and alien purposes,
for the functioning of a political symbol rests on its utility in gaining
support and inspiring action, not on its accuracy to historical detail.
As the text is carried forth by many hands and into many debates,
competence and inclination to elucidate original intentions decline.
The Constitution ceases to be a means of communicating between
the founders and the government and becomes a means by which
the current citizenry communicate among themselves.154

I take as plausible and attractive this “political referent” picture
of how we could accord significance to the writtenness of our
Constitution without demanding judicial Originalism. To be sure, this
account does not by itself dictate what interpretive posture judges
should adopt. But if we conceive of the judge as a participant in this
national discussion, albeit one with a particularized role, we might
suppose that she should be armed with a large toolbox and possess the
wisdom and good judgment to deploy her tools with sensitivity to vari153
154

Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 62–65.
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ations in issue and context. Sometimes she might play a stabilizing or
constraining function by tethering her interpretation of constitutional
meaning to original understandings; sometimes she should act in
accordance with what she deems compelling demands of political justice; and sometimes she should, as would a good sports referee, just let
the contending forces “play on” by deferring to whatever meaning
comes to achieve widespread and stable popular acceptance.
Although Whittington does not expressly contemplate the vision
of appropriate constitutional judging that I have just sketched, he
does, as I have said, provide a fully imagined and sympathetic picture
of the “political referent” conception of a written constitution from
which my non-originalist vision is itself derived. Given that possible
conception, and given the evident compatibility between that conception and judicial non-originalism, what about the writtenness of our
Constitution compels Originalism?
Whittington’s answer is brief: “The idea of the constitutional text
as a fixed referent in the general political discourse is . . . easily assimilated into originalism” by recognizing that “different interpretive
strategies [are] appropriate to different constitutional interpreters.”
Thus is introduced Whittington’s well-known distinction between
“constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction.” The
former is undertaken by judges and must be Originalist; the latter is a
political activity and is limited only by its “dependen[ce] on a fixed
text that can carry only a limited range of meanings.”155
The problem with this response is not that it’s wrong, precisely—
not, in other words, that Originalism is incapable of coexisting with a
conception of the text that serves as political referent for nonoriginalist extrajudicial constitutional discourse. The problem is that
it’s inadequate to the task that Whittington (properly) sets for himself.
The burden for one who contends “that originalism is required by the
nature of a written constitution”156 is to establish not merely that different proposed functions of writtenness can be “assimilated” into or
“accommodated” by Originalism but that the proposed alternatives
cannot work—that they are incoherent or internally contradictory,
produce absurd consequences, violate moral principles that we
endorse on reflection, or the like. Whittington argues that there not
only is “a right answer to the construction of an interpretive standard
but also that that answer is fixed in the essential forms of the
Constitution and does not change.”157 Unless and until Whittington
155
156
157

Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
Id.
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demonstrates either that it is error to assign a “political referent”
function to the writtenness of our Constitution or that non-originalist
judicial interpretation is incompatible with such an assignation, the
claim that Originalism is “fixed in the essential forms of the Constitution” cannot be maintained. The writtenness of a binding constitution
might support Originalism, but nothing in Whittington’s argument
establishes that it must, nor even that, all things considered, it should.
2. Goldsworthy and the Go-Around
While Whittington grounds Originalism in the authority of the
Constitution, the distinguished Australian constitutional theorist
Jeffrey Goldsworthy sees Originalism as necessarily entailed by the
grant, to a majority or supermajority of the contemporary populace,
of exclusive lawful power to amend the Constitution. Both the
American and Australian Constitutions dictate the methods by which
they can be amended, either stating or strongly implying that the procedures they specify constitute the exclusive method of altering the
constitutional text.158 Originalism, says Goldsworthy, is necessary
to ensure that [the amenders’] authority is not usurped by a small
group of unelected judges, who are authorised only to interpret the
Constitution and not to change it. It is concerned to ensure that if
the Constitution is to be changed, the consent of a majority of the
electors must first be directly and expressly obtained, and not taken
for granted by a presumptuous elite purporting to read their minds
or speak on their behalf.159

Non-originalist constitutional interpretation, in short, constitutes an
unlawful evasion, or go-around, of the Constitution’s grant of an
exclusive power to others. Originalism, on this view, is not only
legally clear but also “morally compelling.”160
Notice that the concept of authority marshaled by Goldsworthy is
wholly different from that relied upon by Whittington: Here it means
not bindingness (of the Constitution itself) but prerogatives (of the
contemporary amenders). But however the argument is most
158 Compare AUSTL. CONST. ch. VIII, § 128 (“The Constitution shall not be altered
except in the following manner . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. art. V (specifying methods to
propose and ratify amendments, implying but not stating that these methods are
exhaustive).
159 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Century, 24 MELB. U.
L. REV. 677, 683 (2000) [hereinafter Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution]. This is
just the kernel of Goldsworthy’s more elaborate and sophisticated argument. Interested
readers should also consult Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Raz on Constitutional Interpretation, 22
LAW & PHIL. 167 (2003), and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1 (1997).
160 Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution, supra note 159, at 684.
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illuminatingly classified, it runs into this obvious objection: The grant
of an exclusive power to change the constitutional text is logically
compatible with a practice in which the text’s meaning can change
over time. Judicial power to engage in non-originalist constitutional
interpretation is simply not tantamount to a judicial power of textual
amendment.
To be sure, if interpretive norms allowed “interpreters” to give
the constitutional text “any meaning at all,” then it would follow, as
Goldsworthy argues, that the “‘interpreters’ would have unlimited
power to change [constitutional] meaning at any time and in any way
they should please.” And that, we can agree with him, “would be
absurd.”161 But that is simply not our world, by which I mean not only
that it is not how judges act but also that our concept and practice of
interpretation do not sanction the attribution to a text of “any
meaning at all.”
I think that Goldsworthy understands that the rejection of
Originalist interpretation does not logically entail the endorsement of
unbridled creativity under the guise of interpretation and that, in fact,
non-originalists rarely if ever go to what Goldsworthy aptly deems
“the extreme.” Non-originalists, he says,
must agree that a constitution must have some meaning that cannot
be changed except by the prescribed process of amendment. But in
their view, that unchanging meaning has minimal content, stripped
of all evidence of the founders’ intentions and purposes other than
what their words mean according to current rules of written English.
The Constitution can then be interpreted in any way that is consistent with a current standard English dictionary.162

Now, I am no expert on Australian debates over constitutional interpretation. Perhaps Australian non-originalists are as dim as
Goldsworthy makes them out to be. But I think it more likely that
Goldsworthy himself fails to appreciate fully the nature of the constraints under which non-originalists understand themselves to
operate.
Goldsworthy’s basic error, in my view, is to suppose (in his first
sentence) that the only (or even best) way to avoid the absurdity of
allowing constitutional interpretation to be functionally equivalent to
constitutional authorship is to insist that there be some core of constitutional meaning impervious to change. Indeed, that this was a mistake is strongly suggested by the remainder of the passage, for the
conclusion Goldsworthy attributes to his non-originalist opponents—
161
162

Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 685.
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that the Constitution can be validly interpreted in any way so long as
it is consistent with current English usage—does not obey the desideratum or inescapable criterion that he thinks they recognize. That is, to
maintain that contemporary dictionaries supply the sole constraint on
interpretation is to deny, not to affirm, that a constitution must have
some meaning that cannot be changed except by amendment.
Non-originalists escape the “extreme” and “absurd” conclusion
that interpreters (judicial or otherwise) may attribute any meaning at
all to the Constitution, not by trying to isolate some unchanging core
of meaning, but by recognizing (as Part II.A argued) that interpretation is constrained by the argumentative norms of a culture and of a
practice.163 An interpreter who advances a non-originalist interpretation must be prepared to give reasons both for the strength (or relative weakness) of the presumption she accords originalist aspects of
the text (such as its original public meaning and the original intentions
of its drafters or ratifiers) and for the worth of departing from those
original aspects in the given case. Furthermore, these reasons are subject to evaluation, not only on their own terms, but also for consistency across cases. That is, she is answerable to the demand that the
reasons she offers in a given case cohere with the arguments she has
advanced and the results she has reached in other cases. These argumentative norms will be more or less constraining in different times
and places. But nowhere are they so lax as to afford non-originalist
interpreters anything close to the breadth of law-influencing authority
they would enjoy were they invested with amendment power. The
value of an exclusive power to amend the constitutional text might be
greater in an Originalist world. But that is very different from
claiming, as Goldsworthy appears to do, that the existence or intelligibility of an exclusive amendment power is threatened by nonoriginalism. That claim, I have just explained, is false.
3. Raz and Reasons
To be sure, that Whittington’s and Goldsworthy’s arguments fail
does not establish that Originalism could not possibly be grounded in
a compelling account of authority. If it’s unclear what such an argu163

This claim is developed further in DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGCALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009). Elsewhere, I
have put forth the tentative view that law in general can be fruitfully conceived of in terms
of practice-constrained argumentation. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and
the Rule of Recognition: Toward a Fourth Theory of Law, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
THE RULE OF RECOGNITION (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., forthcoming 2009).

MENT
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ment would look like, however, we might seek guidance from the
work of the doyen of authority theorists, Joseph Raz.
According to Raz’s famous and influential account, a practical
authority resolves disputes over what to do by issuing a directive that
reflects and preempts the underlying reasons.164 A purported
authority is a real authority if persons subject to the authority would
act in greater conformity with the actual reasons that bear on their
situation by following the authority’s advice than by trying to attend
directly to the underlying reasons. It is a conceptual truth about law,
says Raz, that it claims moral authority over its subjects and is
capable, in principle, of having such authority. Because a directive,
legal or otherwise, can possess authority only derived from the
authority of a person (or persons), it might seem to follow that the
Constitution’s authors have authority, and that the Constitution can
be authoritative, only if we defer to the meaning or message that the
authors intended to convey to us. There is no other way, one might
suppose, for the text to have practical authority.
But Raz himself argues against this conclusion.165 Constitutions
are usually designed to last a long time. Surely the U.S. Constitution
was, and has. People’s foresight, however, is limited. As circumstances change, it is implausible that what the Constitution’s framers
believed or intended could remain authoritative for the contemporary
populace or for the contemporary officials. The Constitution can
retain its practical authority, Raz concludes, only if updated by interpreters who vest the interpreted meanings with their own expertise,
creating authoritative meanings by dint of their own authority.
Larry Alexander considers this possibility of “[a] legal system in
which one group of authorities had the role of choosing the words . . .
of legal norms but a second group then assigned its meaning to the
words” only to dismiss it on the bare grounds that such a system
would be “decidedly weird.”166 Frankly, I wish that he had favored us
with more argument, for his intuition of weirdness might depend,
more than he and his readers realize, on a nuanced understanding of
the word “then.” Dictionaries define the word to connote immediacy
of temporal sequence—“[n]ext in time, space, or order; immediately

164

See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM pt. I (1986).
See generally Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998).
166 Alexander, All or Nothing at All?, supra note 108, at 382. A similar argument
appears in PERRY, supra note 42, at 48.
165
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afterward.”167 So if Alexander is imagining a system in which one
group authors a text and a second group immediately or very shortly
thereafter assigns meaning to that text, then I agree with his verdict of
weirdness. But few would disagree; non-originalists routinely emphasize that courts should presumptively treat original meanings of relatively newly adopted provisions as dispositive.168
So suppose that we replace Alexander’s freighted “then” with
words that do not so strongly connote temporal immediacy. If the
system provides that one group choose the words but a second group,
at some subsequent time, can assign the meanings to those words that
conventions will permit, the weirdness is very far from obvious.
Indeed, the fact that this is the orthodox understanding in some contemporary constitutional regimes—Canada, most conspicuously—suggests that such a system is both intelligible and possibly attractive.169
And the reason why a system like this might prove attractive is not
hard to fathom. As we will discuss shortly, it might sensibly realize a
good balance of stability and flexibility. Allowing a second and
changing group to assign meaning (not just any meaning, mind you) to
the text furthers flexibility, which means that it promotes the likelihood of interpretations that make for substantively good law. But
putting the second group in the position of interpreters of a previously
written text, and not of text-writers, constrains that latter group’s
range of possible choices, thereby promoting stability and
predictability.

167 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 45, at
1793; see also, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 45,
at 2370 (defining “then” as “soon after that : immediately after that”).
168 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 1, at 1105 (“‘[T]ext and original understanding exert the
strongest claims when they are contemporary and thus likely to reflect current values and
beliefs, or simply the expressed will of a current majority . . . .’” (quoting Brest, supra note
24, at 229)); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1537 (1985) (“The strength of
arguments against the Court’s deviating from originalist interpretation of amendments
decreases with the passage of time.”).
169 The highest judicial tribunals in Canada have, since 1930, consistently interpreted
Canada’s Constitution (and, later, its Charter of Rights) as “a living tree capable of growth
and expansion.” Edwards v. Att’y Gen. for Can., [1930] A.C. 124, 136 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Can.); see also Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79, ¶
22 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2004/2004scc79/2004scc79.pdf.
The South African Constitution provides by its own terms that it can be interpreted in
accordance with contemporary international norms. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. II,
§ 39(1). Of course, the judgment “possibly attractive” is intended to withhold a verdict.
For sober criticism of the Canadian jurisprudence, see generally Grant Huscroft, A Constitutional “Work in Progress”? The Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation, 23
SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 413 (2004).

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\84-1\NYU101.txt

April 2009]

unknown

Seq: 69

20-MAR-09

ORIGINALISM IS BUNK

11:16

69

III
SOFT ORIGINALISM
Thus far, we have investigated just two of the many arguments for
strong originalism—intentionalism and arguments from authority. We
have yet to reach some of the most familiar—those sounding in
democracy and popular sovereignty, the rule of law, separation of
powers, predictability, stability, and the cabining of judicial discretion.
Although this list is long, the number of truly discrete arguments is
small, for the overlap among them is large. This Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A briefly considers and rejects efforts to channel some
of these concerns into arguments for hard strong originalism. Part
III.B explains why the laundry list of considerations upon which
originalists rely cannot support the contention that an originalist interpretation will always be preferable to a non-originalist one. That is,
soft strong originalism cannot be defended from an actconsequentialist posture. If, from such a perspective, some form of
moderate originalism will always dominate strong originalism, however, the question remains whether there exists a convincing ruleconsequentialist case for strong originalism. In fact, the oft-voiced
originalist cry that “it takes a theory to beat a theory” can be understood as precisely such a claim. This cry is evaluated, and found
wanting, in Part III.C.
A. Soft Originalism Disguised as Hard Originalism
The arguments that I now aim to assess under the heading of soft
Originalism are frequently couched in hard terms.
1. Democracy and Popular Sovereignty
Judge Bork has insisted that “only the approach of original
understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional
adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”170
Here, democracy (or democratic legitimacy) is thought to undergird
hard strong originalism in much the same way as does, for
Whittington, the bindingness of our written Constitution: Once we
are committed to democracy, strong originalism follows necessarily.
Of course, as I have just stated it, this is mere assertion, not argument. To assess the view intelligently, many details will have to be
filled in. Without focusing too heavily on individual strands, however,
we can profitably distinguish two broad forms of argument. The first,
which I take to be both more common and more easily dismissed, con170

BORK, supra note 20, at 143.
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tends that Originalism is required by that synchronic conception of
democracy that emphasizes rule by the contemporary people. On this
account—which I will call the majoritarian argument—it is impermissible to override the policy preferences of contemporary electoral
majorities unless in furtherance of the will of past (super) majorities.
The second form of argument describes Originalism as entailed by a
diachronic regard for the rule of the sovereign people over time. This
view—which I will call the argument from popular sovereignty—
insists that proper respect for democratic self-governance requires
that courts give effect to embedded constitutional norms, interpreted
in accordance with the understandings of the enacting (super)
majorities.
Although these two versions of the democratic argument for
Originalism have much in common, they are importantly distinct
when presented in their purer and more stylized forms. The fundamental norm of the majoritarian variant is that courts should respect
the will of contemporary majorities. By foregrounding majoritarianism and backgrounding constitutionalism, the norm does not itself
supply affirmative reasons for courts to enforce the Constitution.
Rather, it permits the Constitution to serve as a constraint on
majoritarian preferences—but only when interpreted in accordance
with original meaning. The popular sovereignty variant, in contrast,
foregrounds constitutionalism and backgrounds ordinary majoritarianism. While providing no particular affirmative reason why ordinary
politics should be guided by majoritarian norms, it justifies constitutionalism as a means to effectuate the people’s sovereign will over
time, and it maintains that the sovereign will is respected only through
originalist interpretation. We might say that the majoritarian impulse
generates a negative version of Originalism: It does not provide reasons why, in all cases, the Constitution must be interpreted in an
Originalist vein. Its more modest contention is that contemporary
majoritarian preferences may not be overridden except in accordance
with a superior majoritarian preference—a constitutional norm interpreted in accord with the ratifiers’ intent or understanding. The popular sovereignty impulse generates a positive version of Originalism:
It provides an affirmative reason for Originalist interpretation in all
cases.171
171 Although these arguments frequently appear under the heading of “social contract”
theories, I eschew that term because it is variously deployed to capture each of the two
variants I have now distinguished. Compare, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 1766, 1771
(describing social contractarianism as justification for displacement of legislative action by
unelected judiciary), with R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitu-
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To see the difference more clearly, notice that the majoritarian
argument says nothing about how the courts ought to interpret the
Constitution when not striking down state action reflective of
majoritarian preferences or judgments. So in a case that implicates
the horizontal separation of powers, and thus presents parties on both
sides of the dispute (Congress and the President) who can claim with
some plausibility to be speaking for the people, it is not at all clear
that majoritarianism demands that the courts enforce the Constitution
in an Originalist vein. Similarly, when some law or policy X plainly
does enjoy majoritarian support, it is not clear that majoritarianism
precludes courts from rejecting a constitutional challenge, thus
upholding X, by adopting a non-originalist constitutional interpretation. In contrast, the argument from popular sovereignty dictates
Originalism in each of these sorts of cases.
The two strands or variants of democratic argument thus clarified, it should be plain that a hard argument for strong originalism
cannot plausibly be fashioned from majoritarianism. Very generally,
we might describe democracy as rule by the people.172 But as “the
people” do not rule directly in any large society, their judgments and
preferences can be realized in laws and policies only indirectly. And
the bare concept of democracy contains no specific blueprint for what
the transmission mechanisms should be and how much friction is permissible. Under the American regime, the transmission mechanisms
are complex and the obstacles to populist rule substantial: the simple
fact of representation, bicameralism, the unavailability of popular referenda at the national level, the rejection of citizens’ “right to
instruct” their representatives, enormous disparities of wealth and
access, the electoral college, a massive federal bureaucracy that
includes independent agencies, and others. Though none of these
structures is immune from criticism, few people argue that these elements render our system undemocratic. Democracy is more flexible
than that. As Judge Posner rightly observed: “The question posed by
an originalist versus an activist or pragmatic judiciary is not one of
democracy or no democracy. It may not even be a question of more

tional Theories, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141, 178 & n.248 (2004) (presenting social contractarianism as basis for requirement that original understanding be adhered to).
172 This is a political conception of democracy. The conception of democracy that
Tocqueville emphasized was social—it referred to social conditions, not political institutions. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
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or less democracy . . . . It is a question of the kind of democracy we
want.”173
In short, then, the majoritarian argument for hard strong
originalism—that democracy entails respect for majority rule and that
majority rule can be restricted only in furtherance of an originalist
interpretation—rings false. And the argument isn’t salvaged by introducing the related concept of democratic legitimacy. The American
citizenry might well view non-originalist judicial interpretation as
legitimate.
The argument from popular sovereignty is more complicated but
ultimately no more compelling. To see this, turn, once again, to Keith
Whittington, who presents the argument in its best light. The argument is lengthy, and I cannot capture all its complexity. But reduced
to its core, Whittington’s formulation of the argument from popular
sovereignty is:
By enforcing the original terms of the constitutional contract as
articulated by its authors, an originalist Court ensures that the
efforts of the sovereign are not in vain, that its will is effectuated in
its absence. Self-governance becomes an empty phrase if the intentions of authoritative popular bodies can be disregarded. From
another angle, originalism secures the effectiveness of a future
expression of the popular will. By maintaining the principle that
constitutional meaning is determined by its authors, originalism provides the basis for future constitutional deliberation by the people.
Present and future generations can only expect their own constitutional will to be effectuated if they are willing to give effect to prior
such expressions.174

Considerations of this sort will often constitute powerful reasons for a
court to adopt an originalist interpretation in a given case. But in an
effort to channel these considerations into an argument for
originalism both hard and strong, Whittington overstates his case.
173 Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1990). For a
powerful and nuanced argument that judicial review promotes democracy, properly understood, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 194–221 (2004), in which the author argues that constitutional
adjudication embodies and furthers democratic values by affording each member of the
political community a fair and equal right to participate in rights contestation. See also
Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 14, 25, 28 (1992) (emphasizing Constitution’s political role as public
charter expressing values and terms of political association that democratic citizens could
reasonably accept, and arguing that democratic values are best respected when these fundamental terms of association are contested through public deliberation, not by appeal to
original meanings).
174 WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 156. This argument broadly parallels Goldsworthy’s
argument in supra Part II.B.2.
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To start, Whittington’s quasi-Ackermanian suggestion175 that the
popular sovereign is present when drafting and ratifying constitutional
amendments, but “absen[t]” otherwise, ignores another possibility:
that the sovereign people might also be present in a meaningful sense
that deserves our respect when they debate the proper interpretation
of amendments passed in previous generations. Suppose, for
example, that a substantial majority of the citizenry now understands
a particular century-old constitutional provision, P, to stand for principle X, and that legislatures have adopted laws that are consistent
with X but not with some other candidate interpretation of P, Y.176 If
the ratifiers, now all dead, intended P to mean Y, it is not obvious that
popular sovereignty demands that the judiciary interpret P to mean Y
instead of X. And such a claim would be especially doubtful given the
greatly expanded scope of popular enfranchisement from the
founding to the present.177
Nevertheless, Whittington claims that it is true, and for reasons
both conceptual and consequentialist. But neither persuades, because
each category rests on an overly binary picture of the relevant possibilities. To see that this is so, focus on Whittington’s claim that
“[s]elf-governance becomes an empty phrase if the intentions of
authoritative popular bodies can be disregarded.”178 We can agree
that self-governance requires that the text that the sovereign enacts
into law is treated as legally valid. But the contention that selfgovernance is reduced to “an empty phrase” if the intentions of ratifying bodies are disregarded seems to rest on the uncertain premise
that law necessarily embodies, or is constituted by, the intentions of its
makers.
Furthermore, use of the verb disregard suggests an uncharitable
and, I think, inaccurate picture of the most likely alternatives to
Originalism. “Disregard” has two meanings: to pay no attention to,
175 Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991) (advancing
“dualist” conception of American democracy, pursuant to which “the People” govern only
during periodic moments of “constitutional politics,” with their government governing
during ordinary times).
176 One might be tempted to rejoin that, if a supermajority of Americans both understand P to stand for X, and prefer X to Y, then the supermajority can be expected to
constitutionalize X in the form of a new constitutional amendment, so a judicial refusal to
interpret P to mean X incurs no cost in the currency of popular sovereignty. This is
unsound: A supermajority could favor X to an extent sufficient to implicate democratic
values even if it is not quite large enough or sufficiently well-distributed geographically to
secure a constitutional amendment.
177 This reply to the popular sovereignty/social contractarian argument for Originalism
is developed at greater length in Simon, supra note 168, at 1495–505.
178 See supra quoted text accompanying note 174.
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to ignore; and to fail to pay proper respect or attention to.179 Vanishingly few non-originalists, if any, argue that the intentions of ratifying
bodies should be disregarded in the first sense, i.e., ignored. The most
common non-originalist position, rather, is that other considerations
count in addition to the original public meanings of the constitutional
text and the original intentions of the text’s framers or ratifiers. Presumably, then, Whittington must be contending that non-originalism
disregards the intentions of authoritative bodies in the second sense,
i.e., pays it insufficient respect. Yet we have seen that all nonoriginalism is committed to is that original intentions (or meanings)
need not be accorded conclusive significance in the interpretive enterprise. This being so, Whittington’s argument appears to be that selfgovernance becomes an empty phrase if the intentions of authoritative
bodies are not given conclusive weight, i.e., if they are even sometimes
overridden by competing considerations. And that, in turn, seems to
rest on the view that self-governance is empty, or illusory, if not total.
Yet surely that is too stringent. Consider the non-originalist view that
original intentions are entitled to substantial respect and should be
departed from only for compelling reason and after the passage of
generations. Whatever might be said of other positions that might be
classified as non-originalist, it strikes me as implausible to argue that a
view such as this renders self-governance a nullity.
Whittington’s consequentialist argument for deducing
Originalism from a commitment to popular sovereignty is that present
and future generations can only expect their own constitutional will to
be effectuated if they are willing to give effect to the intentions of
prior ratifying or amending generations. Yet here again, the implicit
picture that Whittington paints is overly dichotomous. A generation
that witnesses, and participates in, a consistent failure to give effect to
the intentions underlying prior constitutional acts might well think it
pointless to take up the project of constitutional amendment itself.180
But what if past meanings and intentions are accorded significant
weight short of conclusiveness? I see no reason to think that a judicial
practice of this sort would cause popular majorities to conclude that it
would be pointless for them to entertain and attempt constitutional
reform, especially if departures from a clear original understanding
garner support only after the passage of long periods of time. After
all, the fact that most of our projects (political and otherwise) face
179

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 45, at

522.
180 That is not the same thing as saying that they will think it pointless to engage in
“constitutional deliberation.” This is essentially the upshot of the first objection I
registered.

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\84-1\NYU101.txt

April 2009]

unknown

ORIGINALISM IS BUNK

Seq: 75

20-MAR-09

11:16

75

uncertain prospects has not bred chronic apathy or inactivity. For
example, many people expend great effort to elect their preferred candidates, even when they know that, as officeholders, those candidates
will effectuate the preferences and values of their constituents and
backers only sometimes, not always. Additionally, it’s not clear that
present supermajorities need much care if a judicial commitment to
enforce original meanings wanes over time. What supermajorities
care most about is entrenching norms against change in the present
and foreseeable future. People discount the future when making most
decisions; it’s not clear why they wouldn’t do so as well when ratifying
and amending constitutions (even if they employ different discount
rates).181
For all these reasons, Whittington’s conclusion—“Given the need
for judicial interpretation of the Constitution, popular sovereignty . . .
dictates the adoption of an originalist method of interpretation”182—is
unwarranted.
2. Rule of Law and Separation of Powers
If the democratic arguments for hard Originalism rest on excessively restrictive visions of what majoritarianism and popular sovereignty require, similar things can be said about recurrent efforts to
ground hard Originalism in the rule of law,183 for the rule of law is
capacious and flexible in much the same way that democracy is.184
Even granting arguendo that some of the values that flesh out the rule
of law ideal—predictability, stability, publicity, prospectivity, procedural regularity, principled adjudication, and the like—are better promoted by judicial adherence to original meaning, that does not entail
that an interpretive posture of, say, moderate originalism is inconsistent with the rule of law. Consider by analogy that, although many
theorists have contended over the years that statutory law promotes
this congeries of values better than common law does, very few would
conclude that a commitment to the rule of law thereby forecloses
common law adjudication.185
The common law likewise contradicts another common
Originalist claim, namely that the principle of separation of powers
181

I am grateful to Peter Smith for this point.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 154.
183 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407, 432
(2003) (reviewing FALLON, supra note 100) (“[P]rominent originalists claim that only
originalism can safeguard the rule of law . . . .”).
184 An excellent analysis of the ideal, and its interrelated themes, is BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
185 For a more extensive reply to rule of law arguments for Originalism, see Simon,
supra note 168, at 1519–35.
182
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compels Originalism because it forbids judges from making law.186 To
start, the idea that non-originalist judicial interpretation necessarily
amounts to lawmaking appears to rest upon the implausible intentionalist tenet that interpretation just is a search for authorial intent.187
But even waiving that objection, the argument rests upon an even
more naive understanding of what separation of powers means. As
Justice Jackson taught, “While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.”188 The idea that lawmaking by judges cannot be squared
with the principle of separation of powers relies, then, upon a brittle
conception of that principle that is inconsistent with our entire
national experience, conspicuously including the rampant lawmaking
engaged in by the executive branch after the demise of the nondelegation doctrine.
The point could be driven home from a different direction. Consider that even originalism’s strongest defenders have acknowledged
that we have never had a resolutely Originalist Supreme Court Justice,
let alone an Originalist Supreme Court.189 If either the rule of law or
the principle of separation of powers requires Originalism, then it
must follow that the United States has never respected the rule of law
or the principle of separation of powers—conclusions that I hope will
strike even Originalists as reductiones. This should come as no surprise, for arguments that strong originalism is entailed by any of these
principles, values, or ideals (or kindred others) routinely rely on the
erroneous assumption that they can be realized only fully or not at all.
They fail to appreciate that an interpretive approach, just like any feature of the system of constitutional governance, can satisfy or embody
these values to greater or lesser degrees.190
To conclude that non-originalism is not incompatible with democracy or popular sovereignty, the rule of law, or separation of powers is
186 See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 23, at 1020 (describing Originalism as “almost selfevidently correct . . . a virtual axiom of our legal-political system, necessary to distinguish
the judicial from the legislative function”).
187 We have seen that this is Graglia’s view. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
So his claim that non-originalist judicial constitutional interpretation violates the principle
of separation of powers is parasitic upon the proposition that nonintentionalist interpretation is self-contradictory.
188 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
189 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 173, at 1381 (discussing Bork’s apparent view of matter);
Scalia, supra note 82, at 852.
190 Cf. Dorf, supra note 17, at 1772 (making same point about Originalist appeals to
“legitimacy”).
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to say that we cannot simply deduce strong originalism from such
premises as that we accept one or another of these principles or
values. It is to say, in other words, that these ideals do not feature
into a hard argument for strong originalism. That does not mean, of
course, that our commitment to ideals such as these has no bearing on
the debate. They might yet support soft strong originalism, on the
supposition that strong originalism would promote the values that
underlie these ideals better than would any alternative.
B. Soft Originalism as Act-Consequentialism
Yes, they might. To assess whether they do, let us start by imagining (as seems actual) that judges are able to select between
originalist and non-originalist interpretations on a case-by-case basis.
On this assumption, soft strong originalism would be vindicated if it
would be preferable, on each occasion, for the judge to adopt the original meaning as her interpretation, either because one of these values
is lexically prior to all others and is always best served by the
originalist interpretation or because, although the ordering of relevant
values is nonlexical, it just so happens that an originalist interpretation
always optimizes their collective realization.
1. A First Pass
I suspect that, once the soft Originalist position is put in this way,
most readers will find it so implausible on its face as to render a painstaking rebuttal unnecessary. But if its implausibility does not strike
you, let me give you a flavor of how the fuller argument would go.
Consider the “democratic” arguments for Originalism. Although,
as we have seen, such arguments take varied forms, perhaps the most
common claim is that originalist interpretations lead to fewer government actions being held unconstitutional than do non-originalist ones,
thereby leaving greater room for policy judgments made by the people
either directly (through referenda) or, more commonly, through their
elected representatives.191 But as an army of commentators
(Originalists conspicuous among them) have pointed out, it’s a contingent question whether an originalist approach will dictate that challenged actions be upheld or struck down.192 In fact, Justices have
191 See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 23, at 1026 (arguing that democracy “is served when
judge-restraining originalism permits the results of the democratic political process to
stand”).
192 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 44 (“[J]udicial restraint . . . may not be
consistent with . . . originalism per se.”); Maltz, supra note 11, at 775 (arguing that abstract
constitutional guarantee of rights and courts’ enforcement of such rights are “two separate
inquiries”).
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often invoked originalist arguments to strike down action that their
colleagues, relying more on non-originalist considerations, have
upheld.193
The same is true about the supposed originalist values of predictability and stability, for original meanings and intentions are often
very far from transparent. Any time some relevant actors (the general
public, legislators, regulated entities, practiced litigators) assume that
constitutional provision P means X, while a careful study of the history might reveal that the original meaning of P was Y, interests in the
predictability of judicial decisions and the stability of the law would be
better served by judicial adoption of the non-originalist
interpretation.194
Indeed, the difficulty of the inquiry that Originalism mandates is
meaningful for another, but related, reason. In praising Chief Justice
Taft’s examination into the original meaning of the presidential
removal power in Myers v. United States,195 Justice Scalia concluded
that “[i]t is easy to understand why this would take almost three years
and seventy pages. . . . [D]one perfectly it might well take thirty years
and 7000 pages.”196 That would be no mark against Originalism if
such resources as time and energy were unlimited. In the real world,
though, a rigorous insistence on fidelity to the original meaning—a
commitment to Originalism, in other words—might well translate into
193 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(invoking purported original understanding of Commerce Clause to strike down congressional legislation, in contrast to dissenters who, emphasizing non-originalist arguments,
would uphold legislation); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same); Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860–61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on purported original
meaning of Confrontation Clause to advocate invalidation of state procedures allowing
testimony of young children in sexual abuse cases by closed-circuit television); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that original understanding of executive power renders Independent Counsel Act unconstitutional); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568–72, 581–83 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (relying on purported original understanding of Tenth Amendment to argue for
striking down congressional legislation that majority upheld); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
946–51, 967–68 (1983) (relying on purported original understanding of presentment,
bicameralism, and separation of powers to strike down one-House veto legislation, over
non-originalist dissent); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 449, 453–54
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (relying on original understanding of Contracts Clause
to contend that state legislation upheld by majority is unconstitutional).
194 Cf. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 116 (1973) (“[J]udicial decisions may in fact be more predictable if the judge is also bound by generally held views of
what is just, even when they are not supported by the letter of the law, than when he is
restricted to deriving his decisions only from those among accepted beliefs which have
found expression in the written law.”).
195 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926).
196 See Scalia, supra note 82, at 852.
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a yet greater reduction in the Supreme Court caseload, which itself
would translate into less clarity and less uniformity in our law.
In sum, even if we focus on just the limited number of values that
Originalists most doggedly invoke, it is false that the originalist interpretation will always dominate all non-originalist interpretations.
2. A Second Pass
But the case for soft strong originalism is even weaker, for we
have thus far ignored Raz’s helpful distinction between merit reasons
and nonmerit reasons for changing a Constitution or for interpreting it
in a particular way. A “merit reason” to interpret a constitutional
provision to mean X bears on the value, or merit, of living under a
Constitution with that meaning. It contrasts with reasons for an interpretation “that do not derive from the good of being subject to” a
norm with that particular meaning.197 The arguments for originalist
interpretation that we have addressed thus far all depend upon
nonmerit reasons: We should interpret provision P to mean X
because that was the original meaning and because following the original meaning promotes, say, predictability or greater latitude for popular sovereignty, not because, all else being equal, meaning X would
be better for the community than would meaning Y.
To be clear, observing that the standard arguments for
Originalism rely on nonmerit reasons is not pejorative; a merit reason
for one interpretation need not outweigh a nonmerit reason against it.
But the observation does suggest an obvious consideration for
choosing not to adhere to the original meaning—namely, that the
non-originalist interpretation Y is supported by merit reasons and that
the balance of merit and nonmerit reasons combined favors interpretation Y. In short, even insofar as an originalist interpretation in a
given case better promotes stability, predictability, and democracy, a
non-originalist interpretation might be substantively better—“better”
not by reference to substantive values that Originalists contest but by
reference to widely accepted values like welfare, preferencesatisfaction, security, liberty, equality, and justice, and even by reference to widely accepted conceptions of these values.
The distinction between merit reasons and nonmerit reasons
lends support to the oft-expressed view that non-originalism better
accommodates the tradeoff between stability and flexibility than
Originalism does,198 for it clarifies the notion that, in some nontrivial
number of cases, originalism produces less good results. In a recent
197
198

Raz, supra note 165, at 174.
See, e.g., GOLDFORD, supra note 14, at 88–89; Raz, supra note 165, at 186.
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article, however, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport challenge
this idea by urging that Originalism can be defended on “pragmatic”
or consequentialist grounds.199 Now, a pragmatic defense is not
entirely novel. It is plausible, I think, that all arguments for soft
originalism are, in essence, pragmatic:200 They rest on the idea that
certain values are better served by Originalism, even if these values
are not the goodness of the particular results reached but rather the
goodness that is realized by virtue of how they are reached. If, as they
claim, McGinnis and Rappaport “have mapped out a new field of
engagement,”201 it is by contending that Originalism produces substantively good decisions, i.e., that the balance of merit reasons supports originalist interpretation.
Put in a very small nutshell, they maintain that constitutional provisions are likely to produce substantively good results when read in
line with their original public meaning because they were enacted
under supermajority voting requirements. Fleshed out in slightly
greater detail, their argument appears to rest heavily on the premises
(1) that all else equal, the substantive goodness of a decision is likely
to be proportional to the size of the majority that endorsed it, and (2)
that ratification of the Constitution, or of a constitutional amendment,
is a (supermajoritarian) decision not merely to enact a rule but to
enact a rule with the meaning that the decisionmakers understood it
to have. For these reasons, perhaps conjoined to others, the consequences of adhering to that rule at some later time are likely to be
particularly good if and only if that rule is construed in accord with its
original meaning.
I suspect that McGinnis and Rappaport oversell the extent to
which the supermajoritarian genesis of the constitutional text con199 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2007).
200 Others have argued that consequences broadly conceived supply the touchstone for
evaluating any theory of legal interpretation. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 173, at 1373,
1379 & n.76; Simon, supra note 150, at 613–14; Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies:
A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2238 (2006). I am disposed to think this is correct
because I think it implausible that any single interpretive approach would be the subject of
a deontological obligation or is entailed by the right understanding of concepts such as law,
meaning, or interpretation. If the claim is true, however, it can only be so if we conceive
the consequences potentially at issue broadly enough to encompass not only the value of
the particular holdings that a given theory reaches (or is likely to reach) but also all the
long-term and indirect effects that different interpretive postures and methods produce.
Moreover, I would hope that a comparative consequentialist evaluation of different interpretive theories could take into account qualities attaching to the act of interpretation
itself—as, for example, whether it exemplifies a judicial virtue or vice. But I am open to
being persuaded otherwise. (I am grateful to David Bernard and Ben Zipursky for provoking my doubts on this score.)
201 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 199, at 396.
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duces toward original meanings not only that are substantively good
at the time of ratification but that also remain desirable for generations.202 But the core defect of their pragmatic defense of
Originalism—much like the defect at the heart of Whittington’s argument from authority—runs much deeper: The arguments don’t support the conclusion. Even if we grant McGinnis and Rappaport that
“the passage of entrenchments under supermajority rules would . . .
produce on average good entrenchments,”203 or that “appropriate
supermajority rules tend to produce desirable entrenchments,”204 that
is a country mile from establishing that courts always ought to follow
the original meaning of those entrenchments, which is precisely what
Originalism maintains and what McGinnis and Rappaport expressly
contend.205
Admittedly, the authors are not wholly unaware of this argumentative gap. But to bridge it they offer only the fairly tepid opinion
that, while Originalism is not ideal, “it is likely to have better consequences than competing approaches.”206 Conceivably so. Yet the
argument they supply for this judgment is both dishearteningly brief
and much too heavily focused on the radically ad hoc alternative of
“case-by-case pragmatism.”207 What about, say, the moderate
originalist alternative that judges should abide by the original meaning
except when they are confident that an entrenchment’s original
meaning is quite bad and that a majority of the citizenry shares that
202 Most notably, it seems to me that McGinnis and Rappaport’s interesting analysis
goes more toward establishing (a) that entrenchments are more likely to be good if
adopted via supermajoritarian procedures than if adopted via merely majoritarian procedures, than (b) that the expected consequences of the original meaning are likely to be
better than the expected consequences of some other candidate meaning when measured
at the time of interpretation. Secondly, and independently, I worry that the authors are
insufficiently sensitive to the fact that the 1789 Constitution was ratified as a whole, not
provision by provision. This fact would seem to mitigate very substantially the extent to
which its supermajoritarian passage bears on the goodness of any given part of the text,
making their argument as a whole much less persuasive with respect to judicial interpretation of the articles than with respect to the amendments. Finally, I am not wholly persuaded by the authors’ efforts, see id. at 394–95, to rebut the objection that the heuristic
value of the supermajoritarian process is diminished by the exclusion of large segments of
the population (most notably women and blacks, but also unpropertied white males) from
participating in the drafting or ratifying of most of the text. Some of these objections, and
others as well, are elaborated in Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-originalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1905 (2007).
203 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 199, at 386 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
205 Id. (explaining that their argument “requires that judges interpret the document
based only on its original meaning”).
206 Id. at 391.
207 Id. at 391 n.37.
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view? Unless and until they comparatively assess this and a multitude
of other possible interpretive approaches, McGinnis and Rappaport
are not entitled to their conclusion. They have shown, at most, only
that adherence to original meaning is likely to produce better and
more just public policy than is sometimes supposed. They have not
made the case for strong originalism.
3. Summary
This Section has observed, following Raz, that there exist both
merit and nonmerit reasons to favor (or disfavor) competing interpretations of the constitutional text. It has argued that, in any given case,
any one of these reasons (or values) might weigh in favor of one or
more non-originalist interpretations against the Originalist interpretation. And it has concluded from this that the balance of reasons will
sometimes favor a non-originalist interpretation. To be sure, it has not
argued that, in the aggregate or over the mine run of cases, nonoriginalist interpretations are likely to serve the range of relevant
values (popular sovereignty, predictability and stability, welfare, justice, etc.) better than do interpretations that adhere to the supposed
original meaning. But that is not to the present point. Recall that the
choice the debate over Originalism presents is not between following
the original understanding always or following it never. It is between
following the original understanding always and following it sometimes (perhaps very often, perhaps not). It seems to follow, then, that
a Supreme Court Justice who is not legally bound to interpret the
Constitution always in accord with its original meaning and is sensitive
to the wide variety of values that large numbers of commentators have
identified as relevant to the choice among competing interpretations
would at least sometimes endorse non-original meanings. She would,
that is, reject strong originalism. Put another way, once we fully
appreciate that genuine alternatives to strong originalism include
interpretive postures that give substantial, albeit not conclusive,
weight to the original meaning, that soft arguments can be mustered
to prefer strong originalism to all positions that fall within moderate
originalism does not seem remotely plausible.
C. Soft Originalism as Rule-Consequentialism
The conclusion of the preceding Section ought not to be controversial once we disabuse ourselves of the hard Originalist contentions
that interpretation just is a search for authorial intent or that
Originalism is entailed by a commitment to the bindingness of the
Constitution. If correct, it suggests that the soft arguments marshaled
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in support of strong originalism are more apt to support something
quite different—perhaps something as ill-defined as the instruction
that judges should “follow original meaning except when the balance
of considerations strongly suggests otherwise.” This is a form of moderate originalism, hence (if you’ll excuse the appearance of contradiction) a form of non-originalism.
The most promising objection to this conclusion challenges the
premise with which the preceding Section started. That premise,
recall, was that judges are free to choose between originalist and nonoriginalist interpretations on a case-by-case basis. But because we are
not (uniformly?) blessed with Solomonic judges, one might conclude
that they ought not be free to select between originalist and nonoriginalist interpretations based only on their views as to what makes
most sense in a particular situation. Instead, the argument would run,
they should proceed by means of an articulable rule; and the form of
moderate originalism just proposed that might be conceded to dominate Originalism is insufficiently rule-like.
Precisely why judicial interpreters of the Constitution should proceed by means of an interpretive rule, and not a standard, is rarely
spelled out with the specificity one might hope for, even if the conviction that they should emerges frequently and clearly enough. The task
of this final Section, accordingly, is to assess whether a convincing case
for that proposition can be maintained. For if it cannot, then we will
be left with the conclusion that some form of moderate originalism
dominates strong originalism, which is enough to vindicate nonoriginalism against Originalism. Very possibly, the position under
scrutiny appears most familiarly in the Originalists’ frequent appeal to
the slogan that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”208 So in considering the rule-consequentialist version of soft Originalism, that’s
where we will start.
1. Does It Take a Theory?
Broadly speaking, we might distinguish two ways to defeat a
theory. Sometimes we do so by offering a competing theory that
looks better by reference to various epistemic criteria. Other times,
however, we attack it, let us say, “directly,” by demonstrating that it
rests on unsound premises or invalid reasoning, or by falsifying it
empirically. In one of the most important sets of astronomical observations, for example, Tycho Brahe observed that the path of the great
comet of 1577, when reconstructed using entirely conventional techniques for constructing planetary orbits from parallax observations,
208

Barnett, supra note 4, at 617; see also Farber, supra note 1, at 1102–03.
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cut through the supposedly solid spheres that defined the planetary
orbits. From these observations, he rightly concluded that the
Ptolemaic model of solid spheres was mistaken—a conclusion that
soon won widespread acceptance—even though Tycho did not then
have a competing theory of the planetary system and in fact rejected
the Copernican theory.209 Closer to home, I suppose that many students of jurisprudence accept Hart’s critique of Austin’s command
theory of law without accepting Hartian positivism and even while
remaining agnostic about any of the presently reigning competitors.210
If the arguments thus far presented against Originalism are persuasive, then that should be enough to defeat it—even without a fully
developed competing theory and, indeed, even without a partially
articulated one.
To be sure, judging is a practical enterprise whereas understanding the solar system or what law is are theoretical inquiries. One
might suppose, therefore, that the fact that astronomers and general
jurisprudents are entitled to reject a candidate theory without
embracing an alternative does not entail that jurists may simply reject
originalism without articulating and defending a substitute. While the
distinction between theoretical and practical endeavors might be
meaningful for other reasons, the conclusion that judges or legal theorists must settle on an interpretive theory or approach rests on a confusion—a confusion that emerges clearly if we attend carefully to
Scalia’s formulation of the “it takes a theory” objection. As Scalia
puts it:
“You can’t beat somebody with nobody.” It is not enough to
demonstrate that the other fellow’s candidate (originalism) is no
good; one must also agree upon another candidate to replace him.
Just as it is not very meaningful for a voter to vote “non-Reagan,” it
is not very helpful to tell a judge to be a “non-originalist.” If the
law is to make any attempt at consistency and predictability, surely
there must be general agreement not only that judges reject one
exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt another.
And it is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the
nonoriginalists as to what this might be.211

A court’s job in a constitutional case is to decide cases agreeably
to the Constitution. In carrying out that responsibility, it is reasonable
to suppose, at least as a first pass, that the Supreme Court must decide
what the Constitution means or which meaning, among plausible candidates, to endorse. In fact, non-originalist Justices typically do select
209
210
211

I am grateful to Larry Laudan for suggesting this example.
I criticize Hart’s account in Berman, supra note 163.
Scalia, supra note 82, at 855.
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a meaning. Or, to be more precise, there is nothing about nonoriginalism qua non-originalism that prevents them from selecting a
meaning.212 What Scalia chastises them for is not selecting or articulating a theory or decision procedure for selecting that meaning.
But why should they be required to do that? The voter (to return
to Scalia’s analogy) need not decide on a test for deciding on a candidate. Admittedly, she could. She could always vote for the Democrat, or for the Republican, or based on alphabetic priority. Yet we’d
not criticize her were she to decide for or against Reagan based on an
all-things-considered judgment that takes into account each candidate’s experience, party affiliation, character, policy proposals, and
many more factors. Indeed, her decisionmaking strategy for all elections could be: Vote for the incumbent unless persuaded, all things
considered, that the challenger would be significantly better. The
moderate originalist is in no worse position than this hypothetical
voter, for it is far from self-evident that constitutional interpreters
need a more determinate and spelled-out theory in selecting meaning
than the voter needs in selecting a candidate.213 Thus, Scalia’s
example actually cuts in precisely the opposite direction of his desired
conclusion.
In short, those who would defend Originalism on the ground that
opponents haven’t proposed something determinate in its stead and
that “it takes a theory” might be confusing the need to select a
meaning with the need to select a protocol for selecting that meaning.
To hope for the latter is human nature; to demand it is simply unreasonable. Understanding what law is is hard. So too is articulating a
fully satisfactory normative account of judicial constitutional interpretation. This is not to gainsay that non-originalists likely would win
greater success in the public square if they could coordinate an interpretive approach better suited to sloganeering. But the point of this
Article is neither to persuade the general public nor to predict the
path of popular attitudes.214 My aim is to persuade a scholarly audi212 The point of this more precise formulation is to recognize that a non-originalist judge
of a more minimalist bent might announce a bottom-line conclusion or might craft implementing judicial doctrine, both without announcing an understanding of constitutional
meaning. Cf. supra note 100 (discussing various carvings of meaning/doctrine distinction).
213 That is not to deny, of course, that the judge must have reasons for her interpretation
and also an obligation to provide them publicly, in her opinion. But one can recognize
considerations as reasons without having endorsed a more comprehensive set of general
principles—a theory—from which those reasons follow.
214 I take no position on whether other works that are designed to persuade a general
audience to reject Originalism are properly criticized for failing to offer a clear, easily
digested alternative. For such a criticism, see Ryan, supra note 86, at 1627, criticizing
recent books by Justice Breyer and by Cass Sunstein on precisely this ground. For recent
ruminations on the Right’s largely successful deployment of Originalism to mobilize con-
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ence—an audience which, even if it can’t correct popular misunderstandings, might at least refrain from exacerbating them.
So, of what am I trying to persuade you? That, once we reject
strong originalism, there can be no plausible and attractive account of
constitutional interpretation that looks more theory-like? No, not
quite. My point here is only to acknowledge that that might be our
fate and, if it is, that we can live with it. On this score, consider the
words of Laurence Tribe:
To prevent th[e] interpretive task from degenerating into the imposition of one’s personal preferences or values under the guise of
constitutional exegesis, one must concede how difficult the task is;
avoid all pretense that it can be reduced to a passive process of discovering rather than constructing an interpretation; and replace
such pretense with a forthright account, incomplete and inconclusive though it might be, of why one deems his or her proposed construction of the text to be worthy of acceptance, in light of the
Constitution as a whole and the history of its interpretation.215

Tribe recognizes that such a posture leaves him exposed “to the
charge that [he has] no genuine ‘theory’ of [his] own (at least no
global, unified theory that can be reduced to a sound bite) defining
precisely how the task of textual interpretation should proceed.” But
he concludes that that might be because no “defensible set of ultimate
‘rules’ exists. Insights and perspectives, yes; rules, no.”216
Of course, Tribe might be wrong. But it is surely worthy of note
that radically nonalgorithmic views of this general sort, sometimes
dubbed “pluralism”217 or “eclecticism,”218 have been put forth by
many of our most sophisticated constitutional thinkers, operating
from diverse points on the political spectrum. As Farber put it:
We may have to be content with an approach to constitutional law
that leaves some room for judicial discretion while attempting to
channel that discretion. In other words, the real problem may not
be that originalism is less desirable than some other global theory of
constitutional law, but that no global theory can work. . . . Perhaps,
in other words, constitutional interpretation is best thought of as an
activity that one can do well or poorly, rather than as an application
of some explicit general theory.
servative politics, see generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006), and Jamal
Greene, Selling Originalism (Sept. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1273640.
215 Tribe, supra note 56, at 71–72.
216 Id. at 72–73.
217 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1753 (1994).
218 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 1787–96.
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....
. . . Purists may be dismayed that this process is so unstructured, but that may simply be the nature of the beast.219

Even Michael McConnell—the law professor turned judge whom
Whittington has called “undoubtedly the most prominent new
originalist”220—approves of some sort of eclecticism (albeit one with a
notably heavy dose of original understanding) when actually rejecting
strong originalism. Denying that “the ‘original understanding’
exhausts the resources available to the interpreter,” McConnell has
elaborated his belief
that the constitutional text, historically understood, has reference to
a slowly evolving, common law understanding of rights, and that the
people who instituted the Constitution expected that their traditional rights and privileges would continue to evolve—not by judicial fiat, but by decentralized processes of legal and cultural
change. . . .
....
All of the various constraints on judicial discretion can be
understood as means of tempering judicial arrogance by forcing
judges to confront, and take into account, the opinions of others—
whether they be the Framers of the Constitution (text and original
understanding), the representatives of the people (the presumption
of constitutionality), the decentralized contributors to longstanding
practice (tradition), or judges in earlier cases (precedent). In hard
cases, these sources of wisdom conflict, and sometimes judges may
have no choice but to allow their own convictions and moral intuitions to guide the selection of which course to follow.221

The mind that craves greater certainty or specificity is apt to be disappointed. But one’s disappointment is not a reliable indicator that the
account is false.
2. Pragmatic Rule-Consequentialism
The upshot so far is that the “it takes a theory” argument for
Originalism fails insofar as it is understood to have logical or conceptual force. Further theorizing might well help us choose among the
vastly many competitors that remain once Originalism is swept away.
But we don’t need any more theory than we already have merely to
reject Originalism, and thus to affirm non-originalism.
Let us not, however, place too much weight on the word theory.
Perhaps what the “it takes a theory” crowd really hungers after is not
219

Farber, supra note 1, at 1103–04.
Whittington, supra note 15, at 608. Of course, I’m claiming that Whittington’s characterization of McConnell is mistaken.
221 McConnell, supra note 69, at 1292.
220
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a theory, but simply a rule—a crisp and clear statement of the proper
object of judicial constitutional interpretation. Of course, Scalia’s
example of the voter who chooses among presidential candidates
demonstrates that we don’t always need to proceed according to rule.
So the challenge for Originalists is to explain why it is of overriding
importance that judges follow the (more or less) sharp-edged rule that
Originalism supplies for selecting among candidates for constitutional
meaning. This final Section considers three distinct arguments that
might seem to furnish what Originalists need.
The first argument is suggested by Justice Scalia’s “[y]ou can’t
beat somebody with nobody” passage quoted above: We need agreement on interpretive approach, and only Originalism offers this. Nonoriginalism fails on this view, not only because it is too amorphous,
but also because its radically nonalgorithmic nature results in a multiplicity of idiosyncratic variations. The problem, in other words, is not
that a hard-to-specify interpretive approach is ipso facto undesirable
but that we are unlikely to reach agreement on hard-to-specify
approaches, and it is the absence of agreement that is undesirable.222
Unfortunately, though, Scalia’s stated reason why agreement
about interpretive methodologies is important—that such agreement
is a necessary precondition for any measure of consistency and predictability—has grounding in neither logic nor experience. The conservative critics of the Warren Court who birthed modern Originalism
were not complaining that Supreme Court decisions were too unpredictable but rather that they realized the majority’s all-too-predictable
liberal political preferences. More generally, predictability is possible
because we can observe judges’ behaviors, thereby allowing us to
attend not only to what they say (about their interpretive theories)
but also to what they do (in resolving concrete cases).
A second and more common view focuses on the need to cabin
judicial discretion to reduce judges’ ability to read their own subjec222 See Scalia, supra note 82, at 862–63 (“[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism
is fundamental and irreparable: the impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.”). As Larry Solum has
pointed out, this analysis betrays a double standard in suggesting that consensus on a single
non-originalist approach is impossible without considering the possibility of achieving consensus on a single Originalist approach. Both are possible; neither is easy. Lawrence B.
Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 334–35 (2008); see also Thomas B.
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism 1 (July 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090282 (noting that proponents of Originalism
assume “that ‘originalism’ represents a single, coherent constitutional theory, against which
are arrayed the disparate non-originalist alternatives”). This double standard is a staple in
the Originalist literature. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 199, at 391 n.36
(defending Originalism in part because “judges of various ideologies cannot be expected to
reach agreement on any alternative method”).
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tive policy preferences into constitutional law. Recall the moderate
originalist, i.e., non-originalist, directive that judges should “follow
original meaning except when the balance of considerations strongly
suggests otherwise.” Without endorsing this approach against all
other non-originalist competitors, I have suggested that it does dominate Originalism. One soft argument for Originalism, then, is that the
“except” clause is just an invitation to unbridled subjectivity.
Over the years, Originalists have represented Originalism’s constraining power in extravagant terms.223 This was always naive.
Given the fragmentariness and contestability of the historical record,
the Originalist judge has substantial discretion, a point at which professional historians have long hammered.224 Few Originalists today
make such breathless claims. Representative of the more measured
approach is Jonathan Macey, who observes that “originalism is not
nearly so determinate as its most vocal proponents would suggest”
and concludes that “originalism is defensible not because it restrains
judges completely, or even well, but because it restrains judges better
than alternative methods of judging.”225 And from this he further
concludes that “originalism is defensible because, despite its myriad
imperfections, it is vastly superior to alternative methods for deciding
constitutional cases in a constitutional system of divided, and separated powers.”226
Now, it is not clear to me whether the originalism that Macey
champions is strong originalism—which fact itself lends support to the
view that unmodified references to “originalism” are best avoided.227
But if it is, it should be obvious that Macey’s second conclusion does
not follow from his first. Because limiting judicial discretion is not the
supreme value of our system, enjoying lexical priority over all others,
223 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 41, at 314–15 (noting that employment of nonoriginalist intepretations “reduces the Constitution to an empty shell into which each
shifting judicial majority pours its own preferences”); BORK, supra note 20, at 155 (“No
other method of constitutional adjudication [besides ‘the approach of original understanding’] can confine courts to a defined sphere of authority . . . .”); SCALIA, supra note
38, at 46 (“The originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them. . . . For
the evolutionist, on the other hand, every question is an open question . . . .”); Rehnquist,
supra note 51, at 698 (“Once we have abandoned the idea that the authority of the courts
to declare laws unconstitutional is somehow tied to the language of the Constitution . . . .
[j]udges [become] . . . a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and
state and federal administrative officers . . . .”).
224 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 72, at 6–7, 340; Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the
Origins of Liberal America, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 628, 632–33 (1987).
225 Macey, supra note 58, at 302, 304.
226 Id. at 302.
227 For a discussion of this view, see supra note 48.
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we cannot conclude that Originalism is all-things-considered superior
from the fact (if true) that it is more constraining of judges.
The third and most interesting possible reason to prefer rule-like
strong originalism to a more standard-like moderate originalism rests
on the perceived inevitability, or at least the substantial likelihood, of
drift or slippage from the announced interpretive method to the
method actually practiced. The cause of slippage should be clear. At
least under present practice, interpretive rules are given by judges to
themselves. There is no authoritative external promulgator or
enforcer of the interpretive rules.228 Therefore, that Originalism produces better consequences on balance than any of its competitors is a
reason for judges (say, the Justices of the Supreme Court) to embrace
Originalism only on the assumption that courts should be guided in
their decisionmaking by the goal of realizing best consequences (by
whatever metric of value the consequences might be measured). But
if judges should be guided by such a goal, then there will, inevitably,
arise cases in which they are quite confident that departing from the
original meaning, on that occasion, would produce better consequences than would following it. And this could be so even when they
account for whatever marginal negative effect nonconformity with the
interpretive rule on the occasion in question might have on future
conformity with the rule, by themselves or by others. In short, the
pragmatic case for Originalism runs up against all the usual objections
to rule-consequentialism.
This might look like an argument against strong originalism. But
on the Originalist argument I have in mind, it amounts to just the
opposite. If strong originalism is, so to speak, the law in the books,
the Originalist admits, it will reduce in practice to some form of (in my
terms) moderate originalism. But if moderate originalism is the law in
the books, the Originalist continues, we should expect it also to
become something else in practice—a weaker moderate originalism,
perhaps, but perhaps mere wish fulfillment or what Fish calls, following Hart, “scorer’s discretion.”229 This final argument for
preaching Originalism even while knowing that it cannot be successfully defended against all forms of non-originalism, then, would be
that the theoretically better alternative of a genuine moderate
originalism—one in which Justices do not believe themselves to be
228 To be sure, Originalists might be trying to create external enforcement by nominating or confirming as Justices only those persons who proclaim fidelity to strong
originalism, or even by threatening to impeach Justices who depart from strong
originalism. Until impeachment on such a basis becomes a genuine weapon, however, the
point in text remains.
229 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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firmly tied to original meaning yet act in accordance with constraints
(even if hard to articulate) that mark out a real difference between the
constitutional law they produce and their personally favored views of
political morality—is not practically attainable. If we want some
checking of pure judicial subjectivity, we need to forcefully avow
strong originalism—we might even need to avow hard strong
originalism—even if we will tolerate, indeed prefer, some unacknowledged departures from such strong medicine.230
This variant of the Noble Lie is, I think, likely the best argument
for the ideology of strong originalism. But we should be skeptical that
it’s good enough.
As Scalia himself insists, “[T]he American people are not
fools.”231 They can see and understand dishonesty. And while most
Americans expect it from members of the political branches, they
probably demand better from the courts. If so, judicial dishonesty
might be especially likely to have a corrosive effect on public acceptance of the judicial role and a corrupting influence on the Justices
themselves.232 Thus does my Originalist colleague Lino Graglia
rightly proclaim “that honesty is the best policy, particularly for public
officials and even more particularly for judges.”233 And many of his
fellow partisans in the interpretive debates claim to agree, for one frequently finds Originalism championed as the theory of integrity, honesty, and candor.234
It is cause for concern, then, how often commentators conclude
that the self-proclaimed Originalists abandon Originalism to advance
what seem to be their political preferences.235 My own favorite examples of this abandonment are the recent affirmative action cases
Grutter and Gratz, along with the Court’s rejection, in Seattle School
District, of any effort to take account of race in student assignment
230 A position of this sort is loosely suggested by arguments in Gary Lawson, A Farewell
to Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 893, 897–903 (1997).
231 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232 Macey, supra note 58, at 304 (emphasizing indeterminacy of originalism and
acknowledging that “there is something much worse about willful originalism than other
sorts of outcome-oriented judging . . . because other sorts of outcome-oriented judging are
more honest”).
233 Graglia, supra note 23, at 1031.
234 See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 29, at 286–87 (“Integrity characterizes a judicial process
based on originalism and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives. Many
proponents of originalism bemoan the discrepancy between what the Court does—and
what its nonoriginalist cheerleaders urge it to do—and what it says it does. The originalists
urge upon the Court the simple virtue of candor.”).
235 Several examples are provided in William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven
Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1229–32 (2002).
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plans.236 While Justice Scalia proclaimed that “the Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race,”237 Justice
Thomas quoted and requoted the first Justice Harlan’s famous declaration that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.”238 Yet the basis for
these assertions was and is mysterious—at least for an announced
(and proselytizing) Originalist. Not only does the constitutional text
say no such thing, making it radically implausible to suppose that “no
racial classifications at all” was the original public meaning, but the
best evidence of the original intentions is that the framers did not
intend to constitutionalize a principle of strict colorblindness.239
To be sure, this needn’t stop living constitutionalists from
embracing colorblindness as a constitutional principle. But it should
be a massive impediment—indeed an insurmountable one—for
Thomas and Scalia. Perhaps Thomas and Scalia’s refusal to sanction
any race-based affirmative action policies simply illustrates what
Scalia admits is his own faintheartedness. But less charitable characterizations also spring to mind. This is hardly an isolated example. I
reckon that relatively few Court-watchers would be much surprised by
the conclusion of one recent empirical study that “Justices might
speak about following an ‘originalist’ jurisprudence, but they only
appear to do so when arguments about text and intent coincide with
the ideological position that they prefer.”240
Admittedly, past performance is no guarantee of future results.
But it generally is the best single predictor. Agreeing with Judge
Posner that “[o]riginalism is the legal profession’s orthodox mode of
236 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768–88
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–49 (2003) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 349–78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
237 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238 Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Seattle Sch. Dist.,
127 S. Ct. at 2782, 2787–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
239 See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 82 (1992) (“Bingham’s
preference—shared by the Thirty-ninth Congress and by most of our government authorities, most of the time since—was to retain the discretion to discriminate by race as appropriate.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 430–31 (1997) (providing
examples of Reconstruction Era federal statutes that made special provision for “colored”
poor and for “colored” soldiers and sailors); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 789 (1985) (noting
that “[t]he contemporaneous creation of the race-conscious Freedman’s Bureau programs
and the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment illuminates the amendment’s meaning” as allowing
race-conscious policies).
240 Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 113, 133 (2002) (describing authors’ conclusion after analyzing 895 cases over
eight Supreme Court terms from 1979 through 1994).
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justification,” Originalist Lillian BeVier urges that “the Court should
align its practice with its preaching.”241 But both armchair theorizing
and empirical investigation suggest that the practice is unlikely ever to
accord with Originalist dogma. If so, BeVier might have things backward: The virtue of candor would be better served were the Court to
align its preaching with its practice.
CONCLUSION
Any evaluation of contemporary originalism should start by confronting a modest puzzle: While many commentators believe that the
truth of originalism is the subject of live controversy, a comparable
number bemoan that originalism means so many different things that
no single meaning can be nonarbitrarily isolated. Is one of these views
false? And if not, how can we square the ambiguity of the term
originalism with the sense that it refers to some matter of genuine
debate?
This Article has observed that contemporary originalists do disagree among themselves over more aspects of their creed than is generally recognized: not only over which particular feature of the
Constitution’s original character demands fidelity (framers’ intent,
ratifiers’ understanding, public meaning, or the like), but also over the
nature of the reasons why such fidelity is required and over whether
the obligation of fidelity they recognize binds unelected judges alone
or citizens, legislators, and executive officials as well. But, it has
argued, on at least one dimension of potential variability—what I
have called the dimension of strength—self-professed originalists are
largely united: They believe that those interpreters who ought to
follow some aspect of a ratified provision’s original character (regardless of whether that set be limited to judges) ought to give that original aspect priority over any other consideration. When the original
meaning (or intent, or understanding, or the like) is discernible (to
some generally unspecified subjective confidence level), courts (and
possibly other interpreters too) must always follow it when purporting
to engage in constitutional interpretation, with the sole exception (for
some) that judges may act lawfully in continuing to abide by “wrong”
judicial precedents. In short, the form of originalism that is most vigorously contested by self-professed originalists and their critics (the
nonorignalists)—the form that answers to the descriptions
“originalism proper,” or “originalism unmodified,” or, for economy of
241 BeVier, supra note 29, at 287 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245
(1995)).
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exposition, “Originalism”—is strong originalism (with or without an
exception for stare decisis).
Originalism of this form is predicated on a wide variety of arguments. This Article has sought to demonstrate that the arguments for
Originalism based on the very nature of interpretation or on what is
entailed by a commitment to binding constitutionalism are fallacious.
As to the pragmatic arguments, however, it has concluded only that
such arguments are to this point woefully underdeveloped and unpersuasive. To be sure, more has been said on both sides of the pragmatic
question and still more could be said. Although I think that the balance of pragmatic arguments is extraordinarily unlikely to support
Originalism, especially given well-grounded skepticism about ruleconsequentialism, I cheerfully acknowledge not to have proven that
Originalism is incapable of being superior to all competitors. I don’t
have an impossibility theorem up my sleeve.
In light of that fact, a final point warrants emphasis. If the arguments of this Article are correct, then Originalism must be grounded,
if at all, on the fact that such an interpretive posture yields better consequences than any alternative.242 Such an argument is necessarily
contingent on contestable judgments of fact and value and is therefore
provisional. Originalism (i.e., strong originalism) must be soft.
Indeed, the most thoughtful of originalists have long recognized this
truth. As Richard Kay observed nearly twenty years ago in a muchcited article, “[t]he outstanding characteristic of original intentions
adjudication, for good or ill, is that it is, compared with the alternative
methods, most likely to produce relatively clear and stable rules for
lawful government activity.”243 But, he acknowledged, that fact, even
if true, provides “merely a counter-weight” to the values that nonoriginalism (in one guise or another) might reasonably be thought to
advance. Whether Originalism is desirable on balance, Kay concluded, therefore
depends on an evaluation of the relative importance of the competing values: the value of flexibility and adaptability on the one
hand, and the value of predictability and stability on the other.
Moreover, in specific cases, these concerns cannot be considered in isolation. How we view their competing advantages will be
influenced by the substantive content of the constitutional rules at
issue, and our regard for the individuals who, as judges, will undertake whatever revisions are allowed. Our enthusiasm for stable
rules will be reduced if we think the rules protected are oppressive
and unfair. Our taste for responsive and up-to-date rules will be
242
243

See supra notes 99 and 200.
Kay, supra note 15, at 288.
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diminished if we know they will be “improved” by people we regard
as ignorant or immoral. Thus the preconstitutional decision [of
what interpretive posture to adopt] must be largely empirical,
depending on facts that may be disputed and it must, therefore, be
only provisional.244

These are wise sentiments. Unfortunately, no reader of the
recent originalism literature can fail to be struck by the extent to
which Kay’s measured assessment of the basis on which Originalism
must be predicated contrasts with the overwhelming (but not universal) tenor of contemporary defenses of Originalism. Seduced by
the false belief that Originalism can be grounded in arguments about
the bare concept of interpretation or about the nature or logical
entailments of binding constitutionalism, democracy, or the rule of
law, too many originalists contend that Originalism follows necessarily
from premises that virtually all participants to the debate accept—
such as that judges should engage in “interpretation” not “making-itall-up” and that we do and should treat the Constitution as binding.
In short, too much Originalism is hard.245 Preaching with the fundamentalist fervor of their frequent political allies,246 Originalists are far
too prone to declaim that “original meaning textualism is the only
244 Id. at 291–92. For a similarly restrained defense of Originalism that appeared at just
about the same time, see Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional
Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 43 (1987). For a non-originalist argument that emphasizes how a clear-eyed assessment of who our judges are, or are likely to be, should bear on
the choice of constitutional theory, see Fallon, supra note 17, at 562–72.
245 Fred Schauer diagnosed this problem a decade ago. Because “nothing about
originalism is obligatory as a matter of language or necessary to the very idea of having
something that we call a constitution,” Schauer explained, “it turns out that we are then
engaged in a range of political, moral, social, and institutional design questions to which
there is more than one answer.” Schauer, supra note 115, at 345. Originalists, he continued, have therefore failed to heed the teachings of legal realism:
[O]ne of the lessons of legal realism is a continuing skepticism about the tendency of legal actors, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to disguise in the language of necessity what are in fact political, social, moral, economic,
philosophical, or policy choices.
Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in the many discussions of
originalism. This tendency is due, in part, to the fall of both the proponents
and opponents of originalism into the trap that the legal realists have warned
us against. Opponents argue that originalism is impossible. Proponents argue
that originalism is necessary. In this continuing battle between impossibility
and necessity there is far less discussion than there ought to be about
originalism as a contingent feature of institutional design, which may or may
not, at certain times and in certain places, based upon certain particular political, moral, and philosophical presuppositions, be desirable.
Id. at 345–46.
246 Cf. Posner, supra note 173, at 1368–69 (criticizing Bork’s defense of Originalism for
its “militance and dogmatism,” and viewing his frequent use of religious imagery as
symptom of desire “to place the issue outside the boundaries of rational debate”).
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method of interpreting the Constitution”;247 or that “originalist interpretivism is not simply one method of interpretation among many—it
is the only method that is suited to discovering the actual meaning of
the relevant text”;248 or that “only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy”;249 or that
Originalism “supplies the one, true interpretive method” and that any
other method is “absurd.”250 That such assertions are obnoxious
would be more easily forgiven were they not, in addition, false.

247

Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1142.
Lawson, supra note 42, at 1250.
249 BORK, supra note 20, at 143.
250 Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
529, 529–31 (1998).
248

